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THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES 

OF 

THE GREAT WAR 



BY 
OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD, Ph.D. 

Professor of European History West Virginia University 



Revised Edition 



NEW YORK 

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 



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Copyright, 1917 

By OLIVER PERRY CHITWOOD 

Copyright, 1918 

By THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY 



41^ 

*>CU5Q0871 

-HI ■ I t 



PEBFACE 

The object of this volume is to narrate briefly 
the direct causes of the European war as they 
are given in the published documents of the bel- 
ligerents. These sources are abundantly ade- 
quate for determining the immediate respon- 
sibility of each nation and apportioning the 
guilt for this great crime. It may be thought 
that, inasmuch as each government in publish- 
ing its official correspondence has tried to con- 
vict its enemies and clear itself and its allies, 
the statements made are so biased as not to be 
accepted as evidence. This, however, is not the 
case. The documents corroborate each other 
sufficiently to show that statements of fact given 
in official despatches by ambassadors to foreign 
ministers and vice versa can usually be accepted 
at face value. The numerous cross-references 
in the published correspondence enable us some- 
times to detect false claims based on the omis- 
sion, misinterpretation, or even the distortion 
of facts. Some discrepancies, however, are ir- 
reducible, and where such occur, the evidence 
presented by both sides is given. 

In Part I, I have not attempted a general dis- 



iv Preface 

cussion of the indirect causes of the war, but 
have only tried to restate some well-known facts 
that constitute the background of the great con- 
flict. 1 Of course, to understand thoroughly the 
causes of the war, we should have to go back 
and explain commercial rivalries, race hatreds, 
and historic enmities. But for the correct plac- 
ing of the responsibility for the conflict, a 
knowledge of remote causes is not so necessary 
as an intimate acquaintance with the imme- 
diate causes. The present generation is not 
altogether to blame for national antipathies. 
Many of them are the heritage of former 
decades and even centuries. Many of them are 
based on groundless fears growing out of the 
condition of anarchy that has always character- 
ized international relations. No country can 
be judged too harshly if she harbors a feeling 
of jealousy toward her neighbor because she 
supposes that the line of her rival's ambition 
crosses the path that Providence has marked 
out for herself. The nation that fans a 

1 In preparing these two chapters, I have made use of sec- 
ondary sources almost exclusively. For fuller reading on 
Part I, the following works are recommended: Europe Since 
1815, by Charles Downer Hazen; The Diplomacy of the War 
of 1914, by Ellery C. Stowell; A Political and Social History 
of Modern Europe, by Carlton J. H. Hayes; The International 
Year Book for 1912 and 1913; The Balkan Wars, by J. G. 
Schurman; European History, by Holt and Chilton; The New 
Map of Europe, by H. A. Gibbons; The Diplomacy of the Great 
War, by A. Bullard; The Diplomatic Background of the War, 
by Charles Seymour. For a brilliant interpretation of these 
facts see The European Anarchy, by G. Lowes Dickenson. 



Preface v 

smoldering feeling of rivalry into an act of 
hostility has the greater sin. 

Besides, the spirit of jealousy was not more 
active in 1914 than it had been in former times. 
Indeed the relations between the rival groups 
was less tense at that time than it was a 
few years earlier. France and Germany had 
settled all of their important differences except 
the Alsace-Lorraine question and it had grown 
too old to figure prominently as a cause of a 
European war. England and Germany had 
also about come to an agreement as to the 
Bagdad railroad, one of the most serious causes 
of dispute between them. They had even been 
negotiating with reference to a joint limitation 
of naval armaments. It is true that no agree- 
ment had been reached but the fact that nego- 
tiations had been carried on shows that an 
amicable settlement of the quarrel was within 
the range of possibility. There is also strong 
evidence in support of the belief that both 
the British and German foreign ministers were 
in favor of a German-English rapprochement. 
Von Jagow, the German foreign minister, de- 
clared on August 4, 1914, that he and the 
chancellor had favored a policy of making 
"friends with Great Britain, and then through 
Great Britain, to get closer to France." Even 
if we should be skeptical as to the sincerity of 
this statement, we have to admit that the Ger- 



vi Preface 

man foreign office for about two years (1912- 
14) kept as its representative in London, Prince 
Lichnowsky, who was unquestionably in favor 
of a friendship between the two Governments. 
His efforts in this direction were cordially re- 
ceived and reciprocated by Sir Edward Grey, 
the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, in 
the opinion of Lichnowsky, was anxious to have 
the differences between his country and Ger- 
many settled just as had been done in the case 
of Anglo-French and Anglo-Eussian disputes. 
That the Balkan question had as yet found no 
satisfactory solution has to be admitted, but the 
powers that had sustained the greatest griev- 
ances in connection with it had accepted, though 
protestingly, the settlement of the treaties of 
London and Bukarest (1913). 

There was then no question facing Europe in 
1914 that a desire for peace and wise diplomacy 
could not solve. It seems evident, therefore, 
that the direct causes of the war are more im- 
portant than the indirect for apportioning the 
guilt of this great crime. The principal imme- 
diate cause of this war was Teutonic aggression 
in the Balkans. This aggression began as early 
as 1878, became dangerous in 1908, and criminal 
in 1914. 2 

All of Parts II and III, except Chapter XIII 

2 S., 1007 ; Lichnowsky Memorandum, Inter. Conciliation, 
No. 127, pp. 33, 130. 



Preface vii 

and a few other pages, has been written entirely 
from the documents given out by the various 
belligerents. The principal collections of of- 
ficial papers used are the following: The 
translations made by the New York Times and 
other documents published by the American 
Association for International Conciliation; 
'Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Out- 
break of the European War, edited by James 
Brown Scott and published under the auspices 
of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace ; Collected Diplomatic Documents Relat- 
ing to the Outbreak of the European War and 
Miscellaneous Correspondence, printed under 
the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Of- 
fice, 1915; the Austro -Hungarian Red Book, 
official English translation; Diplomatic Corre- 
spondence with Belligerent Governments Relat- 
ing to Neutral Rights published by our State 
Department; and supplements to volumes 9 
and 10 of the American Journal of Interna- 
tional Laiv. 

In presenting this digest of the source ma- 
terial on the causes of the war, my aim is not 
to argue the case, but only to give and system- 
atize the evidence — not all the evidence on all 
the points, but only adequate evidence on the 
main points. In this second edition I have been 
able in some cases to make positive statements 
where in the original work I could only express 



viii Preface 

opinions. This has been made possible by the 
recent publication of some documents that were 
not known when the first edition came out last 
year. 

I want to acknowledge my indebtedness to 
Professors Charles Downer Hazen and Carlton 
J. H. Hayes of Columbia University, and Frank 
Maloy Anderson, of Dartmouth College, for the 
very valuable suggestions and criticisms that 
they have kindly offered. My thanks are also 
due to my colleagues, Professor David Dale 
Johnson, of the English department, and Dean 
James M. Callahan, head of the department of 
history, who have read portions of my manu- 
script and have made helpful suggestions and 
criticisms. 

Inasmuch as so many books have already 
been written on the causes of the war, I feel that 
I should offer an explanation, if not an apology, 
for adding to the list even a small volume. My 
only excuse for so doing is the hope that a brief 
work will prove useful to college students and 
others who do not have time to read the fuller 
accounts. My own experience as a teacher of 
current European history has caused me to feel 
the need of such a work. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PART I. SOME INDIRECT CAUSES OF 
THE WAR 

PAGE 

Chapter I. Formation of the Triple Alliance 

and the Triple Entente 3 

The Concert of Europe 4 

The Triple Alliance 10 

The Dual Alliance 10 

Attitude of Great Britain Toward Germany ... 11 

The Bagdad Railroad 12 

Friction Between Great Britain and Members of the 

Dual Alliance 13 

The Triple Entente 18 

Chapter II. Friction Between the Rival Groups 20 

Morocco as a cause of dispute 20 

The German Emperor at Tangier 21 

The Casablanca affair 21 

The Agidir incident 22 

The Near Eastern question 24 

Rise of the Christian States in the Balkans . . 25 

The Bosnian Crisis 30 

The Balkan Wars 34 



PART II. THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF 
THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Chapter III. The Assassination of Francis Ferdi- 
nand 43 



x Table of Contents 

FAGE 

The assassination of the Crown Prince and his wife 

at Sarajevo 43 

Significance of the crime 44 

Attitude of the people and press in Serbia toward 

the crime 44 

Attitude of Austro-Hungarian press 47 

Serbia's delay in instituting trial of Serbian accom- 
plices 49 

Serbian officials implicated in the crime .... 51 



Chapter IV. The Austro-Hungarian Note to 

Serbia 52 

Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia, July 23, 

1914 52 

Surprise of the Entente powers at the nature of the 

demands 52 

Contents of the note 54 

Austria's case against Serbia 55 

Responsibility of Germany for the Austrian note . 61 

The Potsdam Conference 63 

The demands of Austria considered unreasonable by 

Serbia 68 

Opinion of other powers regarding these demands . 69 

Attitude of powers toward isolation of the quarrel 72 

Shortness of the time limit 72 



Chapter V. Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary . 76 

The Austrian note defined as a demarche and not an 

ultimatum 76 

Serbia advised to send a conciliatory reply to Aus- 
trian note by Entente powers 77 

Contents of Serbian note 78 

Opinion of Entente powers regarding Serbian con- 
cessions 83 

Serbian reply not acceptable to Austria-Hungary . 84 



Table of Contents xi 

PAGE 

Diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and 

Serbia broken off 85 

Responsibility for Austro-Serbian war .... 85 

Chapter VI. Efforts to Prevent War .... 86 

The problem confronting European diplomacy . . 86 

Germany's plan for solving it 87 

Joint mediation between Serbia and Austria favored 

by Sir Edward Grey 89 

Italy's plan for preventing war 91 

Austria asked to take a favorable view of Serbian 

reply 94 

Joint mediation between Austria and Serbia pro- 
posed 95 

Direct negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hun- 
gary 96 

Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia . 98 

Chapter VII. Efforts to Isolate the War . . . 102 

A general war not desired by the powers .... 102 
Russia's determination to protect Serbia .... 104 
Russia's dissatisfaction with Austrian assurances as 

to the integrity and independence of Serbia . 106 
Sir Edward Grey's proposal for joint mediation re- 
newed 108 

Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia ac- 
cepted by the former Ill 

Chapter VIII. The War Area Broadens . . . 112 

Russian mobilization 112 

Germany's and Austria-Hungary's declarations of 

war on Russia 117 

France's obligations to Russia 117 

French and German mobilization 118 

Inquiry as to the attitude of France toward a possi- 
ble conflict between Germany and Russia . . 119 



xii Table of Contents 

PAGE 

Germany's declaration of war on France .... 119 
Montenegro enters the war 120 

Chapter IX. Great Britain Declares War on the 

Teutonic Powers 121 

Great Britain interested in Austro- Serbian dispute 

only insofar as it affects the peace of Europe . 121 
Her refusal to join Russia and France in a threat 

against Austria-Hungary 122 

Germany's first bid for British neutrality . . . 124 
Britain's refusal to pledge support to France . . 124 
Anxiety of British foreign minister that the quarrel 

be settled by mediation 125 

Answer of France and Germany as to Belgian neu- 
trality 126 

Germany's effort to secure neutrality of France . . 130 
Germany's second bid for British neutrality . . . 130 
Sir Edward Grey's offer to France of the aid of the 

British navy if French coast is attacked . . . 132 
Belgian neutrality violated by Germany .... 135 
Last interview between the British ambassador and 

the German chancellor 137 

Great Britain at war with Germany and Austria- 
Hungary 140 

Neutrality of Luxemburg violated 140 

Chapter X. The Violation of the Neutrality of 

Belgium 141 

Neutralization of Belgium in 1839 143 

Germany's obligation to uphold neutrality of Bel- 
gium 143 

Belgium's announcement of her neutrality . . . 145 
Germany's request for permission to go through Bel- 
gium 146 

Belgium's refusal 147 

Belgium invaded by German troops 149 



PAGE 
150 



Table of Contents xiii 

Great Britain's offer to aid Belgium in upholding 
her neutrality • • '•',.." 

The charge that Belgium had violated her neutrality 

prior to 1914 15U 

Chapter XL Japan and Turkey Drawn into the 

Conflict 

Entrance of Japan into the war 165 

Entrance of Turkey into the war . • • • • ■ ib0 

Requisition of Turkish warships by British Gov- 

* .... 166 
eminent 

Mobilization by Turkey-her announcement ot a 
policy of neutrality . . . • • • • ■ • V 3 

Two German warships sheltered m the Dardanelles 167 

Terms offered by the Entente for Turkish neu- ^ 
trality ' 

The Capitulations abolished by Ottoman Govern- 

ment .._. 

The closing of the Dardanelles . . • • • • j'* 
Turkish military preparations against Egypt . . -UO 
Sinking of Entente vessels in Odessa harbor by 

Turkish torpedo boats ™ • 

Negotiations with Turkey broken off by the En- ^ 

tente powers 

Chapter XII. Italy Enters the War .... 180 

Peace moves favored by Italy ^1 

Italy's refusal to aid her allies . . . • ; ; . * 
The question of compensation to Italy for Austrian 

invasion of Serbia • • • * 

Italy's request for Austro-Hungarian territory . . 1W 
Immediate transfer of ceded territory demanded by ^ 

Italy iq2 

Terms of Italy's proposal ** 

Austria-Hungary's answer 

Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance . . . W* 



xiv Table of Contents 

PAGE 

Final offer of Austria-Hungary 197 

Italy's declaration of war against her former allies 202 

Chapter XIII. The Lesser Belligerents . . . 203 

Bulgaria's support won by Teutonic allies . . . 205 
Declaration of war against Portugal by the Central 

powers 208 

Entrance of Rumania into the war ...... 209 



PART III. REASONS FOR AMERICA'S EN- 
TRANCE INTO THE WAR 

Chapter XIV. The First Submarine Controversy 213 

Germany's war zone proclamation, February, 1915 . 213 

Controversy over this proclamation 213 

Questions of international law involved .... 214 

The Lusitania case 220 

The facts 220 

Formal notes passed between the American and 

German Governments 221 

Later negotiations 223 

The Arabic case 226 

Chapter XV. Minor Controversies and the Sussex 

Case 228 

The dispute over munitions of war . . . . . . 228 

Protest of the Central powers 228 

Position of our Government 229 

The question of armed merchantmen 232 

Attitude of our State Department 233 

Policy of Germany with reference to armed vessels 233 
Final statement as to position of our Government 234 

The Sussex case 237 

The facts 237 

Germany's defense 237 



Table of Contents xv 

PAGE 

Secretary Lansing's note 239 

Germany's pledge and settlement of the case . . 242 

Chapter XVI. The Final Break 244 

Sentiment in Germany divided as to wisdom of ruth- 
less war 244 

Ambassador Gerard's visit to America .... 245 

Peace notes 246 

Germany cancels all pledges 248 

Our Government breaks relations with that of Ger- 
many 249 

Armed neutrality 253 

A state of war with Germany declared 262 

President Wilson's address before Congress . . 262 

War declared against Austria 262 

Index 263 



A.R.B. .. 
A.R.B. (2 
B.C. (13) 

B.C. (14) 

B.G.B. .. 
B.G.B. (2 
B.W.P. .. 
Col. Doc. 



Dip. Cor. 



F.Y.B. .. 
G.W.B. . 
I.G.B. ... 
Jour. ( 9 ) 

Jour. ( 10 
R.O.B, . . 
R.O.B. (2 
S.B.B. .. 

S. ...... 



. . Austro-Hungarian Red Book (No. 1) 
. .Austro-Hungarian Red Book (No. 2) 

. . British Correspondence, Miscellaneous, No. 

13 (1914) 

. .British Correspondence, Miscellaneous, No. 

14 (1914) 

. . Belgian Grey Book ( No. 1 ) 

. . Belgian Grey Book ( No. 2 ) 

. . British White Paper 

. . Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to 
the Outbreak of the European War, 
printed under the authority of His Majes- 
ty's Stationery Office 

. . Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent 
Governments Relating to Neutral Rights 
and Duties. Department of State. Euro- 
pean War, No. 4 

. . French Yellow Book 

. . German W 7 hite Book 

. .Italian Green Book 

. . Supplement to the American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 9 

. .Ibid., vol. 10 

. . Russian Orange Book ( No. 1 ) 

. .Russian Orange Book (No. 2) 

. . Serbian Blue Book 

. . Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Out- 
break of the European War, edited by 
James Brown Scott and published under 
the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace 



References are to numbers except where page references are 
indicated. 



PART I 

SOME INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE 
WAR 



THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF 
THE GREAT WAR 

CHAPTEE I 

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE, TRIPLE 
ENTENTE 

During the greater part of the first decade 
and a half of the nineteenth century, the great 
powers of Europe were united in an effort to 
curb the imperial ambitions of Napoleon. 
After years of useless war, Napoleon was sent 
to a deserved exile, and the balance of power 
was restored in Europe. A peace congress was 
then held at Vienna (1814—15), and the map of 
Europe was rearranged. Europe was sick of 
war and was anxious for an agreement whereby 
the nations would be forced to keep the peace. 
In November, 1815, therefore, the Allies — Eng- 
land, Prussia, Eussia, and Austria — concluded 
a quadruple alliance, pledging themselves to the 
preservation of "public peace, the tranquillity 
of states, the inviolability of possessions, and 
the faith of treaties.' ' For the next eight years, 
European congresses were held from time to 

3 



4 The Causes of the European War 

time to enforce this policy. France, too, took 
part in these meetings, and so there was in ef- 
fect a sort of league to enforce peace. This 
league included all the great powers of Europe, 
and is known as the Concert of Europe. 

The Concert subsequently declared in favor 
of intervention to put down insurrections in the 
various states of Europe, and carried out this 
policy by sending troops to stamp out revolu- 
tions in Spain and Italy. Great Britain dis- 
sented from this interpretation of the treaty of 
alliance and so dropped out of the Concert. 
Therefore, the Concert, in so far as it rested 
on formal engagements, did not last many 
years. There has been a feeling, however, dur- 
ing the entire century following the Congress of 
Vienna that certain questions are of interest to 
all Europe and should be settled only by joint 
agreement of the powers. Such joint action 
has been taken occasionally, and in a sense the 
Concert of Europe continued until the outbreak 
of the war in 1914. 

This important experiment in international- 
ism was neither a complete success nor an en- 
tire failure,. The great aim of maintaining 
peace in Europe was not realized, but some 
progress toward world peace was probably 
made. Peace conferences were held, and the 
principles of international law were expounded. 
The fact that only four wars (and most of these 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 5 

short ones) were fought between great Euro- 
pean powers during this century-long period is 
evidence in favor of the partial success of this 
peace experiment. 

The Concert might have accomplished its pur- 
poses more completely but for certain mistakes 
made in the early years while it was dominated 
by a reactionary royalist, Prince Metternich. 
During this period it ignored two powerful 
forces — the spirit of nationalism and the spirit 
of liberalism. In some sections of Europe (not- 
ably in Germany, in the Habsburg Empire, and 
in the Italian and Balkan peninsulas) there was 
a growing demand for a change in political 
boundaries in the interest of racial and linguis- 
tic unity; Metternich opposed all these aspira- 
tions and insisted on the maintenance of the 
status quo regardless of national feeling. The 
people all over Europe were clamoring more 
and more for a voice in the government of 
themselves; Metternich^ policy was one of 
rigid adherence to the autocracy of the old 
regime. Thus nationalism was allied with 
liberalism; internationalism, with despotism. 
Nationalism was progressive ; internationalism, 
reactionary. Nationalism was going with the 
current; internationalism was pulling against 
it. Nationalism was supported by patriotism; 
internationalism by pacifism. In the struggle 
between these two ideals, the advantage, though 



6 The Causes of the European War 

not altogether the right, was with nationalism. 
The result was a complete triumph for national- 
ism and the eclipse (temporary it is to be 
hoped) of internationalism. A triumphant, un- 
disciplined nationalism is in large part respon- 
sible for the war of 1914. If internationalism 
had in the beginning joined forces with democ- 
racy instead of autocracy and had made rea- 
sonable concessions to nationalism and thus 
neutralized patriotism, she might have tri- 
umphed instead of her opponent. If such had 
been the result, the summer of 1914 might have 
ushered in an era of world peace instead of one 
of world war. 

The failure of Europe to unite into a success- 
ful permanent league to enforce peace based on 
the principle of a concert of action left the way 
open for the formation of smaller groups based 
on the principle of the balance of power. We 
thus find that early in the twentieth century the 
great European powers were alined into two 
rival groups. Probably as good a starting- 
point as any for the history of these groups is 
the Treaty of Frankfort, signed in 1871. One 
of the provisions of this treaty was that Alsace 
and a part of Lorraine should be ceded to Ger- 
many. The loss of these provinces was a great 
humiliation to France. When the proposed 
treaty was brought before the French assembly 
for ratification, it is said that the members 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 7 

broke down and wept over the clause that com- 
pelled them to sacrifice a portion of their 
country's territory. The French people have 
never allowed this feeling to die out, but on the 
contrary have been nursing it to keep it warm. 
They have regarded Alsace and Lorraine as lost 
provinces, and have kept the statue in Paris 
representing Strasburg (in Alsace) draped in 
mourning. 

Bismarck realized that this feeling would lead 
France into another war with Germany unless 
he could continue to keep the odds against her. 
After 1871 he did not want war; he preferred a 
period of peace for the internal development of 
the newly-created empire. Besides, he thought 
it would not be safe to subject united Germany 
to the strain of another war until the cement 
that held the members of the union together 
had had time to dry. His policy, therefore, was 
to isolate France and thus deprive her of all 
hope of success in a war with Germany. To 
this end he approached Austria and Eussia with 
a view to allying them with Prussia. Since the 
war of 1866, he had maintained a very friendly 
attitude toward Austria. He had also in 1863 
offered the Tsar of Eussia aid in putting down 
the Polish revolt and had thereby won his last- 
ing gratitude. Conditions being thus favorable, 
he was able to bring the rulers of Austria, Ger- 
many, and Eussia together in Berlin (1872) and 



8 The Causes of the European War 

the Three Emperors' League was the result. 
It was not an alliance but apparently an in- 
formal understanding. 

The success and permanence of this league 
was endangered by the rivalry of Austria and 
Eussia in the Balkans. This rivalry became 
acute at the time of the Berlin Congress (1878). 
Eussia had, without the aid of the great powers, 
concluded a successful and righteous war with 
Turkey and forced her to sign the treaty of San 
Stefano. By the terms of this treaty Turkey 
was left with only a strip of territory in Eu- 
rope, and Eussia was put in a favorable position 
with reference to the Balkan states. Great 
Britain and Austria-Hungary protested against 
this settlement of the Balkan question, and a 
European congress was held at Berlin to revise 
the treaty of San Stefano. The decision of the 
powers was a diplomatic victory for Austria- 
Hungary and a defeat for Eussia. Bismarck 
supported Austria-Hungary's demands in the 
congress and thereby strengthened the cordial 
feeling existing between his country and Aus- 
tria-Hungary but at the same time incurred 
the ill will of Eussia. The Three Emperors' 
League now fell into abeyance, and though 
Eussia did not formally withdraw at this time, 
relations between Germany and Eussia were 
strained for a few years. 

Bismarck, feeling that he would have now to 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 9 

count on the possible enmity rather than on 
the friendship of Russia, decided to draw more 
closely to Austria-Hungary. In 1879 Germany 
and Austria formed a defensive alliance against 
Russia. The treaty provided that if "one of 
the two Empires were to be attacked by Russia, 
the two contracting parties are bound to lend 
each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their 
imperial military power, and, subsequently, to 
conclude no peace except conjointly and in 
agreement/ } If one of the contracting parties 
should be attacked by any power other than 
Russia this mutual obligation was to be bind- 
ing only in case the attacking power were "up- 
held by Russia. ' ' x 

Italy became a party to the alliance in 1882. 
To take this step Italy had to suspend a deep- 
seated historic enmity toward Austria, for this 
power had frequently thwarted efforts on the 
part of the Italian people to liberate and unify 
the peninsula. Besides, she still held the 
Italian-speaking districts of Trieste and Trent, 
which Italy coveted. One reason for her tak- 
ing this unnatural step was that she was ambi- 
tious to play the role of a great power and was 
angered at France for having taken Tunis 
(1881), because she had picked out this region 
as a suitable field for Italian occupation. 

i For the whole treaty, see Stowell, The Diplomacy of the 
War of 1914, 540-41. J 



10 The Causes of the European War 

The league of the three powers was known as 
the Triple Alliance. It was made for a definite 
period and has been renewed from time to time. 
Italy did not formally withdraw from it until 
May, 1915. The text of the treaties between 
Italy and the Teutonic powers has never been 
published in full; but, judging from the clauses 
that are known, we infer that these treaties em- 
body substantially the same engagements as 
those of the Austro-German alliance, with addi- 
tional agreements regarding the Balkans. 2 

Bismarck had thus succeeded in his policy of 
isolating France. But this period of isolation 
ended in 1891, when France and Eussia formed 
the Dual Alliance. The terms of the agreement 
have not been made public, but apparently there 
are binding engagements as to joint action in 
certain international situations. In July, 1914, 
the French ambassador at Berlin told Von 
Jagow, German secretary of state, that 
France 's obligations to Eussia were as binding 
as those of Germany to Austria. 3 

The formation of the Triple Alliance and the 
Dual Alliance had divided Europe into two 
hostile camps. Great Britain for a while stood 
aside in isolation, maintaining a policy of neu- 
trality toward both groups. She thus had the 
power of tipping the scales in favor of the side 

2 For the articles that have been published, see p. 182. 
s F. Y. B., 74. 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 11 

to which she might throw her support. There 
were causes of friction between Great Britain 
and members of both groups,, and she might at 
any time give up her position of neutrality and 
identify herself with one side or the other. 

The friendship that Bismarck had cultivated 
between Germany and Great Britain began to 
wane in the 'nineties. The Conservative party, 
which ruled England from 1895 to 1905, favored 
imperialism and a strong foreign policy. In 
the meantime, Germany too had entered upon a 
policy of industrial development and colonial 
expansion. As a result of these imperialistic 
ambitions a feeling arose in both countries that 
the interests of Germany conflicted with those 
of Britain. Jealousy and suspicion now took 
the place of the friendship and confidence that 
formerly existed between these two great kin- 
dred peoples. It was thought by many Eng- 
lishmen that Germany had "an ambition to de- 
prive their country of her maritime supremacy 
and to rule the world. ' ' On the other hand, the 
charge was made in Germany that England was 
trying to isolate her and thus prevent her from 
playing an important part in world politics. 
These unsatisfactory relations were aggravated 
by Germany's attitude toward the Boer 
struggle with the British (1899-1902). "The 
British were especially aroused by the more or 
less open favor and sympathy which the em- 



12 The Causes of the European War 

peror and official classes of Germany showed to 
the Boers." 4 

In addition to this general feeling of distrust, 
there were specific instances of friction between 
these two great powers. One important con- 
troversy was that over the Bagdad Bailroad, 
the construction of which was in line with Ger- 
many's ambition to extend her influence over 
Turkey. Germany began her policy of 
economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire 
about 1875, at which time the Anatolian rail- 
road from Scutari (opposite Constantinople) to 
Konia was built for the Turkish Government 
by German engineers. This road afterwards 
came into the possession of a German corpora- 
tion, and in 1899 Emperor William II obtained 
from the Sultan permission to extend it through 
Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. Along with the 
railroad franchise there went the privilege of 
building branch roads, and broad mining, irri- 
gation, and other concessions. 

Germany's avowed purpose was economic, 
the desire to develop the rich natural resources 
of Mesopotamia to the advantage of both 
this neglected district and Germany. It is 
more than likely, however, that her aims were 
political as well as economic. If her plan were 
realized, she would have convenient bases for 

* Hayes, Political and Social History of Modem Europe, II, 
699-700. 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 13 

propaganda against Egypt and India in time 
of peace and of attack in time of war. 

It is no wonder, therefore, that British public 
opinion took affiright and British statesman- 
ship determined to thwart the scheme. The 
classes in England and Eussia engaged in com- 
merce and shipping on the Tigris Eiver con- 
tended that the economic interests of their re- 
spective countries would be menaced. The 
patriots in England feared for the safety of the 
empire. The result was that Great Britain 
determined to shut off the road from the Per- 
sian Gulf. 

The only suitable terminus for the road was 
in the little principality of Koweit, the ruler 
of which was virtually independent of Turkey. 
In 1899 England signed a secret treaty with 
the Sheik of Koweit, pledging him protection 
on condition that he would not dispose of any 
of his territory without the consent of the 
English Government. Great Britain also 
signed an agreement with Eussia in 1907 where- 
by protectorates over southern and northern 
Persia were established by these two countries 
respectively. In this way the Bagdad Eailroad 
was shut off not only from the Persian Gulf 
but also from central Asia. 

The result was very unfortunate for the re- 
lations between Germany and England. The 
German people were aroused to renewed bitter- 



14 The Causes of the European War 

ness against Great Britain which country, they 
considered, had prevented the success of an im- 
portant business venture purely out of jealousy 
and ill will. 

Germany, however, persisted in her plan and 
a few years later succeeded in getting the con- 
sent of both Eussia and Great Britain to the 
completion of the railroad. Russia agreed to 
give up her opposition by an understanding ar- 
rived at in 1911, and Great Britain by one that 
had been negotiated, though not consummated, 
just prior to the outbreak of the war in 1914. 
Thus just on the eve of the Great War, England 
and Germany had virtually settled amicably 
one important cause of difference between them. 

Another cause of friction between England 
and Germany was "the rapid development of 
Germany's naval power.' ' Emperor William 
thought that Germany 's future lay on the ocean, 
and the imperial navy under his fostering care 
had been growing rapidly. This increase in the 
German navy made it necessary for England to 
build more ships. For Britain must maintain 
her naval superiority if she is to keep in touch 
with her colonies and thereby hold her empire 
together. Besides, if Great Britain should lose 
control of the sea, her enemy could starve her 
into submission in a few months. Self-preser- 
vation, therefore, demands that the island king- 
dom must remain as strong on the water as any 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 15 

two combined powers. Thus, when Germany 
began to build up a strong navy,, there was 
placed upon the British Government a heavy 
burden, if she were to continue to "rule the 
waves.' ' Besides, there was present the con- 
stant expectation and fear that Germany was 
preparing to contest Britain's control of the 
sea. 

Such a situation could be remedied only by an 
understanding between the two powers provid- 
ing for joint limitation of naval armaments. 
Britain proposed such an agreement but the 
suggestion was flatly declined in 1911 by the 
German chancellor. Next year, however, nego- 
tiations were started looking to an agreement 
on this important point of dispute. An under- 
standing could not be reached, owing to the un- 
reasonable demands made by the German Gov- 
ernment, and so the efforts to form a treaty of 
friendship between the two powers failed. 5 

Great Britain's relations with the rivals of 
the Triple Alliance had also been characterized 
by friction. She had for a long time opposed 
Eussia's ambitions in the Balkans. Russian 
and British interests had also clashed in Persia, 
Afghanistan, and China. Russia had joined 
France in the Dual Alliance largely on account 
of England's opposition to her, and Great 

s N. Y. Times, June 2, 1918; Pub. of Amer. Asso. for Con- 
ciliation, No. 127, 168-172. 



16 The Causes of the European War 

Britain had Allied herself with Japan because 
of the fear of Russian aggression in the far 
East. 

Great Britain and France were also still 
rivals at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Conflicting ambitions as to certain parts of 
Africa were the main cause of friction. In 1879 
they had intervened jointly in Egypt in the in- 
terest of English and French creditors. When 
a rebellion broke out in 1882, France declined to 
aid Great Britain in its suppression. The latter 
was thus left in sole control of the country, 
though France objected to Britain's position 
in the province. Later (1898), the Egyptian 
Sudan was brought under the authority of the 
English Government. Britain's progress south- 
ward conflicted with the ambition of France to 
expand eastward from the Congo. France de- 
sired to control the whole Sudan from the west- 
ern coast to the Abyssinian region in the east. 
In furtherance of this plan, Captain Marchand 
in 1898 led an expedition from the French 
Congo eastward and took possession of a little 
island, Fashoda, in the upper Nile region. As 
Fashoda was in territory that Great Britain 
had staked off for herself, its occupation by the 
French aroused great excitement among the 
English people. General Kitchener was sent 
south from Khartum and war seemed in- 
evitable. Happily, France yielded and the in- 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 17 

cident was closed by an agreement between the 
two countries in 1899. 

In the midst of her trouble with Great 
Britain, the French Government called to its 
foreign office in 1898 Theophile Delcasse, one of 
the ablest diplomats of the modern period. He 
at once entered upon a new and vigorous 
foreign policy which was calculated to relieve 
his country of the comparative isolation in 
which she had hitherto been placed. His plan 
was to court the friendship of Italy and Great 
Britain. 

About this time, too, relations between 
England and Germany were tense because of 
the former's policy in Asiatic Turkey and the 
latter 's opposition to it. For at the end of the 
nineteenth century the Anglo-German quarrel 
over the Bagdad Eailway scheme was at its 
height. England would, therefore, naturally 
be favorably disposed toward a friendship with 
Germany's rival. Accordingly, the advances 
of Delcasse were kindly received by the British 
Government and King Edward VII used his in- 
fluence in favor of an understanding between 
his country and France. The result of these 
efforts was a treaty of mutual understanding 
between the two countries, signed in 1904. By 
this treaty England was for the future to be un- 
hampered in Egypt, France was given a free 
hand in Morocco, and other points at issue be- 



18 The Causes of the European War 

tween them were settled. All causes of friction 
now being removed, there gradually developed 
during the decade of 1904-1914 "particularly 
friendly relations betwen the peoples and gov- 
ernments of France and Great Britain. ' ' 6 The 
mutual understanding growing out of this 
friendship is known as the Entente Cordiale. 

In the meantime Russia had been badly de- 
feated by Japan in the war of 1904—05. Rus- 
sia's weakness was revealed to such an extent 
that the English people became less afraid of 
her. Then, too, since England had gotten con- 
trol of Egypt she had ceased to be so nervous 
about the possibility of her road to India being 
blocked by Russian ambition in the Balkans. 
The real menace to India and Anglo-Indian 
communication was now thought to be the rapid 
growth of Teutonic power and influence in the 
Balkans and Mesopotamia. Besides, Great 
Britain had come to regard Germany as the 
"most powerful nation on the Continent, and 
her most active rival for the world's com- 
merce.' ' 7 Her fears had also been aroused by 
the rapid growth of Germany's navy and mer- 
chant marine. The time was thus ripe for an 
understanding between Britain and Russia, and 
so in 1907 these two powers came to agreements 
settling all disputes as to their relations with 
Persia and Afghanistan. These agreements 

a Hayes, II, 702. 7 Stowell, 17. 



The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente 19 

" practically transformed the Entente Cordiale 
between France and Great Britain into the 
Triple Entente between Russia, France, and 
Great Britain. ' ' 8 It was never a formal al- 
liance, but was a kind of "gentlemen's agree- 
ment." Japan was already in alliance with 
Great Britain. In 1910 she and Russia came 
to an understanding regarding Manchuria. So 
Japan had virtually ranged herself on the side 
of the Entente. 

s Hayes, II, 702. 



CHAPTEE II 

FRICTION BETWEEN THE RIVAL GROUPS 

It has already been shown that England was 
drawn into a friendship with France and Eussia 
because of the friction that had developed be- 
tween her Government and that of Germany. 
During the decade preceding the war, occasions 
of dispute also arose between the other mem- 
bers of the Triple Entente — Eussia and France 
— and the Triple Alliance powers. The most 
serious of these quarrels were those between 
Eussia and Austria over the Balkans and 
France and Germany over Morocco. Germany 
was in favor of the "open-door" policy with 
reference to Morocco and was opposed to 
the arrangement provided for by the agree- 
ment of 1904 between Great Britain and France. 
She did not, however, protest against this 
arrangement, probably because she felt that 
the odds against her were too strong for her to 
risk a war; but in the next year, after Eussia 
had suffered great defeats at the hands of 
Japan, she concluded that the opportunity had 
come for her to declare her disapproval of the 
French Moroccan policy. On March 31, 1905, 

20 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 21 

the German Emperor stopped at Tangier on his 
way to Constantinople and made a speech. He 
declared that the Sultan of Morocco was an in- 
dependent ruler and that all nations had equal 
rights and should enjoy equal opportunities in 
his dominions. This was a challenge to France, 
but the latter country was not in a position to 
take it up owing to the weakness that her ally, 
Russia, was then exhibiting. The question was 
referred to an international congress held at 
Algeciras, Spain (1906). Great Britain and 
Italy supported France in the congress, and 
France won a diplomatic victory. It was de- 
cided that the merchants and investors of all 
the signatory powers were to have equal oppor- 
tunities in Morocco but that France and Spain 
were to supervise the policing of the country. 
The result of Germany's attitude was to 
strengthen the friendly feeling between Eng- 
land and France. 

In 1908 another occasion of dispute arose 
between France and Germany in Morocco. Six 
soldiers under the control of the French de- 
serted at Casablanca and appealed to the Ger- 
man consul for protection. Three of these 
soldiers were of German nationality. The Ger- 
man consul, thinking that all were Germans, 
gave them a safe-conduct to a German ship. 
The French officials disregarded this safe-con- 
duct and arrested the soldiers before they could 



22 The Causes of the European War 

embark. Germany protested most vigorously 
against this action, claiming that it violated 
her right to protect through her consuls Ger- 
man subjects in Morocco. France conceded to 
Germany the right to protect her nationals in 
Morocco, but contended that this right could 
not be exercised in such a way as to deprive 
her military officials of authority over their 
soldiers. The difficulty was settled by refer- 
ring the questions in dispute to The Hague 
Tribunal. 

Germany and France also signed a conven- 
tion in 1909, by the terms of which Germany 
agreed to cease her opposition to French po- 
litical supremacy in Morocco and France agreed 
to "safeguard the economic equality" of all 
countries in the Sultan's dominions. This 
agreement, however, was not approved by the 
political leaders in Germany and Von Billow, 
who negotiated it, was superseded as chancel- 
lor by Von Bethmann-Hollweg. The new chan- 
cellor was opposed to the convention and de- 
termined to annul it as soon as a proper occa- 
sion should arise. The opportunity came in 
1911, when France sent troops to occupy Fez, 
the Moroccan capital. In July of this same 
year Germany sent a warship to the port of 
Agidir, declaring that its presence was neces- 
sary for the protecion of the interests of Ger- 
man capitalists. At the same time she stated 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 23 

that the " warship would be withdrawn as soon 
as conditions were sufficiently settled to admit 
of French withdrawal from Fez. ' ' 1 Both coun- 
tries began preparations for war, and Great 
Britain announced that France could count on 
her support. The trouble, however, was settled 
by another convention (November, 1911) be- 
tween Germany and France. By this second 
agreement, the " open-door' ' policy in Morocco 
was guaranteed by France and her political 
supremacy was recognized by Germany. The 
latter nation was also given a part of the 
French Congo. 

The long controversy over Morocco was thus 
finally settled but in a way that was unsatis- 
factory to both parties. The French were dis- 
pleased because they had lost a part of their 
territory and had gained nothing but a recog- 
nition of a right which they already had been 
exercising. Germany, too, was disappointed in 
not being able to win a port on the Moroccan 
coast. She also considered that her "position 
as a world power " had been jeopardized "by 
the joint machinations of the French and the 
British. " 2 The friendship between England 
and France had been strengthened as well as 
the hostility between Germany and her rivals; 
and thus the Moroccan question in passing left 
behind a legacy of jealousy and hatred between 

i Hayes, II, 705. 2 Hayes, 706, 



24 The Causes of the European War 

the Entente and its enemies that foreboded 
greater trouble in the future. 

Although Morocco had thus been eliminated 
as a source of trouble, still the peace of Europe 
was being threatened from another quarter. A 
growing friction between the rival groups had 
developed over the Balkan situation. To un- 
derstand this situation it is necessary to review 
briefly some of the events out of which it has 
grown. 

There were many different peoples in the 
Balkan peninsula, at the time it was overrun 
by the Turks. Of these the most important 
were the Serbs, the Bulgars, the Albanians, the 
Bumanians, and the Greeks. The Turks ruled 
these subject races very harshly and unjustly, 
extorting from them exorbitant and at times 
almost ruinous taxes and subjecting them to all 
sorts of cruel indignities. They were, however, 
permitted to retain their religion, their civil 
laws, and in large measure the right of local 
self-government. They had their own magis- 
trates and thus controlled the local administra- 
tion. These concessions helped to keep alive 
national sentiment among the subject peoples, 
and furnished them with a governmental ma- 
chinery that could be employed against their 
oppressors when the opportunity for revolt 
should arise. 3 The Turkish Government was 

3 Hazen, Europe Since 1815, 603. 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 25 

thus supplying its Christian subjects with 
grievances and at the same time giving them 
the means whereby their discontent could find 
effective expression. Under such circum- 
stances, revolts could be expected at all favor- 
able opportunities. 

The first of the Christian peoples to win their 
independence were the Serbs of Montenegro. 
They claim never to have been conquered by 
the Moslem invaders, but their independence 
was not recognized by the Turkish Government 
until 1799. 

In 1804 there was an unsuccessful revolt in 
Serbia. Another uprising eleven years later 
was partially successful, but it was not until 
1830 that Serbia was recognized by Turkey as 
an autonomous principality. 

The Greeks rose against their oppressors in 
1821 and carried on against them for about 
eight years a war that was characterized by 
barbarous practices on both sides. Finally, 
France, Great Britain, and Russia intervened 
and demanded of Turkey that she grant local 
autonomy to Greece. This demand was re- 
fused, and the Allied powers attacked Turkey, 
destroying her fleet in the battle of Navarino. 
Two years later, Turkey yielded and by the 
treaty of Adrianople with Russia (September, 
1829) recognized Greece as an entirely inde- 
pendent state. The independence of the new 



26 The Causes of the European War 

state was placed under the guarantee of the 
liberating powers, France, Russia, and Great 
Britain, and in 1833 Otto, the son of the King 
of Bavaria, was placed on the throne as the 
first ruler of the Hellenic Kingdom. 

The Rumanians are a mixed race, composed 
of Slavic, Gothic, Tartar, and Latin elements. 
They are proud of the name Ruman (Roman) 
and claim to be descendants of colonists settled 
north of the Danube (Dacia) by the Roman 
emperors. By the treaty of Adrianople, the 
provinces Moldavia and Wallachia (now Ru- 
mania) were practically, though not nominally, 
taken out from under the control of Turkey 
and placed under the protection of Russia. At 
the close of the Crimean War, in which Russia 
was defeated by France and England, Russia 
had to give up her protectorate over these two 
provinces and agree, by the treaty of Paris 
(1856), that thenceforth they should be "inde- 
pendent under the suzerainty of the Porte." 4 
This arrangment, however, was not satisfac- 
tory to the Rumanians, who wanted the two 
provinces united into one nation and to be en- 
tirely free from Turkish control. In 1859 Mol- 
davia and Wallachia each elected the same man 
as prince and so virtually became one principal- 
ity. "Later the two assemblies were merged 
into one, and in 1862 the Sultan recognized these 
changes. ' ' 5 

*Hazen, 615. s Ibid., 618. 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 27 

In 1876 the Christians in the province of Bul- 
garia revolted against the Ottoman officials and 
put some of them to death. The Turks in their 
effort to put down the revolt committed awful 
atrocities. Their acts of savage cruelty 
aroused public sentiment all over Europe. 
Even in England, the traditional friend of the 
Porte, sentiment was so strong that the Dis- 
raeli ministry could do nothing in support of 
the Ottoman Government. Mr. Gladstone, 
then in retirement, " urged that the Turks be 
expelled from Europe ' bag and baggage. ' ' ' 6 
Serbia and Montenegro joined the Bulgarians 
and declared war on Turkey. 

The Eussian people sympathized warmly 
with their kinsmen and co-religionists of the 
Balkans, and many of them enlisted in the army 
as volunteers against the Turk. Pressure was 
thus being brought to bear on Alexander II to 
intervene. He did not want war, declaring that 
he had no intention or desire to take Constanti- 
nople, but felt that Europe ought to put a stop 
to the Balkan troubles. He also said that he 
would have to undertake the task singlehanded 
if the other nations would not join him. Fi- 
nally, after long delays and fruitless diplomatic 
negotiations, Kussia issued a declaration of war 
against Turkey on April 24, 1877. After the 
defeat of Turkey, the treaty of San Stefano 

6 Ibid., 622. 



28 The Causes of the European War 

was signed in 1878. By this treaty Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Eumania were declared inde- 
pendent ; Bulgaria became an autonomous state 
with a good deal of territory, Eastern Bumelia 
and most of Macedonia being given to her; and 
Turkey retained in Europe "only a narrow 
broken strip across the peninsula from Con- 
stantinople west to the Adriatic." 7 

All the countries interested except Bussia 
and Bulgaria were dissatisfied with the treaty. 
Both Serbia and Greece wanted a part of the 
Macedonian territory that had been given 
Bulgaria. But the most effective opposition 
came from the great powers. Great Britain 
and Austria-Hungary contended that Kussia 
could not change the Balkan map without the 
consent of the other powers,, and Germany sup- 
ported this contention. Austria-Hungary had 
an ambition to expand toward the JSgean, and 
both she and Great Britain were afraid that 
Bussia would become too powerful in the 
Balkans and extend her authority to the 
Mediterranean. By a threat of war, Bussia 
was frightened into yielding, and a conference 
of the powers was held at Berlin. The treaty 
of Berlin (signed July, 1878) was thus sub- 
stituted for that of San Stef ano ( signed March, 
1878). By the treaty of Berlin, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Eumania became independent ; Bul- 

7 Hazen, 624. 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 29 

garia was made an autonomous principality 
tributary to Turkey. Eastern Eumelia and 
Macedonia were, however, left out of Bulgaria, 
Macedonia being restored to Turkey and East- 
ern Bumelia being made an autonomous state 
under Turkish control. Bosnia and Herze- 
govina were turned over to Austria-Hungary 
to be administered by her, though they were 
still to be nominally a part of the Ottoman Em- 
pire. It is needless to say that the Bulgars 
were dissatisfied with this arrangement and 
were determined to modify it as soon as they 
could with safety. This they did in 1885 when 
Eastern Eumelia was united with Bulgaria. 8 

These important changes had all been made 
in southeastern Europe without any serious 
menace to the general peace. But early in the 
twentieth century the Balkans gave promise of 
trouble between the rival groups. By this time 
Germany and Austria-Hungary had entered 
upon a policy of economic and political expan- 
sion toward the iEgean and had an ambition 
to bring the Ottoman Empire within their 
sphere of influence. These efforts had been 
rewarded with considerable success. Serbia 
had been under the tutelage of Austria-Hun- 
gary from 1878 to 1903, when King Alexander 
was assassinated and a new ruler, who was 
friendly to Kussia, was placed on the Serbian 

sHazen, 620-27. 



30 The Causes of the European War 

throne. The rulers of Bulgaria and Bumania 
were Germans and the crown prince of Greece 
was a brother-in-law of the Kaiser, William II. 
Germany had obtained from Bumania an im- 
portant railroad concession and from Turkey 
the right to build a railroad to Bagdad and the 
Persian Gulf. German officers went to Turkey 
to train her soldiers, and the Teutonic powers 
showed that they intended to bolster up Turkey 
and support her against her enemies. Ger- 
many had thus supplanted Great Britain as the 
protector of the Ottoman dominions. Out of 
this policy there had grown up in the Balkans a 
serious rivalry between Bussia and the 
Teutonic powers. 

This rivalry reached the danger point in Oc- 
tober, 1908, when Austria-Hungary formally 
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Turkish 
provinces which she had been administering 
since 1878. It was a favorable time for such an 
act of aggression, for conditions in the Ottoman 
Empire were unsettled as a result of a revolu- 
tion that had been carried out in the previous 
summer. At about the same time, Bulgaria 
severed the weak bond that held her to the 
Turkish Empire by declaring her absolute in- 
dependence. Both of these acts were a clear 
violation of the treaty of Berlin, but Turkey, 
conscious of her weakness, was induced to 
acquiesce in this loss of territory. 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 31 

The powers, however, did not consider that 
Turkey alone was concerned with this infrac- 
tion of a treaty to which they were signatories. 
Italy, Great Britain, Russia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia were all displeased at Austria's action. 
Serbia had hoped that as long as the provinces 
maintained a nominal connection with the 
Turkish Empire, some stroke of fortune might 
cause them to fall to her. 9 She was especially 
anxious to have them because they would give 
her an outlet to the Adriatic and would enable 
her to round out her dominions if she should 
ever become the Greater Serbia of her dreams, 
a kingdom which would include as subjects the 
Serbs of the then Austro-Hungarian provinces 
as well as those of her own country. 

Russia, too, was very much excited over the 
annexation. She felt that not only were the 
interests of her protege, Serbia, compromised, 
but that her own position in the Balkans was 
also jeopardized. She determined to support 
Serbia, and since the diplomatic negotiations 
offered no satisfactory adjustment of the dif- 
ferences, she began to mobilize her army. 

At this juncture Germany declared in favor 
of Austria-Hungary and announced her willing- 
ness to give the latter country military assist- 
ance if necessary. Germany was free to take 
this stand because the Young Turk party, which 

»Stowell, 21. 



32 The Causes of the European War 

was responsible for the July revolution and 
which had gotten control of the government, 
had shown signs of preferring Great Britain to 
Germany as their country's protector. This 
fickleness on the part of the Ottoman Govern- 
ment gave Germany the opportunity of dis- 
ciplining her new friend and at the same time 
of doing a good turn for her old ally. Eussia 
had not as yet recovered from the military 
weakness exhibited in the Russo-Japanese War, 
and great Britain and France, being unwilling 
to go to war over this quarrel, advised her to 
yield. She, therefore, withdrew her opposi- 
tion, and Serbia, under pressure from the 
Entente powers, declared on March 31, 1909, 
that she acquiesced in the annexation of the 
provinces as a fait accompli. 

The crisis was thus passed without war, but 
a feeling of humiliation and bitterness was left 
in the hearts of the Serbs and Russians. 
Smarting under this feeling, "the Russian 
Government began to reorganize its army, to 
construct strategic railways, and to do every- 
thing in its power to insure Russia against a 
like humiliation in the future. ' ' 10 

In the early fall of 1912, war broke out be- 
tween Turkey and the Balkan states of Monte- 
negro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The time 
was favorable for joint action against the Otto- 

io Hayes, II, 708. 






Friction Between the Rival Groups 33 

man Empire, for that power had been weak- 
ened by the Turco-Italian war and by internal 
troubles in Albania and Macedonia. The 
Christians in Macedonia had been oppressed 
for years, and conditions were not improved 
when the Young Turks came into power in 
1908. A spirit of discontent began to manifest 
itself in secret revolts and assassinations, which 
was aggravated by the ineffective efforts of the 
Turkish officials to allay it. These unjust and 
unwise measures caused the Serbs, the Bulgars, 
and Greeks in Macedonia to suspend their 
hatred of each other and thus made it easier 
for the Greek and Bulgarian Governments to 
bury their differences and act together against 
the common enemy. The Albanians,, despite 
their historic friendship for the Porte, were 
also chafing under recent grievances. Eevolts 
broke out in 1910 and 1911, in which the 
Montenegrins made common cause with the in- 
surgents. This brought on a friendly feeling 
between the Northern Albanians and the Serbs 
of Serbia and Montenegro. 

Conditions were thus favorable for a union 
of the Balkan states against Turkey. Accord- 
ingly, in the spring of 1912 engagements were 
entered into whereby Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, 
and Montenegro were united into an alliance 
against Turkey, the object of which was the 
liberation of the Balkan Christians from Otto- 



34 The Causes of the European War 

man misrule. The formation of this alliance 
did not mean an immediate break with the 
Porte, and it was not until October that war 
was declared on Turkey. 11 

In the meantime, the powers had made an 
effort to prevent war. They agreed to act in 
concert and announced (October 8) to the Bal- 
kan Allies that they would not approve of a 
war with Turkey at that time. They promised 
that reforms in the government of European 
Turkey should be made, but were unwilling that 
anything should be done to affect the integrity 
or independence of the Ottoman Empire. In 
case the Allies should go to war with the 
protege of the powers, they would be restrained 
by the latter from taking any territory in Euro- 
pean Turkey. If the powers had been in a 
position to back up these strong words with 
concerted action, the threat would have silenced 
the Allies and peace would have been main- 
tained. But the Allies were aware of the 
rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia 
in the Balkans, and so were not frightened 
away from their plan of dividing the Ottoman 
dominions in Europe. 

The Allies were successful in their military 

n The authorities disagree as to the nature of the Balkan 
Alliance. For a fuller discussion of this subject, see Hayes, II, 
527; Holt and Chilton, European History, 485; Schurman, 
The Balkan Wars, 34-39; Gibbons. The New Map of Europe, 
264-66. 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 35 

operations, and Turkey soon showed a willing- 
ness to negotiate for peace. A truce was de- 
clared December 3, 1912, and a peace confer- 
ence was held in London, beginning on Decem- 
ber 16. The belligerents, however, could not 
agree on terms, and hostilities were renewed. 

There was a danger that the Balkan trouble 
would involve other countries and thus bring on 
a general war, a calamity which the European 
Governments seemed anxious to avoid. In or- 
der to keep the conflict within its original limits, 
the French premier, M. Poincare, had tried to 
induce the powers to announce their own 
"territorial disinterestedness" in the Balkan 
quarrel. Such a pledge was opposed by the 
Triple Alliance, especially Austria-Hungary, 
who seemed to think that her own interests 
were being threatened. She was opposed to 
such changes in the map of Europe as would 
extend Serbia to the Adriatic and place strong 
Slavic states between her and Salonica. 
Serbia had captured Durazzo and insisted on 
keeping it and a small portion of the Albanian 
coast. But Austria-Hungary favored the 
autonomy of Albania and was so determined in 
her opposition to Serbian ambitions that she 
began a general mobilization of her military 
forces. 

The expressions of opinion given out by the 
various governments showed that the Triple 



36 The Causes of the European War 

Alliance powers took one side of the contro- 
versy and the Triple Entente powers the other, 
the former being inclined to support Turkey 
and the latter the Balkan Allies. There was, 
therefore, a danger that the Balkan quarrel 
would assume European proportions and thus 
bring on a world war. This calamity was 
averted because the powers were on this occa- 
sion sane enough to settle their differences of 
opinion in the spirit of compromise. A con- 
ference was held in London in December, 1912, 
and it was agreed out of deference to the wishes 
of Austria and Italy that Albania should be an 
autonomous state and Serbia should have l i com- 
mercial access to the Adriatic. ' ' 

Serbia acquiesced in this compromise, but 
Montenegro gave trouble. The powers in ar- 
ranging the boundaries of Albania finally de- 
cided that they should include Scutari. The 
Montenegrins were, therefore, ordered to raise 
the siege of Scutari ; but instead of obeying this 
command, they went on with the siege and suc- 
ceeded in capturing the city on April 22, 1913. 
Austria-Hungary and Italy threatened to at- 
tack Montenegro if she did not agree to turn 
over Scutari to Albania. Austria-Hungary's 
stand aroused great excitement in Russia and 
war between that country and the Dual 
Monarchy seemed imminent, when Montenegro 
wisely yielded and agreed to relinquish her 
prize (May 3). 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 37 

A second peace congress was held in May and 
the belligerents all agreed to the treaty of Lon- 
don (May 30). By this treaty, Turkey gave up 
all of her territory in Europe except a narrow 
strip extending from the Black Sea to the 
iEgean, including Constantinople but excluding 
Adrianople. 

Before the treaty with the Porte was signed, 
the Allies had begun to quarrel over the spoils. 
Serbia and Bulgaria had agreed by a secret 
treaty signed in March, 1912, upon a plan for 
the division of the territory to be taken from 
the Ottoman Empire. By this scheme Bul- 
garia was to have most of Macedonia with a 
seaport on the JEgean; and Serbia was to get 
the greater portion of Albania and a seaport 
on the Adriatic. The creation of Albania into 
an independent state had deprived Serbia of a 
large part of her share, while the war had taken 
such a turn as to give Bulgaria more than had 
been contemplated by the treaty. Serbia, 
therefore, demanded a more equitable division 
than could be effected by a literal adherence to 
this agreement. Greece, too, thought that Bul- 
garia's portion was too large, it being, she 
contended, three-fifths of all the territory taken 
from Turkey. She was especially anxious to 
keep Salonica. The outcome of the dispute 
was that Bulgaria soon found herself at war 
with her former allies, Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Greece. 



38 The Causes of the European War 

Rumania had remained neutral during the 
first Balkan War and expected compensation to 
balance the gains of the other states. She was 
promised Silistria, but was dissatisfied at not 
having gained more territory. When the sec- 
ond Balkan War broke out, she demanded 
further compensation from Bulgaria as the 
price of her neutrality. Bulgaria hesitated to 
meet her demnads, and Rumania joined the list 
of Bulgaria's enemies. Turkey, too, entered 
the war and recaptured Adrianople. 

Bulgaria soon grew tired of the unequal con- 
test and asked (July 21) the King of Rumania 
to intercede with the other rulers for peace. A 
peace conference was held in Bukarest and a 
treaty was signed (August 10) by all the Chris- 
tian belligerents. By the treaty of Bukarest 
Rumania "secured an extension of her south- 
eastern frontier, ' ■ 12 and Bulgaria gave up cer- 
tain territories to Greece and Serbia. Later, 
by the treaty of Constantinople (September 
29), Bulgaria had to give up Adrianople and 
other territory to Turkey. Turkey now had 
twice the area in Europe that had been left her 
by the treaty of London. 13 

The Balkan wars had left a bitterness of feel- 
ing behind them which might easily lead to 
other trouble. Austria was dissatisfied with 

12 Int. Yr. Bk., 1913, 699. 

is For map, see Schurman, The Balkan Wars, 124. 



Friction Between the Rival Groups 39 

the final settlement. Serbia had become larger 
and stronger and was thus able to form a more 
effective barrier to her ambitions in the direc- 
tion of the iEgean. Besides, her difficulties 
with her Serbian subjects had been increased 
as a result of the increased importance of the 
Serbian state. Then, too, her prestige in the 
Balkans had been lowered because in both wars 
she "had backed the wrong horse," her 
sympathies having been with Turkey in the 
first war and with Bulgaria in the second. 
This loss of prestige was especially galling in- 
asmuch as Eussia's position in the Balkans 
had been strengthened by these wars. For 
Eussia had won the gratitude of Greece, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and even Eumania by the diplo- 
matic support that she had given them. The 
Austrian Emperor was, therefore, dissatisfied 
with the Treaty of Bukarest and felt that an- 
other war was necessary to right the Balkan 
situation. His disappointment was so keen 
that he would probably have gone to war in 
1913 if Italy and Germany had not discouraged 
it. 14 Montenegro, too, felt aggrieved in that 
Scutari had been wrenched from her and added 
to Albania. 

Serbia had a new cause of complaint against 
Austria. The creation of the Kingdom of 

i* World's Work, June, 1918, p. 171 j Dickinson, The Euro- 
pean Anarchy, 106. 



40 The Causes of the European War 

Albania, for which Austria and Italy were re- 
sponsible, cut her off from the sea and robbed 
her, as she considered, of the choicest fruits 
of her victory over Turkey. Then, too, the 
national aspirations of the Serbians had been 
greatly increased, because their recent suc- 
cesses had encouraged a new hope that her 
further territorial ambitions might be realized. 
Bulgaria felt that the treaty of Bukarest was 
unfair to her and was hoping for an oppor- 
tunity to revise it. Besides, the ill feeling of 
the Bulgars toward the Serbs and Greeks had 
been intensified. 



PART II 

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE 
EUROPEAN WAR 



CHAPTER III 

THE ASSASSINATION OF FRANCIS FERDINAND 

The year 1914, as has already been shown, 
found Austria-Hungary and Serbia living on 
terms that are unsafe for neighbors. Public 
sentiment was inflamed in both countries and 
there was a danger that some unusual occur- 
rence would cause an outburst of feeling and 
bring on war. The event that fanned the smol- 
dering hatred into a flame was the assassina- 
tion of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir- 
apparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary. 
The crown prince and his wife were killed on 
June 28, 1914, at Sarajevo, the capital of 
Bosnia, by the explosion of a bomb thrown by 
two Serbian subjects of Austria-Hungary. 
"No crime,' ' says the British White Paper, 
"has ever aroused deeper or more general 
horror throughout Europe ; none has ever been 
less justified. Sympathy for Austria was 
universal. ' ' l 

The crime owes its significance to the feeling 
aroused in Austria-Hungary and Serbia by it; 

i B. W. P., iii. 

43 



44 The Causes of the European War 

to the alleged complicity of the Serbian people 
and Government in the crime; and to Serbia's 
inability or refusal to satisfy Austria-Hungary 
as to reparation and guarantees for the future. 

According to Austrian sources, public senti- 
ment in Serbia approved the deed of the assas- 
sins. The people rejoiced over it as an act of 
" revenge for the annexation" and hoped that 
it would prove to be the initial step in a move- 
ment that would ultimately lead to ' ' the detach- 
ment from the Dual Monarchy of all territories 
inhabited by South-Slavs and the eventual de- 
struction of that monarchy as a great power." 2 
Manifestations of joy and exultation were re- 
ported from Belgrade, 3 Nish, 4 and Uskub, the 
populace at the last named place giving ' ' itself 
up to a spontaneous outburst of passion." 5 

The press of Serbia was also charged with 
responsibility for "the outrage of Sarajevo," 
because the public mind had been inflamed by 
the propaganda conducted by it against Austria 
in the interest of the "Great Serbian" cause. 
This propaganda had not been confined to Ser- 
bia but had also been carried on, it is alleged, in 
the Serbian districts of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy. 6 The Austrian Red Book gives ex- 
tracts from twenty-six Serbian newspapers 
commenting on the assassination to show the 



2 A. R. B., 1, 6. 


s Ibid., 3. 


a A. R. B., 1. 


e Ibid., 7. 


*Ibid. t 5. 





The Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 45 

attitude of the press toward this crime. These 
press extracts breathe a very hostile feeling to- 
ward Austria, but no one of them attempts to 
justify the murder. 7 The statements that come 
nearest to a justification of this act are the fol- 
lowing : 

The Piemont of July 1 said : 

The fact that Princip [one of the assassins] carried 
out his act of vengeance on the sacred national holiday 
of Vidovdan [St. Vitus Day], the day fixed for the 
carrying on of maneuvers, makes the desperate deed of 
the young martyr appear more intelligible and natural. 

[The paper was confiscated by the police because of 
this article, but the confiscation was annulled on the 
following day by the Belgrade court of first resort.] 

The Pravada of July 4 said : 

All murders and attacks heretofore committed in 
Austria have had one and the same origin. The op- 
pressed peoples of the monarchy were obliged to re- 
sort to this kind of protest, because no other way was 
open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror it is 
natural and understandable that the era of murderous 
attacks should become popular. 

The Mali Journal of July 7 said : 

A scion of the Middle Ages was murdered in 
Sarajevo a few days ago. He was murdered by a boy 
who felt the suffering of his enslaved fatherland to 
the point of paroxysms of emotion — the suffering 
which the despoilers of the lands of his fathers had 
inflicted upon it. What has official Austria-Hungary 
done thereafter? It has replied with general mas- 

7 A. R. B., 19, enclosure 9, 



46 The Causes of the European War 

sacres, plunderings, and destruction of Serb life and 
property. By such exploits only those who are worth- 
less distinguish themselves. The cowards are always 
great heroes when they are certain that nothing will 
happen to them. Only compare > Princip and Ga- 
brinovitch with these heroes, and the great difference 
will be noted at once. Civilization and justice in 
Austria- Hungary are a great, gross falsehood. 

In defense of his Government, M. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister of Serbia, pointed out that "as 
soon as news of the crime arrived the Serbian 8 
court and the Government expressed not only 
their condolence, but also their heartfelt repro- 
bation and their horror at such a crime. All 
the festivities that were to take place that day 
in Belgrade were suspended. ,, M. Pashitch 
further declares that the abhorrence of this un- 
fortunate event was not confined to the gov- 
ernmental circles but was shared by all classes 
of the people, as the commission of this crime 
was against the best interests of Serbia. 9 In a 
telegram (July 14) to all the royal legations the 
prime minister said, in part: 

Absolute calm rules in Belgrade; no demonstra- 
tion has taken place this year; nobody has had the 
intention of provoking any disorder. Not only do the 
Minister of Austria-Hungary and the members of his 

8 In quoting from the documents, I have frequently changed 
"v" to "b" in the spelling of "Serbia" and "Serbian." This 
liberty has been taken in the interest of uniformity; for the 
different state papers do not employ the same method in the 
spelling of these words. 

» S. B. B., 30, 8. 



The Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 47 

staff walk freely in the city, but no insult either 
through acts or through words has been offered to any 
Austro-Hungarian subject, as the newspapers of 
Vienna claim, and no Austro-Hungarian subject has 
seen his house attacked or its windows broken; no 
Austro-Hungarian subject has had any motive to lodge 
the slightest complaint. All this false news is spread 
only with the object of disturbing and irritating pub- 
lic opinion in Austria-Hungary against Serbia. 10 

Insist on the fact that public opinion in our coun- 
try is relatively calm and that on our side nobody 
wishes to provoke or wound Austria-Hungary. 11 

The Serbian minister at London also called 
attention to the fact that "both the assassins 
were Austro-Hungarian subjects; that one of 
them had been suspected by the Serbian author- 
ities who desired to expel him; and that he had 
been protected by the Austrian authorities who 
considered him innocent and harmless. 12 

Serbian documents virtually concede that 
feeling in Austria-Hungary was inflamed by 
utterances of the Serbian press. On July 1 the 
Serbian minister at Vienna wrote to his home 
Government as follows: "I beg you to do 
what is necessary in order that demonstrations 
be prevented at home, and that the utterances 
of the press of Belgrade be restrained as much 
as possible.' ' 13 

The minister referred to the subject again on 
July 6 in the following words: "The feeling 

io Ibid., 21. 12 B. W. P., 30. 

u 8. B. B., 20. is S. B. B., 9. 



48 The Causes of the European War 

against Serbia continues to increase in military 
and governmental circles, in consequence of ar- 
ticles in our papers which the Austro-Hun- 
garian Legation at Belgrade zealously ex- 
ploits." 14 

The Serbian officials, however, contended 
that the hostility of the Serbian press was pro- 
voked by the attitude of the Austrian and Hun- 
garian newspapers which " began the polemic" 
and had for two years "been wounding the 
Serbs and Serbia in their most delicate sensi- 
bilities ' ' ; that Austria was intentionally giving 
undue publicity to the radical utterances of 
rather irresponsible publications; and that, as 
the press is free in Serbia, the Government has 
no means other than the courts to employ in 
curbing the press, though it has advised the 
press of Belgrade "to remain calm and limit 
itself to the denial and the refutation of false 
and distorted news." 15 

Serbia also brings serious counter-charges 
against the Austro-Hungarian press. She 
complains that the newspapers of Vienna and 
Budapest sent out false news in order to arouse 
feeling at home and to hold up Serbia in a false 
light before the nations of the world. They ac- 
cused Serbia, it is alleged, of the crime of Sara- 
jevo in order to rob her of the good name that 
she had with the European powers. As an ex- 

" Ibid., 15, is S. B, B. ? 12, 30, 



The Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 49 

ample of unfair treatment by the news service, 
the Serbian minister at Vienna cites an account 
of the assassination given by the Vienna dailies 
on June 28. These papers, he said, " an- 
nounced in big type that the two perpetrators 
of the crime were Serbians, in such a way as to 
make the people believe that they were meant 
for Serbians from Serbia. ' ' 16 

The British White Paper also speaks of the 

storm of anti-Serbian feeling which swept Austria- 
Hungary after the Sarajevo murders. 

Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. 
The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Coun- 
cil of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with 
cries of ' ' Serbian assassins, ' ' Mobs in Vienna threat- 
ened the Serbian Legation. The Austrian Press, al- 
most without exception, used the most unbridled lan- 
guage, and called for the condign punishment of 
Serbia. There were signs that the popular resent- 
ment was shared and perhaps encouraged by the 
Austrian Government. 17 

Austria-Hungary contends that Serbia could 
have i * averted the serious steps she had reason 
to expect" from Austria, "if she had spon- 
taneously begun within her own territory pro- 
ceedings against the Serbian accomplices in the 
murderous attack of the 28th of June, and [had 
disclosed] the threads of the plot, leading, as it 
has been proved, from Belgrade to Sarajevo. 
Until to-day (July 23), the Serbian Govern- 

16 S. B. B., 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 16. " B. W. P., iii-iv. 



50 The Causes of the European War 

ment, in spite of much notorious circumstantial 
evidence pointing to Belgrade, not only has 
failed to do anything of that sort, but even has 
endeavored to efface the existing traces.' ' 18 

In answer to this charge, the Serbian Govern- 
ment says that "Serbia, in the very first days 
that followed the horrible crime, declared 
that it condemned the crime and that it was 
ready to open an inquiry on its territory if the 
complicity of certain of its subjects was proved 
during the trial opened by the Austro-Hungar- 
ian authorities." 19 The prime minister also 
said that the Government had promptly ex- 
pressed its readiness to hand over to justice 
any of its subjects "who might be proved to 
have played a part in the Sarajevo outrage." 

Serbia excuses her failure to take any steps 
against the accomplices of the murderers on 
the ground that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment had "never asked any help whatever of 
the Serbian Government concerning the matter. 
It has [had] not asked either an investigation 
or a trial in the case of any of the accomplices. 
Once only has [had] it asked for information 
concerning the present residence of some stu- 
dents expelled from the primary normal school 
of Pakrac, who had passed over to Serbia to go 
on with their studies. All the information 

is A. R. B., 2, 9 ; B. W. P., 3. 

is Russian Orange Book, 6; S. B. B., 5; B. W. P., 30. 



The Assassination of Francis Ferdinand 51 

which could be collected concerning this has 
been transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian 
Government. ' ' 20 

The trial of the assassins brought out evi- 
dence which, Austria asserts, proved that the 
plot to murder the Archduke had been formed 
in Belgrade; that the' "arms and explosives 
with which the murderers were provided has 
[had] been given them by Serbian officers"; 
and that "the passage into Bosnia of the 
criminals and their arms was organized and 
carried out by the chiefs of the Serbian frontier 
service." 21 In support of these charges 
Austria gives extracts from the records of the 
trial of the assassins. These documents report 
the confessions of the murderers and these con- 
fessions as thus reported confirm the Austrian 
allegation. 22 

20 S. B. B., 5, 30. 22 A. R. B., 19, enclosure 8. 

21 A. R. B., 7. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA 

On July 23, 1914, Austria-Hungary sent an 
ultimatum to the Serbian minister for foreign 
affairs, demanding an answer in forty-eight 
hours. The Austrian minister was to add ver- 
bally that he was instructed to leave Belgrade 
at the expiration of the ' ' time-limit ... in the 
event that within that period' ' he had not re- 
ceived an "unconditional and favorable re- 
sponse from the Royal Serbian Government." * 

The Entente powers were taken by surprise 
when they learned the contents of the note. 
According to the English ambassador at 
Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Government 
had maintained the strictest silence during the 
time just preceding the delivery of the note at 
Belgrade, and the representatives of Italy, 
Russia, and France, as well as himself, were 
kept in ignorance by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government as to what demands would be made 
on Serbia. The Russian ambassador was so 
completely in the dark as to Austria's plans 

iA. R. B., 7; R. O. B-., 1. 

52 



The Austro-Hung avian Note to Serbia 53 

that he had left Vienna about the 20th of July 
for a two weeks' vacation. The French 
ambassador on July 22 received from the 
Austro-Hungarian foreign office the impression 
that ' ' the note which was being drawn up would 
be found to contain nothing with which a self- 
respecting state need hesitate to comply." 2 

The note addressed to Serbia starts out by 
reminding Serbia of her promise of March 31, 
1909, henceforth to regard the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a fait accompli and 
to renounce her attitude of protest and opposi- 
tion and "to live in [the] future on good neigh- 
borly terms" with Austria-Hungary. This 
pledge, it is charged, has not been kept; on the 
contrary, "the history of recent years, and in 
particular the painful events of the 28th June 
last, have shown the existence of a subversive 
movement with the object of detaching a part 
of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the 
Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth 
under the eye of the Serbian Government, has 
gone so far as to make itself manifest on both 
sides of the Serbian frontier in the shape of 
acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and 
murders. . . . 

"The Royal Serbian Government has done 
nothing to repress these movements. It has 
permitted the criminal machinations of various 

2B. W. P., 161. 



54 The Causes of the European War 

societies and associations directed against the 
Monarchy and has tolerated unrestrained lan- 
guage on the part of the press, the glorifica- 
tion of the perpetrators of outrages, and the 
participation of officers and functionaries in 
subversive agitation. It has permitted an un- 
wholesome propaganda in public instruction. 
In short, it has permitted all manifestations of 
a nature to incite the Serbian population to 
hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its in- 
stitutions. ' ' It is also contended that the con- 
fessions of the assassins on trial for the murder 
of the Archduke prove the complicity of Ser- 
bian officials in the crime of Sarajevo. 3 
The note continues as follows : 

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Serbian Gov- 
ernment had not ceased at the moment when the 
events of the 28th June last proved its fatal conse- 
quences to the whole world. 

It results from the depositions and confessions of 
the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th 
June that the Sarajevo assassinations were planned in 
Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which 
the murderers were provided had been given to them 
by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the 
Narodna Odbrana, and finally that the passage into 
Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized 
and carried out by the Chiefs of the Serbian frontier 
service. 

The above mentioned results of the preliminary in- 
vestigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment to pursue any longer the attitude of ex- 

3 See p. 51. 



The Austro-Eungarian Note to Serbia 55 

pectant forbearance which it has maintained for years 
in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and 
thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. 
The results, on the contrary, impose upon it the duty 
of putting an end to the intrigues which form a per- 
petual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy. 

To achieve this end, the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment finds itself compelled to demand from the 
Royal Serbian Government a formal assurance that it 
condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Mon- 
archy — in other words, the whole series of tendencies, 
the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Mon- 
archy territories belonging to it — and that it under- 
takes to suppress by every means at its disposal this 
criminal and terrorist propaganda. 

In order to give a solemn character to this under- 
taking the Royal Serbian Government shall publish 
on the front page of its "journal official," of the 26th 
of July [13th July] the following declaration: 

The Royal Government of Serbia condemns 
the propaganda directed against Austria- 
Hungary, of which the final aim is to de- 
tach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
territories belonging to it, and it sincerely 
deplores the fatal consequences of these crim- 
inal proceedings. 

The Royal Government regrets that Serbian 
officers and functionaries have participated 
in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus 
compromised the good neighborly relations 
to which the Royal Government was solemnly 
pledged by its declaration of the 31st of 
March, 1909. 

The Royal Government, which disapproves 
and repudiates all idea of interfering or at- 
tempting to interfere with the destinies of 
the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of 
Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty for- 



56 The Causes of the European War 

mally to warn officers and functionaries, and 
the whole population of the Kingdom, that 
henceforward it will proceed with the utmost 
rigor against persons who may be guilty of 
such machinations, which it will use all its 
efforts to prevent and suppress. 

This declaration shall simultaneously be communi- 
cated to the royal army as an order of the day by 
His Majesty the King, and published in the Official 
Bulletin of the army. 

The Royal Serbian Government further undertakes : 

1. To suppress any publication which incites to 
hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy and the general tendency of which is directed 
against its territorial integrity ; 

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Na- 
rodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propa- 
ganda, and to proceed in the same manner against all 
other societies and their branches in Serbia which 
engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the 
necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved 
from continuing their activity under another name 
and form ; 

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruc- 
tion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and 
the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or 
might serve, to foment the propaganda against Aus- 
tria-Hungary ; 

4. To remove from the military service, and from 
the administration in general, all officers and func- 
tionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right 
of communicating to the Royal Government ; 

5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of repre- 
sentatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in 
the suppression of the subversive movement directed 
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy ; 



The Austro -Hung avian Note to Serbia 57 

6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories 
to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian ter- 
ritory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment will take part in the investigation relating 
thereto ; 

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major 
Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan 
Ciganovitch, a Serbian State employee, who have 
been compromised by the results of the magisterial in- 
quiry at Sarajevo ; 

8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation 
of the Serbian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms 
and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and pun- 
ish severely the officials of the frontier service at 
Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the 
perpetrators of the Sarajevo crime by facilitating their 
passage across the frontier ; 

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government 
with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utter- 
ances of high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and 
abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, 
did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to 
express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility 
to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally, 

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government 
without delay of the execution of the measures com- 
prised under the preceding heads. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the 
reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 
o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July. 

A memorandum dealing with the results of the 
magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo with regard to the 
officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached 
to this note. 4 

On the same day on which this note was sent 
to Serbia, the Austro-Hungarian minister for 

* A. R. B., 7. 



58 The Causes of the European War 

foreign affairs sent instructions to the Austro- 
Hungarian ambassadors at the various Euro- 
pean capitals to bring the contents of the note 
to the Governments of the powers and at the 
same time present a statement, prepared by the 
foreign office, explaining why Austria-Hungary 
had felt compelled to take such action against 
Serbia. These ambassadors were also to say 
that the Austro-Hungarian Government held at 
the disposal of the powers a dossier "record- 
ing the Serbian machinations and showing the 
connection between these machinations and the 
murder on the 28th of June." 5 This dossier 
was sent to the powers on July 25. 6 The fol- 
lowing is a summary of the document: 

There has been going on in Serbia for a long 
time a propaganda looking to the detachment 
of the Southern Slav provinces of the Dual 
Monarchy in order to unite them with Serbia. 
This movement reached its climax at the time 
(1908) of the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina by Austria-Hungary. The entire press 
at that time clamored for war with Austria and 
"associations were formed in preparation for 
a struggle." The Narodna Odbrana was the 
most important of these associations. It was 
formed as a private organization, but it was 
dominated by the Government because of the 
state functionaries on its roll of membership. 

3 A. R. B., 8. e Ibid., 19. 



The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 59 

The object of the society was to recruit and 
equip "bodies of volunteers for the coming war 
with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy." The 
activities of the society were open and were 
supported by the Government. In this way the 
"guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary 
was organized." 

"This period of aggressiveness was termi- 
nated by the declaration ' ' of March 31, 1909, 
when Serbia declared her willingness to acqui- 
esce in the annexation. The movement against 
Austria now seemed to be at an end. But the 
"aspirations hostile to the Dual Monarchy re- 
mained in operation," and the propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary continued and grew 
more active. Secret intrigues were now car- 
ried on in the Southern Slav provinces of the 
Dual Monarchy and Austro-Hungarian sub- 
jects were "corrupted to betray their country." 

The newspapers were especially active in 
this work. "They habitually referred to the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an 
act of robbery committed against Serbia and 
requiring remedy." These sheets "were 
smuggled into the [Dual] Monarchy through 
well organized secret channels." 

The Narodna Odbrana is the center of this 
agitation. It preaches to the people that Aus- 
tria-Hungary is trying to crush Serbia, and is 
therefore Serbia's greatest enemy. It pledges 



60 The Causes of the European War 

its members to preach to the people untiringly 
and unceasingly "that the waging of a war of 
extermination against Austria-Hungary . . . 
is an imperative necessity.' ' There are other 
societies affiliated with the Narodna Odbrana. 
They too are dominated by l ' army officers, pro- 
fessors, and state officials.' ' One of these is 
the Sokol Society. Its aims nominally are 
"athletic" as those of the Narodna Odbrana 
are "cultural," but one of the real aims is the 
"liberation of the brothers across the Drina." 
The Narodna Odbrana appeals not only to the 
subjects of Serbia but to all Southern Slavs. 
It tries to incite them to the work of destruc- 
tion of the Dual Monarchy. It also keeps in 
touch with the "brothers outside of Serbia." 
"Princip and Grabez [assassins of the Grand 
Duke] are types of the youths whose minds had 
been poisoned in school by the teaching of 
the Narodna Odbrana." Milan Ciganovitch 
and Major Voija Tankositch [Serbians al- 
leged to have aided the assassins] were leaders 
of the Narodna Odbrana. The Serbian Gov- 
ernment is responsible because it has allowed 
the hostility of the press and this activity of 
the associations against another state to go on 
and has not suppressed the "activities of men 
holding high positions in the state administra- 
tion," "who poisoned the national con- 
science. ' ' 7 

7 A. R. B., 19, enclosure. 



The Austro-Hung avian Note to Serbia 61 

Along with this paper were sent documents 
proving, it was alleged, the claims of the dos- 
sier. It is difficult to make extracts from these 
that would adequately summarize the evidence, 
and so the reader is referred to the documents 
themselves. 

Before sending the note to Serbia, Austria- 
Hungary asked the advice of Germany as to 
what should be done. Germany, according to 
her own statement, replied as follows : 

The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of 
this view of the situation and asked our opinion in 
the matter. "We were able to assure our ally most 
heartily of our agreement with her view of the situa- 
tion and to assure her that any action that she might 
consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to 
the movement in Serbia directed against the existence 
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our 
approval. We were fully aware in this connection 
that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary 
against Serbia would bring Russia into the question 
and might draw us into a war in accordance with our 
duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital in- 
terests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we 
could neither advise our ally to a compliance that 
would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor 
could we deny her our support in this great hour of 
need. We were all the more unable to do this inas- 
much as our interests also were seriously threatened 
as a result of the continuous Serbian agitation. If 
Serbia, with the help of Russia and France, had been 
allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring 
monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual 
downfall of Austria and would result in submission 
to Slavic sway under the Russian scepter, thus making 



62 The Causes of the European War 

the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe 
untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking 
down as the result of the advance of Russian Pan- 
Slavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could 
count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need 
in view of the attitude of our eastern and western 
neighbors, which has constantly grown more threaten- 
ing. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand 
in her action against Serbia. We have taken no part 
in the preparations. 8 

The German Government, however, denied 
all knowledge of the contents of the note until 
after it was sent. 9 But this denial has not been 
fully credited by Germany's opponents. They 
contend that the German Government knew be- 
forehand just what action Austria would take 
and could have prevented her from going as 
far as she did. 10 

s g. w. B., S., 772. 

9 B. W. P., 18, 25. 

io R. O. B., 18; F. Y. B., 35. 

The French minister at Munich in an official communication 
to the French acting foreign minister (July 23) said: "The 
[Bavarian] President of the Council said to me to-day that 
the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to him, 
was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted 
by Serbia." 

The North German Gazette said (September 21, 1914) that 
the statement charging the Bavarian Government with fore- 
knowledge of Austria's note to Serbia "has been shown to 
be an invention by the official Dementi of the Royal Bavarian 
Government." See F. Y. B., 21; War Chronicle, Dec, 1914, 
19. 

The British ambassador- at Vienna in a dispatch to his 
Government (July 30) said: "Although I am not able to 
verify it, I have private information that the German Am- 
bassador [at Vienna] knew the text of the Austrian ultima- 
tum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to 
the German Emperor." B. W. P., 95. 



The Austro-Hung avian Note to Serbia 63 

The question as to whether the German 
foreign office knew in advance the contents of 
the Austrian note was a mooted one up until 
about a year ago, when evidence came to light 
which corroborates the Allied contention that 
Germany was responsible for Austria's unrea- 
sonable ultimatum to Serbia. A correspondent 
of the London Times declared (July, 1917) that 
he had learned from a thoroughly reliable 
source of a conference held at Potsdam July 5, 
1914, at which the German Emperor and chan- 
cellor, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, 
and others were present. "The meeting dis- 
cussed and decided upon all the principal points 
in the Austrian ultimatum which was to be dis- 
patched to Serbia eighteen days later. " It was 
thought probable that "Russia would refuse to 
submit to such a direct humiliation and that 
war would result. That consequence the meet- 
ing definitely decided to accept. ' ' This charge 
has been flatly denied by the official North 
German Gazette, which declares that no such 
conference was ever held. 

The indictment of the Times correspondent, 
however, is supported by the following convinc- 
ing evidence : 

Hugo Haase, Minority Socialist leader, in a 
speech made in the Reichstag July, 1917, spoke 
of "the conferences in Berlin on July 5, 1914, " 
as if they were well-known. (The Times cor- 



64 The Causes of the European War 

respondent contended that this statement re- 
ferred to the alleged Potsdam Conference.) 
Prince Lichnowsky, who was German ambas- 
sador at London at the time of the break in 
August, 1914, makes this statement in his secret 
memorandum published some months ago: "I 
learned that at the decisive conference at Pots- 
dam on July 5th the Vienna inquiry received 
the unqualified assent of all the controlling 
authorities, with the further suggestion that it 
would not be a bad thing if war with Eussia 
should result.' ' The German foreign minister 
in his reply to Price Lichnowsky does not deny 
the statement made regarding the confernce, 
but only pleads an alibi for himself. 

Still more weighty testimony comes in- 
directly from a member of the conference, 
Baron Wangenheim, who was German am- 
bassador at Constantinople at the time. On 
July 25, 1914, Wangenheim told Marquis Gar- 
roni, former Italian ambassador at Constanti- 
nople, that he had returned on the previous 
day from Berlin, where, in obedience to a sum- 
mons from the Emperor, he had been present 
at a conference at which war was decided upon. 
The plan was, he said, for Austria, after an 
interval of a few weeks, to make such demands 
on Serbia as the latter could not possibly meet 
and in consequence of this refusal "war would 
ensue in forty-eight hours.' ' The report of 



The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 65 

this conversation between the German and 
Italian diplomats has come to us through Mr. 
Lewis Einstein, who was an attache of the 
American embassy in Constantinople in 1915. 
He says that this account was given to him by 
Marquis Garroni himself, and that the incident 
herein described had been publicly referred to 
in Italy by Signor Barzilai. 

But the most damaging evidence of all is that 
given by Mr. Morgenthau, former American 
ambassador at Constantinople. It seems that 
Ambassador Wangenheim was on familiar 
terms with Mr. Morgenthau, and was inclined 
at times to give a freer rein to his tongue than 
comported with ambassadorial discretion. 
Baron Wangenheim had left "for Berlin soon 
after the assassination of the Grand Duke" 
and Mr. Morgenthau afterwards learned from 
him the cause of his absence. The following 
is in part an account in our ambassador's own 
words of which the German baron said in un- 
guarded conversations: 

' ' The Kaiser, he told me, had summoned him 
to Berlin for an Imperial conference. This 
meeting took place at Postdam on July 5th. 
The Kaiser presided; nearly all the am- 
bassadors attended. . . . Moltke, then Chief of 
Staff, was there, representing the army, and 
Admiral von Tirpitz spoke for the navy. The 
great bankers, railroad directors, and the cap- 



66 The Causes of the European War 

tains of German industry, all of whom were as 
necessary to German war preparations as the 
army itself, also attended. 

"Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser 
solemnly put the question to each man in turn. 
Was he ready for war? All replied 'Yes' ex- 
cept the financiers. They said that they must 
have two weeks to sell their foreign securities 
and to make loans. At that time few people 
had looked upon the Sarajevo tragedy as some- 
thing that was likely to cause war. This con- 
ference took all precautions that no such suspi- 
cion should be aroused. It decided to give 
the bankers time to readjust their finances for 
the coming war, and then the several members 
went quietly back to their work or started on 
vacations. The Kaiser went to Norway on his 
yacht, Von Bethmann-Sollweg left for a rest, 
and Wangenheim returned to Constantinople. 

"In telling me about this conference, 
Wangenheim, of course, admitted that Ger- 
many had precipitated the war. . . . 

"This Imperial Conference took place July 
5th; the Serbian ultimatum was sent on July 
22nd. That is just about the two weeks ' in- 
terval which the financiers had demanded to 
complete their plans. All the great stock ex- 
changes of the world show that the German 
bankers profitably used this interval. Their 
records disclose that stocks were being sold 



The Austro -Hungarian Note to Serbia 67 

in large quantities and that prices declined 
rapidly. At that time the markets were some- 
what puzzled at this movement; Wangenheim's 
explanation clears up any doubts that may still 
remain. Germany was changing her securities 
into cash, for war purposes. 11 

Even though it disclaimed responsibility for 
the contents of the note, yet the German foreign 
office supported Austria-Hungary in the stand 
that she had taken. Austria could not, it con- 
tended, draw back, now that * ' she had launched 
that note." 12 Besides, according to the Ger- 
man ambassador at Paris, Germany "ap- 
proved the point of view of Austria, ' ' and now 
that the bolt was shot, "could only allow her- 
self to be guided by her duties as an ally." 13 
"Unless the Austro-Hungarian Government," 
said the German chancellor officially, on July 
23, "wishes definitely to give up all claim to 
its -position as a great power, there is nothing 
for it to do but back up its demands on the Ser- 
bian Government by strong pressure and, if 
necessary, by recourse to military measures, in 
which case the choice of means must be left to 
it. . . . Considering the conditions, the acts as 
well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian 

11 Literary Digest for September 1, 1917, pp. 18-19; May 4, 
1918, p. 23; World's Work for June, 1918, pp. 170-171; Inter. 
Conciliation, No. 127, 323, 364. 

12 B. W. P., 25. 
is R. 0. B., 19, 



68 The Causes of the European War 

Government cannot but be looked upon as justi- 
fied." These statements taken in connection 
with the other evidence given leave no room for 
doubt as to Germany's responsibility for 
Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. 14 

The Serbian prime minister considered that 
the "claims of Austria-Hungary were such that 
the government of no independent country 
could accept them entirely." He hoped, there- 
fore, that England would induce Austria to 
moderate her demands. 15 Serbia objected to 
the note not only on account of the unrea- 
sonableness of its demands, but also because 
of the shortness of the time limit. The Crown 
Prince Alexander, in a telegram to the Czar, 
on July 24, declared that some of these de- 
mands could not be met without changes in 
legislation, which would require some time. 
He also asked if Russia would not come to the 
aid of his country, as the latter might be at- 
tacked by Austria as soon as the time limit ex- 
pired. 16 Russian help had also been solicited 
on the very day that the Austrian note was pre- 
sented. Dr. Patchou, Serbian Minister for For- 
eign Affairs ad interim, had on that day asked 
the help of Russia, stating at the same time 
to the Russian charge d'affaires at Belgrade 
that "no Serbian Government will [would] be 
able to accept the demands of Austria. ' ' 17 

i±B. W. P., annex 1. i« S. B. B., 37; R. 0. B., 6. 

is S. B. B., 35. it R. 0. B., 1. 



The Austro -Hungarian Note to Serbia 69 

Great Britain and Eussia also thought that 
the terms laid down by Austria-Hungary were 
unreasonable. Sir Edward Grey said on July 
24 that Austria had demanded more than he 
had ever known one state to ask of another 
independent state. 18 Eussia took a decided 
stand in opposition to the demands of the ulti- 
matum to Serbia. M. Sazonof, her foreign 
minister, considered that Austria had decided 
to make war on Serbia and was using her al- 
leged grievances as a pretext. He expressed 
himself to this effect to the Austrian ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburg, and declared that Serbia 
would no longer be mistress of her own house 
if she submitted to the proposed cooperation 
"of Imperial and Eoyal [Austro-Hungarian] 
officials in the suppression of the revolutionary 
movements. ' ' 19 

Eussia also suggested that the Entente pow- 
ers unite against the stand that Austria-Hun- 
gary had taken against Serbia. On the day 
(July 24) that the Austrian note was received 
at St. Petersburg, the Eussian minister for for- 
eign affairs had a conference with the British 
and French ambassadors. At this meeting he 
stated that Austria-Hungary would never have 
made such unreasonable demands on Serbia if 
Germany had not been consulted. He wanted 
Great Britain and France to declare their will- 
is B. W. P., 5. is A. It. B., 14. 



70 The Causes of the European War 

ingness to support Eussia in preventing 
Austria-Hungary from intervening in the in- 
ternal affairs of Serbia. The French ambas- 
sador declared France's -willingness to fulfill 
her obligations to her ally and urged the 
English ambassador to promise that his Gov- 
ernment would join in a declaration of solid- 
arity. Sir George Buchanan, the English 
ambassador, declared (and his position was 
later approved by Sir Edward Grey) that his 
country could not take a stand that would in- 
volve her in war over Serbia, as her interests 
there were nil, and public sentiment would not 
sanction a war over Serbia. He received the 
impression that Russia and France were "de- 
termined to make a strong stand even if Britain 
should refuse to join them." 20 

M. Sazonof next day renewed the request that 
England declare her intention to support Rus- 
sia. Such a declaration, he thought, would pre- 
vent war, as Germany, in his opinion, did not 
want to fight ; but unfortunately she was count- 
ing on Britain's neutrality, and if the latter did 
not now take a firm stand beside France and 
Russia "rivers of blood would flow." M. Sa- 
zonof was of the opinion that Austria's action 
was directed against Russia, and her real aim 
was to "overthrow the present status quo in 
the Balkans" and establish "her own hege- 

20 b. w. P., 6, 24. 



The Austro-Hung avian Note to Serbia 71 

mony there.' ' "Russia could not," he said, 
"allow Austria to crush Serbia and become 
the predominant power in the Balkans, and if 
she feels [felt] secure of the support of France 
she will [would] face all the risks of war." * 
Despite all this, however, Sir George Buchanan 
declined to promise for his country a declara- 
tion of "solidarity" with France and Eussia, 
but, on the contrary, urged prudence upon the 
Russian foreign minister. He expressed to 
him "the earnest hope that Russia would not 
precipitate war by mobilizing" until Sir Ed- 
ward Grey had had time to use his "influence in 
favor of peace," for he thought that if "Rus- 
sia mobilized, Germany . . . would probably 
declare war at once." M. Sazonof assured 
him "that Russia had no aggressive intentions, 
and she would take no action until it was forced 
upon her. " 21 

This statement regarding her peaceful inten- 
tions was a true expression of Russia's atti- 
tude, according to the opinion of the French 
ambassador at St. Petersburg. The Russian 
Government, he said on July 24, was anxious to 
preserve peace but would be forced by public 
sentiment to intervene if Austria should offer 
violence to Serbia. 22 

Germany, as has been seen, supported Aus- 
tria-Hungary in the position that she had taken. 

21 B. W. P., 17. 2 2 F. Y. B., 31, 38. 



72 The Causes of the European War 

Besides, Germany contended that the quarrel 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary con- 
cerned these two countries alone and that the 
other nations should not take a hand in it. She 
was anxious that the dispute be localized, fear- 
ing grave consequences in case another power 
should intervene. 23 England was willing to 
regard the Austro-Serbian quarrel as of no con- 
cern of hers if "it did not lead to trouble be- 
tween Austria and Bussia." 24 France, too, 
according to Austrian sources, was willing that 
the dispute be localized. 25 M. Sazonof, on the 
other hand, declared that the trouble was not 
solely a question between Austria and Serbia, 
but was a matter of concern for all Europe, ' ' in- 
asmuch as the compromise arrived at in con- 
sequence of the Serbian declaration in 1909 
had been brought about under the auspices of 
the whole of Europe. " As early as July 24 
he made it perfectly clear to both the British 
and Teutonic ambassadors that his Government 
could not remain indifferent to "any action 
taken by Austria to humiliate Serbia." 26 

The shortness of the time limit mentioned 
in the ultimatum, in the opinion of the Entente 
powers, made it more difficult to adjust the 
differences between Austria and Serbia. Such 

23 F. Y. B., 28. 

24 B. W. P., 11. 

25 A. R. B., 13. 

26 A. R. B., 16; B. W. P., 7; G. W. B., annex 4. 



The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia 73 

an opinion was expressed by the French am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg on July 2'4, 27 and 
the time limit was opposed by Sir Edward Grey 
from the beginning. He thought it a "matter 
for great regret thai a time limit, and such 
a short one, had been insisted upon" and that 
"a time limit was generally a thing to be used 
only in the last resort, after other means had 
been tried and failed." 28 

M. Sazonof, acting on the suggestion of the 
British ambassador at St. Petersburg, 29 took 
the initiative in asking that the time limit be 
prolonged. On July 24 he telegraphed a re- 
quest to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
for an extension of the time limit, giving as a 
reason the opportunity which would thus be 
afforded for the powers to examine the data 
on which Austria-Hungary had based her de- 
mands on Serbia. If the powers "found that 
some of the Austrian requests were well- 
founded, they would be in a position to advise 
the Serbian Government accordingly." The 
Kussian Government also asked the courts of 

27 F. Y. B., 31. 

28 B. W. P., 3, 5. 

29 As soon as the Austrian ultimatum reached him, M. 
Sazonof asked for a conference with the French and British 
ambassadors. At this meeting (held July 24), the British 
ambassador declared that the "important point was to induce 
Austria to extend the time limit." The "French ambassador, 
however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind 
to act at once or that she was bluffing," and, therefore, the 
time was too short to carry out the Britsh ambassador's 
suggestion. B. W. P., 6. 



74 The Causes of the European War 

London, Rome, Berlin, Paris, and Bukarest to 
support its request. England, France, and 
Italy instructed their ambassadors at Vienna to 
join in the effort to secure an extension of the 
time limit. 30 

Germany was also invited by Great Britain to 
cooperate with the other powers in the attempt 
to secure a prolongation of the time limit. Von 
Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, at once telegraphed to the German am- 
bassador at Vienna instructing him, according 
to the report of the British ambassador, to 
"pass on" to the Austro-Hungarian foreign 
office the request of London. 31 The French 
ambassador, however, received the impression 
that the telegram was "to the effect that he 
[the German ambassador at Vienna] should 
ask Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs] for this extension. 32 
It is evident, however, that Von Jagow did not 
enthusiastically support the effort in favor of 
an extension of the time limit. He expressed 
(July 25) to the Russian charge d'affaires at 
Berlin the opinion that all such "demarches 
were too late, ' ' and doubted the wisdom of Aus- 
tria's "yielding at the last moment," being 

30 B. W. P., 13, 40; R. O. B., 4; F. Y. B., 39. 
The instructions to the Italian ambassador, however, came 
too late to be of any practical value. 
3i B. W. P., 18. 
32 F. Y. B., 41. 



The Austro -Hungarian N.ote to Serbia 75 

"inclined to think that such a step on her part 
might increase the assurance of Serbia." 33 

Count Berchtold was away from Vienna and 
so Kussia's request did not reach him 
promptly. On the 25th he replied and declined 
the request. 34 

33 R. O. B., 14; F. Y. B., 43. 

34 A. R. B., 20. 



CHAPTER V 



There was a danger that Austria, not receiv- 
ing a satisfactory reply from Serbia, might at- 
tack the latter, and Europe would thus be con- 
fronted with a war before diplomacy had had 
time to arrange the terms of a settlement. Sir 
Edward Grey's fears on this score were allayed 
when the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister 
explained to him, through the Austro-Hun- 
garian ambassador at London, that the note to 
Serbia "was not an ultimatum but a demarche 
with a time limit, and that if the Austrian de- 
mands were not complied with within the time 
limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would 
break off diplomatic relations and begin 
military preparations, not operations." 1 

The German ambassador at London thought 
that a negative reply from Serbia might mean 
immediate action by Austria. In order to give 
the latter power an excuse for postponing ac- 
tion he suggested (July 24) that "a reply fa- 
vorable on some points ' ' be sent at once by Ser- 
bia. 2 

iA. R. B., 17; B. W. P., 14. 
2 B. W. P., 11. 

76 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 77 

This policy was acceptable to the Entente 
powers, for they were willing to advise Serbia 
to send a conciliatory reply to Austria. Be- 
fore the Serbian note was sent, the French for- 
eign minister had expressed the hope that Ser- 
bia's answer would be favorable enough to 
prevent a break with Austria, and, according 
to the Austrian ambassador at Paris, had ad- 
vised Serbia to go as far towards meeting Aus- 
tria-Hungary's demands as she could without 
compromising her sovereignty. 3 The British 
White Paper says that the Entente powers ad- 
vised "Serbia to go as far as possible to meet 
Austria ' ' ; and we know that Sir A. Nicholson, 
British Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, on July 23 expressed to the Serbian 
minister at London the hope that "the Serbian 
Government would endeavor to meet the 
Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moder- 
ate spirit. " 4 Sir Edward Grey thought (July 
24) that Serbia should give satisfaction to Aus- 
tria if any of her officials had been implicated 
in the plot. As "for the rest," he said, " [the] 
Serbian Government must reply to Austrian de- 
mands as they consider best in Serbian inter- 
ests." 5 The French foreign minister said on 

3B. W. P., 16; A. R. B., 13. 

4 B. W. P., VI, and No. 30. 

5 Apparently, this statement was in substance made to the 
Serbian minister at London July 24. The British minister 
at Belgrade was instructed on this same day to express this 
opinion of the British foreign minister to the Serbian Govern- 



78 The Causes of the European War 

July 27 that "the powers, particularly Eussia, 
France and England, have by their urgent ad- 
vice induced Belgrade to yield." 6 

Serbia made her reply to the Austrian note, 
on July 25, just before the forty-eight hour 
time limit expired. It was as follows : 

The Royal Serbian Government has received the 
communication of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment of the 10th [23rd] of this month, and it is per- 
suaded that its reply will remove any misunderstand- 
ing that threatens to spoil the good relations between 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of 
Serbia. 

The Royal Government is conscious that the pro- 
tests which have been made both in the tribune of 
the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and 
acts of the responsible representatives of the State, 
protests which were cut short by the declaration of 
the Serbian Government under date of 18-31 March, 
1909, have not been renewed in regard to the great 
neighboring Monarchy on any occasion, and that since 
this time both on the part of the Royal Governments 

ment, but only after he had advised with his Russian and 
French colleagues. It was too late, now, the Russian foreign 
minister thought, to make such a representation to the Ser- 
bian Government. Besides, he said, Serbia was ready to pun- 
ish any of her subjects that should be proved guilty of a 
share in the crime. The British minister at Belgrade con- 
sulted his colleagues, but found that they had not received 
instructions to act with him. Consequently, he had not, up to 
July 25 (the very day of the Serbian reply), given any ad- 
vice to the Serbian Government. He thought, however/ that 
the Russian Government had "already urged the utmost mod- 
eration on the Serbian Government." It seems, therefore, 
that Sir Edward Grey's suggestion of July 24 was conveyed 
from the British, French, and Russian cabinets to the Serbian 
Government by some channel other than that of the British 
minister at Belgrade. F. Y. B., 56; B, W. P., 12, 17, 22, 46, 
6 F, Y. B„ 61, 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 79 

which have succeeded one another and on the part 
of their agents no attempt has been made with the ob- 
ject of changing the state of affairs, either political 
or judicial, created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Royal Government note that in this respect the Im- 
perial and Royal Government has made no representa- 
tion except as regards a schoolbook, on the subject of 
which the Imperial and Royal Government received 
an entirely satisfactory explanation. 

Serbia has numerous times given proofs of her 
pacific and moderate policy during the Balkanic crisis, 
and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice she made 
in the exclusive interest of European peace that this 
peace was preserved. 

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible 
for manifestations of a private character such as the 
articles in newspapers and the peaceful work of socie- 
ties, manifestations which take place in almost all 
countries as an ordinary thing, and which as a general 
rule escape official control, all the less that the Royal 
Government at the time of the solution of the whole 
series of questions which arose between Serbia and 
Austria-Hungary has shown a great care and has suc- 
ceeded in this fashion in settling the greatest number 
of them to the profit of the progress of the two neigh- 
boring countries. 

It is for this the Royal Government has been pain- 
fully surprised by the affirmations according to which 
persons in the Kingdom of Serbia had taken part in 
the preparation of the attentat committed at Sarajevo. 
It expected to be invited to collaborate in the investi- 
gation of everything bearing upon this crime, and it 
was ready in order to prove by acts its entire cor- 
rectness, to act against all persons in regard to whom 
communications should be made to it. 

Bowing, then, to the desire of the Imperial and 
Royal Government, the Royal Government is disposed 
to hand over to the courts any Serbian. subject with- 
out regard to his situation or his rank of whose com- 



80 The Causes of the European War 

plicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs should be 
furnished. 

It undertakes especially to publish on the first page 
of the official journal under date of 13-26 July the 
following declaration : 

The Royal Government of Serbia condemns all 
propaganda which might be directed against Austria- 
Hungary, that is to say, the ensemble of the tendencies 
which have the ultimate object of detaching from the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form 
part of it, and it sincerely deplores the dreadful con- 
sequences of these criminal actions. 

The Royal Government regrets that certain Serbian 
officers and functionaries should have taken part, ac- 
cording to the communication of the Imperial and 
Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propa- 
ganda and thereby compromised the relations of good 
neighborliness to which the Royal Government had 
solemnly pledged itself by its declaration of 18-31 
March, 1909. 

The Royal Government, which disapproves and re- 
pudiates any idea of or attempt at interference in the 
destinies of the inhabitants of any part of Austria- 
Hungary whatever, considers it is its duty to formally 
warn officers, functionaries, and all the population of 
the kingdom that henceforward it will proceed with 
the utmost rigor against persons who should render 
themselves guilty of such actions, which it will use 
all its efforts to prevent and to repress. 

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of 
the royal army by an order of the day in the name 
of his Majesty the King by his Royal Highness the 
Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in 
the next official bulletin of the army. 

The Royal Government undertakes further: 
(1) To introduce at the first regular session of the 
Skupshtina a clause in the law dealing with the press 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 81 

by which the most severe punishment will fall upon 
any provocation to hatred and disdain of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy as well as upon any publica- 
tion whose general tendency would be directed against 
the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. 

It undertakes, at the time of revision of the Con- 
stitution which is soon to come, to introduce into 
Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment of such 
a character that the foregoing publications can be 
confiscated, which is actually, under the categorical 
terms of Article 22 of the Constitution, an impossi- 
bility. 

(2) The Government possesses no proof, and the 
note of the Imperial Royal Government does not 
furnish it with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" 
society and the other similar societies have committed 
up to the present any criminal act of this kind by any 
one of their members. Nevertheless the Royal Gov- 
ernment will accept the demand of the Imperial and 
Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna 
Odbrana society and any other society which should 
act against Austria-Hungary. 

(3) The Serbian Royal Government undertakes to 
eliminate without delay from the public instruction in 
Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment a 
propaganda against Austria-Hungary when the Im- 
perial and Royal Government shall furnish it with 
the facts and proofs of this propaganda. 

(4) The Royal Government similarly accepts to re- 
move from the military service those whom the judicial 
inquiry shall prove to have been guilty of acts directed 
against the integrity of the territory of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy ; it expects that the Imperial and 
Royal Government will communicate to it later the 
names and the acts of these officers and functionaries 
for the purposes of the procedure which will follow. 

(5) The Royal Government must acknowledge that 
it does not clearly understand the sense and the mean- 
ing of the demand of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 



82 The Causes of the European War 

ment contending that Serbia should undertake to ac- 
cept upon its territory the collaboration of the agents 
[officers] of the Imperial and Royal Government. 

But it declares that it will admit any collaboration 
which would fit in with the principles of international 
law and the criminal procedure, as well as accord with 
good neighborly relations. 

(6) The Royal Government, it goes without saying, 
considers it its duty to open an inquiry against all 
those who are or who, eventually, might have been 
mixed up in the plot of 15th June, and who should be 
found on the territory of the kingdom. As for the 
participation in this inquiry of agents of the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities who should be delegated to 
this effect by the Imperial and Royal Government, 
the Royal Government cannot accept it, for it would 
be a violation of the Constitution and of the law upon 
criminal procedure. However, in the concrete cases, 
communications on the results of the inquiry in ques- 
tion could be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 

(7) The Royal Government proceeded, on the eve- 
ning of the receipt of the note, to the arrest of Com- 
mander Voija Tankositch. As for Milan Ciganovitch, 
who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
and who up to the 15th June was employed as aspirant 
in the Administration of the Railways, he has not yet 
been found. The Imperial and Royal Government is 
requested to be so good as, in the accustomed form, 
to make known the soonest possible the presumptions 
of culpability, as well as the eventual proofs of culpa- 
bility, which have been gathered up to this day by 
the inquiry at Sarajevo, for the purpose of the ul- 
terior inquiries. 

(8) The Serbian Government will strengthen and 
extend the measures taken to prevent the illegal traf- 
fic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes 
without saying that it will order immediately an in- 
quiry and will severely punish the frontier function- 
aries on the Schabatz-Loznica Line who have been 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 83 

derelict in their duty and allowed the authors of the 
crime of Sarajevo to escape. 

(9) The Royal Government will willingly give ex- 
planations regarding the statements which its func- 
tionaries both in Serbia and abroad have made after 
the attentat in interviews and which according to the 
affirmation of the Imperial and Royal Government 
have been hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the 
Imperial and Royal Government shall have communi- 
cated to it the passages in question of these state- 
ments and as soon as it shall have demonstrated that 
the statements employed were in effect made by the 
said functionaries, although the Royal Government 
itself will undertake to collect proofs and convictions. 

(10) The Royal Government will inform the Im- 
perial and Royal Government of the execution of the 
measures comprised in the preceding points in so far 
as that has not already been done by the present note, 
as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and 
executed. In case the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment should not be satisfied with this reply, the Ser- 
bian Royal Government, considering that it is the 
common interest not to precipitate the solution of 
this question, is ready as always to accept a pacific un- 
derstanding by leaving this question either to the de- 
cision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, 
or to the Great Powers which took part in the elabora- 
tion of the declarations which the Serbian Govern- 
ment made on the 18-31st March, 1909. 7 

The reply of Serbia went beyond the expecta- 
tions of the Entente powers "in its moderation 
and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfac- 
tion to Austria." 8 The French director of the 
political department thought that its concilia- 

* International Conciliation, Pamphlet 84, No. 13. 
8B. W. P., 46; R. 0. B., 33. 



84 The Causes of the European War 

tory attitude would "produce the best impres- 
sion in Europe, ' ' 9 and the foreign minister ex- 
pressed himself as believing that as Serbia had 
yielded on nearly all points, a little mutual 
good-will would bring about an agreement. 10 
Sir Edward Grey considered that Serbia had 
subjected herself to the greatest humiliation 
that he had ever known a country to undergo. 
He was therefore disappointed when Austria 
received the note as a flat refusal when she 
should, in his opinion, have accepted it as a 
basis for negotiation. 11 

Serbia's reply was not acceptable to Austria. 
A comparison of the Serbian and Austrian 
notes shows that Serbia declined to meet the 
demand that Austro-Hungarian officials be al- 
lowed to participate in the trial of alleged "par- 
ticipants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who 
are [were] on Serbian territory." As to de- 
mand 5, that Austro-Hungarian officials be al- 
lowed in Serbia to "cooperate in the suppres- 
sion of a movement directed against the ter- 
ritorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy," Serbia declared her willingness 
"to accept every cooperation which does not 
run counter to international law and criminal 
law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly 
relations." Austria-Hungary contended that 

9 R. O. B., 27. ii B. W. P., 46, 48. 

10 F. Y. B., 75. 



Serbia's Reply to Austria-Hungary 85 

on other points, too, the Serbian answer failed 
to meet the requirements of her note, and that 
the whole statement was an effort to deceive the 
powers, as Serbia knew that the promises given 
would not be kept. 12 The German ambassador 
at Vienna was of the same opinion. 13 

Austria-Hungary, therefore, broke diplo- 
matic relations at once 14 and notified France, 
July 27, that she would on the next day take 
steps to make Serbia give satisfaction. 15 Ger- 
many supported Austria in this policy, and be- 
lieved the latter had a right to " secure full 
guarantees that Serbia's promises shall 
[should] be also turned into deeds/' 16 Ac- 
cording to Eussian and French sources, how- 
ever, the Austrian and German ambassadors at 
Paris were surprised that the reply had not 
satisfied the Austrian Government, 17 and Sir 
Edward Grey stated that the German secretary 
of state admitted that " there were some things 
in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly 
be expected to accept." 18 

12 A. R. B., 34, enclosure and 39; B. W. P., 48. 

is B. W. P., 32. 

14 A. R. B., 24. 

is F. Y. B., 75. 

16 G. W. B., annex 22; R. O. B., 43. 

it R. 0. B., 27; F. Y. B., 57. 

is B. W. P., 46. 



CHAPTER VI 

EFFORTS TO PREVENT WAR 

The danger of a rupture between Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia became imminent as soon 
as the former announced her refusal to give 
the latter a longer time in which to meet her 
demands. As Europe was divided into two 
rival groups, each composed of great powers 
tied together by alliances, a war between Serbia 
and Austria-Hungary would almost inevitably 
widen into a general conflict. The great prob- 
lem, therefore, that confronted European 
diplomacy was to settle the Austro-Serbian 
quarrel without war or, if this could not be 
done, to prevent this local quarrel from widen- 
ing into a European conflict. 

Two solutions were proposed. One was to 
allow Austria to punish Serbia but to prevent 
the trouble from spreading to other countries. 
The other was to settle the difficulty without a 
war between Serbia and Austria. A great war 
could therefore be avoided if the Austro-Ser- 
bian conflict could be either localized or pre- 

86 



Efforts to Prevent War 87 

vented. Germany was the champion of " local- 
ization,' ' * Russia of prevention 2 of war. 

The difficulties of this problem were greater 
than were those raised by the annexation 
(1908) of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- 
Hungary. Now, as then, both Russia and 
Serbia were in violent opposition to the policy 
of the Dual Monarchy. Now, as then, the 
friends of Russia, France and Great Britain, 
were not sufficiently interested to go to war 
solely over an Austro-Serbian quarrel. Then 
Russia and Serbia were finally induced to yield 
to Austria-Hungary. Both Serbia and Russia, 
however, considered that their grievance now 
against the Habsburg Government was greater 
than it had been on the former occasion; for 
if the Austrian demands were met in their en- 
tirety the independence of Serbia would, in 
their opinion, unquestionably be compromised. 
Besides, Russia, at the time of the annexation 
crisis, did not feel that she had the military 
strength to risk a war with Germany and 
Austria; now she was more hopeful as to the 
state of her military preparedness. In 1908-9 
there was plenty of time for negotiations ; now 
there were only a few days in which to settle 
the quarrel. 

These difficulties would have taxed the diplo- 

iG. W. B., annex, 1 and 13; B. W. P., 9, 46; R. O. B., 18. 
2F. Y. B., 83; B. W. P., 56. 



88 The Causes of the European War 

matic skill of a Bismarck or a Talleyrand; but 
Europe at this time could not point to any great 
names in the list of her official diplomats. In 
fact, the inefficiency exhibited by European 
diplomacy during this great crisis is one of the 
most unfortunate circumstances connected with 
the entire war. The diplomats, however, took 
up the task before them and worked energetic- 
ally at the problems confronting them. Efforts 
to prevent war were made both before and after 
Serbia's reply to the Austrian ultimatum was 
delivered. 

.Germany's plan for solving the problem was 
to induce Eussia to stand aside and allow Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Serbia to settle their own 
quarrel. 3 If Serbia were unsupported by a 
great power she would, of course, have to yield 
and there would be no war. Germany, there- 
fore, early in the dispute, made an effort to se- 
cure the neutrality of Eussia toward a possible 
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 
Before Austria had sent her note to Serbia, the 
German ambassador at London had asked Sir 
Edward Grey to exercise a "moderating influ- 
ence at St. Petersburg. ' ' After the note was 
sent, Sir Edward Grey in a conversation with 
the German ambassador said (July 24) that, 
"in view of the extraordinarily stiff character 
of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time 

3G. W. B., annex 13. 



Efforts to Prevent War 89 

allowed, and the wide scope of the demands 
upon Serbia/ ' he "felt quite helpless as far as 
Russia was concerned,' ' and he "did not be- 
lieve any power could exercise influence 
alone." 4 

Later (July 26) Germany asked that France 
unite with her in trying to influence Russia to 
moderation. France regarded this proposal as 
an effort to separate her from her ally and 
compromise her in the eyes of Russia. The 
same effort was made by Germany in London 
on or before July 27. Paris and London re- 
plied that Russia had "given proof of the 
greatest moderation, especially in urging upon 
Serbia to accept all that was possible of the 
Serbian note." According to these Govern- 
ments, the lack of moderation had been shown 
by Vienna and it was there that action should 
be taken. After this rebuff, Germany ap- 
parently gave up "the idea of pressure upon 
Eussia only" and inclined rather "toward 
mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at 
Vienna. ' ' 5 

Sir Edward Grey was in favor of the joint 
"mediation of the four Powers ... in the Ser- 
bian question, namely, England, France, Italy, 
and Germany, this mediation to be exercised 
simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Peters- 

*b. w. P., 10, n. 

5F. Y. B., 56; B. W. P., 46; R. 0. B., 35, 53. 



90 The Causes of the European War 

burg." We find him and the French ambas- 
sador at London on July 24 agreeing that it 
would be wise for the English cabinet to ask 
Germany to take the initiative in an effort at 
mediation between Austria and Serbia. Sir 
Edward Grey expressed at this time "his de- 
sire to leave no stone unturned to avert the 
crisis." 6 The policy of joint mediation was 
approved by Eussia and Italy, and the French 
foreign minister declared his willingness to co- 
operate in any conciliatory action at Vienna. ' ' 7 
Germany, however, was opposed to interven- 
tion between Austria and Serbia, but Herr von 
Jagow, German foreign minister, said (July 
25) that he was ready to join in with Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's plan of mediation "if the rela- 
tions between Austria and Eussia became 
threatening. ' ' 8 

As Austria had broken off relations with Ser- 
bia, these two powers were now on the verge of 
war and if this calamity were to be avoided 
either the former must modify her demands or 
the latter must grant them unqualifiedly. Italy 
was the only power that seemed to make a seri- 
ous effort to induce Serbia to comply with Aus- 

e F. Y. B., 32, 34. 

7 The Russian foreign minister said (July 25) that "if Ser- 
bia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready- 
to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, 
France, Germany, and Italy." 

B. W. P., 17, 35; F. Y. B., 34. 

s B. W. P., 18; G. W. B., annex 13. 



Efforts to Prevent War 91 

tria's demands. The Italian minister for for- 
eign affairs expressed the opinion on July 27 
that it would have been wiser if Serbia had ac- 
cepted Austria-Hungary's terms in their en- 
tirety. He was satisfied that Austria-Hungary 
would not agree to modify these terms, and he 
doubted if Germany would urge her to do so. 
The wise thing, therefore, was for Serbia to 
yield. Austria-Hungary, he thought, would be 
satisfied if Serbia would now agree to comply 
with the provisions of the Austrian note. Ser- 
bia could save her dignity by accepting the note 
under the advice of the four powers. She could 
then say that she had yielded at the suggestion 
of Europe rather than at the behest of Austria- 
Hungary. 9 

The Serbian charge d'affaires at Rome ex- 
presed the opinion that if Austria would ex- 
plain articles 5 and 6 of her note, ' * Serbia might 
still accept the whole note." It was not ex- 
pected that Austria-Hungary would make these 
explanations to Serbia, but she might give them 
to the "powers engaged in discussions, who 
might then advise Serbia to accept without con- 
ditions." The Italian foreign minister re- 
quested the English ambassador at Rome to re- 
port this information to his Government. The 
former was very anxious that a discussion of 
this phase of the question should be undertaken 
at once, and seemed to want England to ap- 

»F. Y. B., 72; B. W. P., 57. 



92 The Causes of the European War 

proach Austria-Hungary on the subject, though 
there is no clear statement of such a wish. 10 
Sir Edward Grey's reply to this proposal was 
that he would not take up the question with 
Austria-Hungary as that power had shown an 
unwillingness to "accept any discussion on 
basis of Serbian note." 1X The British foreign 
minister did, however, present Italy's plan to 
the German ambassador, but made no proposal 
of his own. 12 

The Russian foreign minister had declared 
(July 26) that certain of the demands made 
by Austria-Hungary could not be met by Serbia 
without changing her laws and also incurring 
the risk of exciting mob violence against the 
Government. 13 Three days later, after she had 
ordered partial mobilization and war between 
herself and Austria seemed imminent, Russia 
showed great anxiety to avoid a conflict. At 
that time Sir George Buchanan, English am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg, asked the Russian 
foreign minister if he would object to the sug- 
gestion of Italy that Serbia promise the powers 
to meet fully the demands of Austria-Hungary. 
His reply was that "he would agree to any- 
thing arranged by the Four Powers, provided 
it was acceptable to Serbia' ' — that he was not 
"more Serbian than Serbia." 14 

10 B. W. P., 64. 13 R. O. B., 25. 

ii B. W. P., 81. I* B. W. P., 78. 

12 B. W. P., 90. 



Efforts to Prevent War 93 

The published correspondence of the various 
Governments does not show that the negotia- 
tions along this line proceeded any further, nor 
does it explain why they ceased at this point. 
It is charged that Austria did not expect nor 
want Serbia to accept her proposals. The Ser- 
bian ambassador at Vienna considered, he says, 
on July 24 that war with Austria was inevitable, 
even if Serbia should accede to all of Austria's 
demands. 15 The French ambassador at Vienna 
thought that the military party in Austria did 
not want Serbia to yield. 16 On July 27, the 
British ambassador expressed the opinion 
that the Austro-Hungarian Government was 
anxious for war with Serbia and the Austro- 
Hungarian note had been "so drawn up as to 
make war inevitable." 17 Germany, too, ac- 
cording to a Eussian source, did not want the 
breach between Serbia and Austria to be 
healed. The Eussian charge d'affaires at 
Berlin contended that up until July 28 the Wolf 
Bureau had not published the contents of the 
Serbian note, for fear that it would have a con- 
ciliatory effect on the people. 18 

Two plans for the prevention of war had now 
failed, but there was left the possibility of in- 
ducing Austria-Hungary ' ' either to approve the 
response from Belgrade or else to accept it as a 
basis for discussions." To bring about one of 

is S. B. B., 52. " B. W. P., 41. 

la F. Y. B., 27. is R. O. B., 46. 



94 The Causes of the European War 

these results was the aim of Sir Edward Grey. 
At first his efforts seem to have been directed 
toward the former objective and later toward 
the latter. 19 

The Entente Governments felt that Germany 
was the only power that could influence Austria 
to abate her demands. The "key of the situa- 
tion/ ' according to M. Sazonof, Eussian 
foreign minister, "was in Berlin.' ' The first 
important move would have to be made by Ger- 
many. So on July 25 Sir Edward Grey ex- 
pressed to the German ambassador at London 
the hope that his Government would "be able 
to influence the Austrian Government to take 
a favorable view" of the Serbian note, if it 
should prove to be as conciliatory as the fore- 
cast of it indicated. The German foreign office 
"passed on" the desire of Britain, but, accord- 
ing to her contention, apparently made no ef- 
fore to influence Austria-Hungary to adopt the 
suggestion. Germany gave as a reason for her 
hesitancy in pressing Austria the danger that 
Austria would come out with a fait accompli. 
On July 29 the secretary of state for foreign 
affairs seemed distressed and said that Austria- 
Hungary had done what he feared. He also 
felt that by passing on England's suggestion 
he had hastened a declaration of war. 20 

19 A. R B., 29, 38, 43. 

20 B. W. P., vi; 25, 27, 34, 54, 76; G. W, B., annex 15; 
A. R. B., 43, 44. 



Efforts to Prevent War 95 

Sir Edward Grey's other plan was that 
Eussia and Austria-Hungary agree to abstain 
from military operations until the four powers 
not directly concerned — Italy, Great Britain, 
France, and Germany — could arrange a satis- 
factory agreement. The ambassadors repre- 
senting those four Governments at London 
should keep in touch with each other and by 
their joint efforts try to work over the Serbian 
concessions and change them into terms that 
would be acceptable to both sides. A proposal 
to this effect was made by him July 26, and the 
other three powers were invited to take part 
in the conference. 21 France, 22 Italy, and Eus- 
sia 23 agreed to the plan. 

Germany, while opposed to mediation be- 
tween Austria and Serbia, said that she ac- 
cepted the principle of mediation between Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Eussia, but was opposed to 
the conference proposed by Grey on the ground 
that it would be a court of arbitration and could 
not be called except at the request of these two 
powers. Besides, she favored a direct inter- 

The German under-secretary of state was of the opinion 
that his Government, by merely submitting to Austria-Hun- 
gary the British proposal, gave it a qualified endorsement. 
B. W. P., 34. 

2i A. R. B., 38, 41 ; B. W. P., 36. 

22 F. Y. B., 70. 

23 B. W. P., 49, 55. 

The Russian foreign minister said that "he was perfectly 
ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for 
a conference." 



96 The Causes of the European War 

change of views between Austria and Eussia, 
and thought that nothing else should be done 
until the result of these negotiations was 
known. The British ambassador at Berlin ex- 
plained that Sir Edward Grey's plan did not 
contemplate a court of arbitration but only an 
informal discussion as to what could be done, 
no suggestion to be considered that had not 
previously been consented to by Austria-Hun- 
gary and Eussia. 24 The French ambassador at 
Berlin expressed his regret at Germany's re- 
fusal. He said that Sir Edward Grey's plan 
went beyond the question of form — the main 
point in his plan was the cooperation of the 
four powers in the interest of peace ; that this 
cooperation could take place in the form of 
"common demarches at Vienna and at St. 
Petersburg. ' ' 25 Austria, however, declined 
the proposal and Sir Edward Grey agreed that 
direct negotiations between Austria and Eus- 
sia were preferable to his plan of a conference, 
if a direct interchange of views between Vienna 
and St. Petersburg could be effected. 20 The 

24 G. W. B., annexes 12 and 13; B. W. P., 43, 46, 67. 

The reason afterwards given by Von Jagow, German Secre- 
tary of State, for his opposition to Sir Edward Grey's proposal 
was that the Teutonic powers would probably have suffered a 
diplomatic defeat in a European conference at that time. For 
Italy, because of her sympathy with Serbia and her rivalry 
with Austria, would have opposed her allies in the conference. 
Lichnowsky Memorandum, Inter. Conciliation, No. 127, p. 363. 

25 F. Y. B., 74. 

26 B. W. P., 67; G. W. B., S., 775. 



Efforts to Prevent War 97 

plan of a conference, therefore, fell into abey- 
ance for the time being, the powers awaiting 
the outcome of the direct negotiations, which 
had already been started. 

Russia had taken the initiative in opening 
these negotiations. In an interview (July 26) 
with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, M. Sazonof, the Russian foreign 
minister, suggested an exchange of views be- 
tween the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernments "in order to redraft certain articles 
of the Austrian note." "This method of pro- 
cedure would perhaps enable us [the two Gov- 
ernments] to find a formula which would prove 
acceptable to Serbia, while giving satisfaction 
to Austria in respect to the chief of her de- 
mands.' ' He asked at this time that Austria- 
Hungary take back her ultimatum to Serbia and 
modify her terms, and promised that he would 
guarantee the result. 27 M. Sazonof at first was 
hopeful as to the result of these pourparlers; 
and this first meeting between him and Count 
Szapary had, according to English sources, 
made a good impression at Vienna. 28 The 
Russian ambassador at Berlin (July 27) asked 
Von Jagow, the German secretary of state, to 
persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government 
to accept Russia's proposal to negotiate with 
reference to the Serbian question. Von 

27 R. O. B., 25; F. Y. B., 54. 28 F. Y. B., 80. 



98 The Causes of the European War 

Jagow's attitude was one of acquiescence in the 
plan, but he declined to advise Austria-Hun- 
gary to yield, even though the ambassador 
urged him to take a more decided stand in favor 
of the proposal. 29 

This plan, however, failed, for Count Berch- 
told, Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, told the Russian minister at 
Vienna (July 28) that Austria could not with- 
draw from the position that she had taken nor 
could she "enter upon any discussion of the 
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note. ' ' 30 

The proposal for the mediation of the four 
powers was also rejected by Austria-Hungary. 
She declared war on Serbia July 28, 31 and next 
day made a formal statement as to her reasons 
for so doing. The Serbian Government, she 
said, had "proceeded to the mobilization of the 
Serbian forces before it replied to our [her] 
note, and subsequently has [had] allowed three 
days to elapse without showing any disposition 
to modify its point of view." The Austro- 
Hungarian minister had also previously 
charged Serbia with having attacked Austrian 
frontier guards on July 27. 32 

The efforts to prevent war had failed, but all 
negotiations between Russia and Austria were 
not at an end. Russia had partially mobilized 

29 R. O. B., 38. si A. R. B., 37. 

so R, 0. B., 45. 32 A. R. B., 41, 44. 



Efforts to Prevent War 99 

but was still anxious to come to an agreement 
with Austria. Both the Russian foreign minis- 
ter and the German ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg favored an l ' interchange of views between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia." M. Sazonof 
also thought well of Sir Edward Grey's plan of 
a conference of the four powers. Both plans 
for peace could, in his judgment, be wisely pros- 
ecuted simultaneously. 33 

The war that soon widened into a world con- 
flict had now begun. The powers that started 
the flame are responsible for the world con- 
flagration. This responsibility cannot by any 
possibility be placed at the doors of France, 
Russia, or England. Prince Lichnowsky is 
right in the opinion that if the Entente Gov- 
ernments had wanted war they could have 
gotten it by suggesting to Serbia that she re- 
fuse to yield to Austria-Hungary. |Such an 
intimation would have caused Serbia to refuse 
to accept the Austrian demands to the extent 
that she did and war would have been certain. 
The cause of this Balkan war was Austria's 
unreasonable ultimatum to Serbia and her re- 
fusal to accept any satisfaction that would not 
reduce the little state to a condition of vassal- 
age. Germany, by her own admission, shared 
equally with Austria the responsibility for 
the latter 's unreasonable demands on Serbia. 

33 R. O. B., 49; B. W. P., 118. 



100 The Causes of the European War 

Therefore, Germany and Austria must unques- 
tionably bear the blame for the Austro-Serbian 
war. This fact alone would fix upon them the 
main responsibility for the European war. 
For a Balkan war is always liable to bring on 
a general conflict and the danger was particu- 
larly great in 1914, owing to the tangled con- 
dition of European relations at that time. 

We cannot at this time say with absolute 
certainty whether the Teutonic powers wanted 
a war with Eussia in 1914 or preferred to make 
a successful stroke in the Balkans at small cost. 
Some evidence points to the former theory and 
some to the latter. Prince Lichnowsky, for 
example, in one place represents the German 
foreign office as assuming that Russia was not 
able to strike and therefore that the Central 
powers could get away with the Balkan loot 
without being chased. In another place, how- 
ever, he speaks as if Wilhelmstrasse felt that 
the sooner the Teutons and the Russians had 
it out the better it would be for the former. 
One thing, however, is certain — that the Cen- 
tral powers were willing to take a chance on 
starting a general war rather than forego their 
designs on Serbia. Now, a nation that would 
risk a universal conflict at a time like that is 
guilty of the results that follow, even though it 
did not desire them. If the Teutonic Govern- 
ments really thought that they could bluff Rus- 



Efforts to Prevent War 101 

sia into acquiescence in their Balkan policy, 
this belief would, to a slight degree, extenuate, 
though by no means excuse, the guilt of the 
crime. 34 

34 Lichnowsky Mem. Inter. Conciliation, No. 127, pp. 325, 
341, 327. 



CHAPTER VII 

EFFORTS TO ISOLATE THE WAR 

The effort to prevent war having failed, the 
policy of "isolation" now offered the only hope 
for peace. Efforts in this direction had 
already been made. These had no chance of 
success unless Eussia could be induced to stand 
aside and acquiesce in the punishment of Ser- 
bia, or Austria-Hungary could be persuaded to 
stop hostilities against Serbia and moderate 
her demands. Therefore, the great problem 
still was how to bring Austria-Hungary and 
Russia to an agreement. 

Despite Russia's determination to stand by 
her protege, there was still a possibility that the 
war between Austria and Serbia would not drag 
in the other European nations. Both Russia 
and the Teutonic powers seemed anxious to 
avoid a general war. The German chancellor 
said, as late as the evening of July 29, that he 
was still " ' pressing the button' as hard as he 
could" at Vienna. 1 The French minister at St. 
Petersburg more than once spoke of the anxiety 

i b. w. P., 71, 97, 107. 

102 



Efforts to Isolate the War 103 

of the Russian Government for peace. 2 Ac- 
cording to the British White Paper, Russia 
wanted a period of peace to develop her internal 
resources. 3 It is true that the Russian ambas- 
sador at Vienna had declared officially (July 
27) to the Austro-Hungarian Government that 
in case war broke out between the Dual Mon- 
archy and Serbia "it would be impossible to 
localize it, for Russia was not prepared to give 
way again, as she had done on previous occa- 
sions." 4 The Teutonic authorities, however, 
seemed to think that Russia would not go to 
war at this time. She was having revolution- 
ary troubles at home, and her military prepar- 
edness, it was thought, was not adequate, de- 
spite assurances to the contrary given out by 
the Russian Government. 5 Britain and France 
had no interest in the Austro-Serbian dispute 
unless it grew into a Russo-Austrian quarrel. 6 
The German Emperor felt that Russia ought 
not to interfere with Austria's purpose to chas- 
tise Serbia. His position was that the trouble 
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was lo- 
cal and that the latter was justified in secur- 
ing such guarantees as would force Serbia to 
turn her promises into deeds. Inasmuch as 

2 F. Y. B., 31, 38, 54. 

3 B. W. P., viii. 
*B. W. P., 56. 

s B. G. B. (2), 12; B. W. P., 32; F. Y. B., 96. 
6B. W. P., 48; A. R. B., 38. 



104 The Causes of the European War 

Austria-Hungary had promised to annex no ter- 
ritory from Serbia, Eussia could afford to stand 
aside as a disinterested spectator. 7 

Eussia, however, took an entirely different 
view of her obligations to Serbia. Both senti- 
mental and political considerations urged her to 
protect Serbia. Public sentiment, therefore, 
would not allow the Government to stand aside 
and see the little Slavic state humiliated. The 
feeling in Eussia was that Eussians could not 
desert their brethren in Serbia. 8 Besides, the 
Eussian Government felt that the real cause of 
the trouble was Austria's desire to be supreme 
in the Balkan peninsula. If Eussia allowed 
Serbia's independence to be compromised, she 
considered that she would lose her position in 
the Balkans, and the hegemony of these states 
would in the future belong to Austria-Hungary. 
Therefore, she had, as has been seen, an- 
nounced in the very beginning that if France 
would support her, she would intervene in case 
Serbia were attacked. 9 It seems that Austria- 
Hungary, too, felt that her future with refer- 
ence to the Balkan states was at stake, for 
Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian am- 
bassador at London, told Sir Edward Grey on 
July 29 that "Serbia had always been consid- 

7 G. W. B., annex 22. 

s Ibid., annex 18. 

9 F. Y. B., 103; B. W. P., 17; R. 0. B., 10; G. W. B., annex 4. 



Efforts to Isolate the War 105 

ered as being in the Austrian sphere of in- 
fluence" prior to the Balkan War. 10 

Austria's promise to respect the integrity of 
Serbia did not satisfy Russia, even though it 
was afterwards ratified by Germany. 11 Be- 
sides, this promise was later (July 27) condi- 
tioned on the localization of the war between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. There was a 
danger, as England pointed out, that public 
sentiment in Austria might make it impossible 
for the Austro-Hungarian Government to re- 
deem its pledge. 12 Russia, however, insisted 
on the maintenance of the independence as well 
as the integrity of Serbia and she contended 
that the enforcement of Austria's demands 
would reduce the little state to a condition of 
vassalage under the Dual Monarchy. This 
would disturb the equilibrium in the Balkans 
and would thus touch Russia's interests. 
Therefore, the Russian Government could not, 
in the opinion of M. Sazonof, afford to allow 
Serbian independence to be jeopardized. 13 

Austria-Hungary declared (July 30) that she 
had repeatedly promised to respect the sover- 
eignty of Serbia and accused the Russian Gov- 
ernmnet of having suppressed information re- 
garding these assurances. This charge was 

io b. w. P., 91. 

ii Ibid., 97. 

12 A. R. B., 32 ; B. W. P., vi-vii. 

is A. R. B., 47; B. W. P., 55, 90, 97, 111. 



106 The Causes of the European War 

emphatically denied by the Kussian ambassador 
at Paris. 14 In support of Austria's contention 
regarding her promises as to the independence 
of Serbia, we have the following evidence: 
Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, instructed the Austro-Hun- 
garian ambassador at St. Petersburg (July 25) 
to inform M. Sazonof, the Eussian foreign min- 
ister, that clause 5 of the Austrian note was 
"not intended as an infringement on Serbia's 
sovereignty. ' ' 15 The Austro-Hungarian am- 
bassador stated (July 29) to M. Sazonof that 
his Government had no intention to violate the 
sovereignty of Serbia. The British ambas- 
sador at Vienna stated (July 29) that Austria 
had declared in St. Petersburg that she had no 
desire to destroy the independence of Serbia. 16 
These promises, however, rested for their ful- 
fillment only on the good faith of Austria-Hun- 
gary, as the guarantee of her ally, Germany, 
did not cover the independence of Serbia. 
Eussia's fears were not allayed by these declar- 
ations ; for her foreign minister considered that 
the Dual Monarchy was already trying to com- 
promise the sovereignty of Serbia by insisting 
on the enforcement of its demands. 17 On July 
28 he told the English ambassador at St. 

i* A. R. B., 50 ; R. O. B., 75. 
is A. R. B., 27. 
is A. R. B., 47; B. W. P., 79. 
it A. R. B., 47. 



Efforts to Isolate the War 107 

Petersburg that Kussia would not be satisfied 
with any assurances that Austria-Hungary 
might give as to the integrity and independence 
of Serbia if Serbia should be invaded. 18 

The Italian ambassador at Vienna thought 
(July 29) that if Austria-Hungary would con- 
vert into a binding engagement the declaration 
that she had made, promising not to destroy the 
independence or integrity of Serbia, "Russia 
might be induced to remain quiet." 19 Two 
days later, Sir Edward Grey suggested that, as 
Eussian distrust of Austria's assurances as to 
the integrity and independence of Serbia and 
Austrian distrust of Serbian promises had been 
a bar to an agreement, the powers should offer 
to guarantee to Austria that she should re- 
ceive full satisfaction from Serbia and to 
guarantee to Russia that Austria would not 
interfere with the integrity and independence 
of Serbia. Sir Edward Grey's proposal car- 
ried with it the provision that Germany would 
sound Austria-Hungary as to her agreement 
with such a plan and he would sound Russia. 
The plan was presented to the German secre- 
tary of state on July 31, after the German 
demand for demobilization had been sent to 
Russia. He expressed sympathy with the idea 
but declared that his Government could not 

is B. W. P., 72; A. R. B., 55. 
is B. W. P., 79. 



108 The Causes of the European War 

consider any proposal until after it had heard 
from Eussia. 20 

In the meantime other efforts at mediation 
had been made. On July 29 the French ambas- 
sador at Berlin suggested that after Austria 
had entered Serbia and chastised her and thus 
satisfied her own military prestige, the moment 
might then be favorable for mediation of the 
four powers. The German under-secretary of 
state seemed to think the idea worthy of consid- 
eration and thought it a very different proposi- 
tion from the plan of a conference offered by 
Sir Edward Grey. 21 

M. Sazonof, the Russian foreign minister, on 
that same day asked Sir Edward Grey to renew 
his proposal of the conference and to endeavor 
to induce Germany's cooperation. This re- 
quest came at a time when Russia was "mobil- 
izing partially in her southern provinces, ,,22 
and Austro-Hungarian troops were bombarding 
Belgrade. As Germany had on July 28 (re- 
ceived July 29) given England assurances that 
she was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, 23 Sir Edward Grey on the 29th took 
up with the German ambassador, in accordance 
with the wish of the Russian Government, the 
question of renewing the plan of joint media- 

20 b. w. P., Ill, 121. 

21 B. W. P., 76. 

22 B. W. P., 70, 78; also vi-vii. 

23 B. W. P., 71. 



Efforts to Isolate the War 109 

tion. He asked the German Government to 
suggest a plan of mediation that would be ac- 
ceptable to it, inasmuch as it had objected to 
the conference previously proposed by him on 
the ground that it was too formal. " Mediation 
was ready," he said, "to come into operation 
by any method that Germany thought possible 
if only Germany would ' press the button' in 
the interests of peace." 

Sazonof 's offer of mediation was conditioned 
on a suspension of hostilities against Serbia by 
Austria; otherwise, he said, "mediation would 
only allow matters to drag on and give Austria 
time to crush Serbia." Sir Edward Grey 
thought that it was now "too late for all mili- 
tary operations against Serbia to be sus- 
pended"; but he wanted Austria to promise 
that after she had taken Belgrade her armies 
would not advance farther pending the media- 
tion of the powers. It was understood, how- 
ever, that Austria-Hungary was to hold the 
territory occupied until she "had complete 
satisfaction from Serbia. ' ' 24 

The German Government promised (July 30) 
to endeavor to influence Austria-Hungary to ac- 
cept mediation on the terms laid down by the 
British foreign office, and the chancellor said 
that on the evening of that day he begged Aus- 
tria to reply to Sir Edward Grey's proposal. 

2* B, W. P., 70, 78, 84, 88. 



110 The Causes of the European War 

As yet Austria-Hungary had made no reply, but 
her foreign minister promised to take the 
wishes of the Emperor next morning (July 
31 ). 25 

On this same July 30 there occurred at 2 a. m. 
a memorable meeting between M. Sazonof, the 
Russian foreign minister, and the German am- 
bassador at St. Petersburg. When the German 
ambassador saw that Russia's determination 
was unshaken and that war was inevitable, he 
"completely broke down." "He appealed to 
M, Sazonof to make some suggestion which he 
could telegraph to German Government as a 
last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up 
and handed to German ambassador a formula 
in French, of which following is translation: 
' If Austria recognizing that her conflict with 
Serbia has assumed character of question of 
European interest, declares herself ready to 
eliminate from her ultimatum points which 
violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Rus- 
sia engages to stop all military prepara- 
tions. ' " 26 

At Great Britain's request, Russia agreed to 
modify her offer, leaving it to the powers to 
decide what satisfaction Serbia would give Aus- 
tria without compromising her independence. 27 

25 B. W. P., 98, 100, 103, 112. 

26 B. W. P., 97. 

27 B. W. P., 103, 120. 



Efforts to Isolate the War 111 

On July 29 Austria-Hungary, acting on the ad- 
vice of Germany, renewed negotiations with 
Russia 28 and two days later she announced her 
willingness, despite the change in the situation 
due to Russian mobilization, to consider Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's proposition to mediate between 
herself and Serbia. The conditions laid down 
by the foreign minister were as follows: 

Our acceptance, however, is subject to the condi- 
tion that our military action against Serbia shall 
nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall 
induce the Russian Government to stop the mobiliza- 
tion directed against us. It is understood that in this 
case we would at once cancel our defensive military 
counter-measures in Galicia, which had been forced 
upon us by Russia's mobilization. 29 

28 B. W. P., 110, 96; A. R. B., 47, 49; G. W. B., S., 777. 

29 A. R. B., 51. 



CHAPTEE VIII 

THE WAR AEEA BROADENS 

Hopes of peace were now aroused. These, 
however, were soon dashed to the ground, for 
Germany, at this time, July 31, sent an ulti- 
matum to Russia, demanding the cessation of 
her mobilization within twelve hours. 1 No re- 
ply being received, Germany began to mobilize, 
and on August 1 war on Russia was declared by 
Germany. 2 All hope of a peaceful settlement 
of the dispute now ended. Germany charges 
that Russian mobilization was the cause of this 
final failure of the efforts for peace. 3 The En- 
tente powers, on the other hand, blame it on the 
German ultimatum. They claim that it was en- 
tirely unnecessary, as the Russo-British plan 
for mediation provided for a general suspen- 
sion of hostilities. 

Inasmuch as Russian mobilization figures as 
an important cause of the war, it is necessary 
to give in brief the steps that led to Russian 
and German mobilization. On July 26 Ger- 

i r. o. B., 76. 

2R. O. B., 70; B. W. P., 117; G. W. B., 24, 25. 

3 G. W. B., S., I, 779. 

112 



The War Area Broadens 113 

many heard through her military attache at St. 
Petersburg that Russia had begun mobilization. 
In consequence of this report, the German Gov- 
ernment declared to the Russian Government 
that "preparatory military measures by Rus- 
sia' ' would force Germany to mobilize against 
both Russia and France, inasmuch as Germany 
knew of France's obligations to Russia. 4 Ger- 
many was assured by Russia on the 27th that 
mobilization had not begun, though prepara- 
tions for it had been made. It was stated, 
however, that mobilization against Austria- 
Hungary would begin if Serbia's frontier was 
crossed, but that under no circumstances would 
it extend to the districts next to Germany's 
frontier. A like statement was made to Aus- 
tria-Hungary July 28. 5 

After Austria-Hungary had declared war on 
Serbia, Russia (July 29) announced her deci- 
sion to mobilize in the four southern districts 
near Austria-Hungary. At the same time she 
declared that her military movements were not 
directed against Germany, nor was there any 
aggressive action intended against Austria- 
Hungary. Russia had no intention to make a 
sudden attack on Austria-Hungary, but her 
troops would be kept under arms to be ready in 
case her interests in the Balkans were menaced. 

* G. W. B„ exhibit 7 ; also 6., 774. 
5 G. W. B., exhibit 11; A. R. B., 42. 



114 The Causes of the European War 

Such measures had to be taken by her, she 
contended, inasmuch as Austria could mobilize 
more quickly than she could and already had the 
start of her. 6 

Several reasons for this action were given by 
Russia. She was offended because Austria had 
completely ignored her in the Serbian dispute. 
Other reasons were that Austria had gone to 
war with Serbia and had mobilized more exten- 
sively than this war warranted, giving rise to 
the impression that these movements were di- 
rected against Russia. She declared that Aus- 
tria had already mobilized half of her army, and 
that this mobilization was proceeding on the 
Russian frontier, according to information re- 
ceived by the Russian ambassador at Berlin. 
Then, too, Austria-Hungary had declined to 
continue the conversations that had been going 
on between the two powers. 7 Austria-Hun- 
gary, however, contended that she had not 
mobilized against Russia but only against Ser- 
bia, but would now have to mobilize against 
Russia, not as a hostile act, but as a response 
to Russia's mobilization. She, therefore, or- 
dered a general mobilization on July 31. 8 

When Germany learned that Russia had par- 
tially mobilized, she notified the latter power 

6R. O. B., 49; A. E. B., 47. 

7 B. W. P., 95; F. Y. B., 95; R. O. B., 51, 77; A. R. B., 47. 

8 A. R. B., 50, 52. 



The War Area Broadens 115 

that if she did not cease her military prepara- 
tions, she [Germany] would order mobilization. 
Russia felt that she could not accede to this 
demand, and, therefore, had no alternative but 
to hasten military preparations and consider 
that war was inevitable. On July 31 Russia 
ordered a general mobilization. The Emperor 
of Germany was, however, assured by Czar 
Nicholas that "his troops would not move so 
long as mediation negotiations continued." 
The reason alleged for this action was that 
Austria had determined not to yield to the 
intervention of the powers and was moving 
troops against Russia as well as Serbia, or, 
in other words, had begun general mobilization. 
Besides, she had reason to believe that Ger- 
many was making active military preparations 
and Russia could not afford to let her get the 
start. 9 Sazonof, the Russian foreign minister, 
told the English ambassador at St. Petersburg 
on July 30 that he had absolute proof that Ger- 
many was making military and naval prepara- 
tions against Russia. 10 The German chan- 
cellor as late as July 31 declared that his Gov- 
ernment had made no preparations for mobili- 
zation. The German White Book also charges 
that between July 29 and 31 there appeared re- 
newed and cumulative evidence concerning Rus- 

9R. O. B., 58; F. Y. B., 100; B. W. P., 113; S., 1022. 
io B. W. P., 97; R. O. B., 61, 62. 



116 The Causes of the European War 

sian mobilization. Concentration of troops on 
the east Eussian frontier and a declaration of a 
state of Avar over all important parts of Eus- 
sia 's west frontier allowed no further doubt 
that Eussian mobilization was in full swing, 
while such measures were all being denied on 
word of honor. 11 

The order of mobilization on the part of Eus- 
sia did not cause an immediate break in the rela- 
tions with Austria-Hungary. For the Eussian 
ambassador at Vienna was still exchanging 
views with the Austro-Hungarian minister for 
foreign affairs on the 31st, after Eussia's order 
for mobilization had been promulgated. 12 Eus- 
sia maintained that mobilization in her case did 
not necessarily mean war, as she could remain 
mobilized for months without making war. 

"This was not the case [with Germany]. 
She had the speed and Eussia had the num- 
bers," and she did not propose to sacrifice that 
advantage by delay. 13 So at midnight July 31, 
the German ambassador at St. Petersburg de- 
clared to the Eussian Government that Ger- 
many would mobilize if Eussia did not com- 
mence demobilization in twelve hours, not only 
against Germany but also against Austria. 
The French foreign minister considered this a 

ii G. W. B., S., 777-8; exhibits 23, 24. 
12 R. O. B., 66. 
is B. W. P., 138. 



The War Area Broadens 117 

very unreasonable demand inasmuch as Eussia 
had not ordered a general mobilization until 
"after Austria had decreed a general mobiliza- 
tion and that the Russian Government were 
ready to demobilize if all Powers did likewise." 
The German chancellor took the position that 
a general mobilization on the part of Russia 
necessarily meant a mobilization against Ger- 
many. 14 Russia made no answer to this de- 
mand, and Germany declared war on Russia 
on the evening of August l. 15 Five days later 
Austria-Hungary followed her ally in a declar- 
ation of war against Russia. 16 

France and Germany were the next countries 
to go to war. The documents show conflicting 
claims as to which power first began mobiliza- 
tion and it is hard to say which country took the 
initiative as to mobilization. The question of 
priority, of military preparations, however, 
was of no great significance as a cause of 
war between Germany and France. France 
was bound by treaty obligations to Russia, and 
let it be known before Russia and Germany 
went to war that she would stand by her ally. 
As early as July 27, the French ambassador 
at Berlin informed Von Jagow, German for- 
eign minister, that the relations of Germany 

1* R. O. B., 70; G. W. B., 23, 24; B. W. P., 126. 
is R. O. B„ 76. 
is R. 0. B„ 79. 



118 The Causes of the European War 

and Austria were no closer than those of France 
and Eussia. 17 On July 29 the French premier 
declared that Russia could count on his country, 
as France would fulfill all her obligations as 
Russia's ally. He was anxious, however, for 
peace and wanted England to renew her offer 
of the mediation of the four powers. 18 The 
French ambassador at London told Sir Edward 
Grey this same day that France "was bound 
to help Russia if Russia was attacked." 19 

Two days later (July 31), M. Jules Cambon, 
the French ambassador at Berlin, was informed 
by Von Jagow that his Government, owing to 
the general mobilization of the Russian army, 
had proclaimed Kriegsgefahrzustand (the state 
of danger of war). M. Cambon was also at the 
same time notified of Germany's demand on 
Russia that the latter cease mobilization. 20 
The French military authorities regarded this 
proclamation as tantamount to mobilization. 
It was, they said, "mobilization under another 
name." As the French frontier forces were 
faced by eight German corps, they were in im- 
minent danger of attack by the latter. For 
these reasons the French Government in the 
afternoon of August 1 ordered a general mobili- 
zation, stating at the same time that it was 

17 F. Y. B., 74. 

is F. Y. B., 101; R. 0. B., 55. 

19 B. W. P., 87. 

20 F. Y. B., 116. 



The War Area Broadens 119 

taking this action purely for defensive pur- 
poses. The French troops were stationed ten 
kilometers from the frontier and were not to 
attack the Germans. 21 

In the evening of July 31, M. Viviani, the 
French foreign minister, was asked by the Ger- 
man ambassador at Paris to state "what the 
attitude of France would be in case of war be- 
tween Germany and Russia.' ' The French 
Government understood this inquiry, it de- 
clared, to carry with it an intimation that Ger- 
many would recall her ambassador from Paris 
if a satisfactory answer were not given next 
day. The French foreign office regarded this 
as an extraordinary request and took the posi- 
tion that it did not have to announce its inten- 
tions to any power other than an ally. 22 
Therefore, when the inquiry was renewed next 
day, the French premier replied that "France 
would do that which her interests dictated. ' ' 23 

This answer was, of course, not satisfactory 
to Germany, but her ambassador was not re- 
called until Auugst 3, on which day war was 
formally declared on France by Germany. 24 
France maintained diplomatic relations with 
Austria-Hungary a week longer, and did not de- 
clare war on this power until August 12. 25 

2i B. W. P., 136, 140. 

22 G. W. B., exhibit 25; F. Y. B., 117; B. W. P., 120. 

23 G. W. B., exhibit 27. 

24 F. Y. B., 147, 148. 25 A. R. B., 63, 65. 



120 The Causes of the European War 

Montenegro sympathized warmly with Serbia 
and decided early to help her against her ene- 
mies. She, therefore, declared war against 
Anstria-Hnngary on August 8 and against 
Germany four days later. 



CHAPTER IX 

GREAT BRITAIN DECLARES WAR ON THE 
TEUTONIC POWERS 

Great Britain was anxious that a European 
conflict be avoided, 1 and, as has been seen, sug- 
gested several plans for settling the questions 
at issue. She was willing to support both the 
policy of isolation championed by Germany and 
the policy of prevention championed by Eussia. 
She was the only great power whose hands were 
not tied by alliances. Her understanding with 
France and Russia did not impose upon her a 
treaty obligation to enter the war if either or 
both of these powers should be drawn into the 
conflict. Nor is there the slightest intimation 
in all the correspondence that France and Rus- 
sia considered that she was bound by the terms 
of the Triple Entente to take sides with them 
against their enemies. Britain, therefore, de- 
clared herself interested in the quarrel only in 
so far as it jeopardized the peace of Europe and 
thereby menaced her own security. 

Her attiude toward the Austro-Serbian quar- 

i b. w. P., 1, 3. 

121 



122 The Causes of the European War 

rel was in keeping with this general policy. 
While she regarded the demands of Austria- 
Hungary as unreasonable and considered that 
Serbia's " reply went farther than could have 
been expected to meet Austrian demands," 2 
still she declined to discuss the merits of the 
case, declaring that she would concern herself 
with the dispute only to the extent that it af- 
fected the peace of Europe. She was in- 
terested in Austria's ultimatum solely because 
of the trouble between Austria and Russia that 
might grow out of it. This stand was taken as 
early as July 24, and it was known to all the 
interested powers. 3 

Russia and France were anxious for Great 
Britain to join them "in making a communica- 
tion to Austria to the effect that active inter- 
vention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia 
could not be tolerated," believing that by such 
joint action war might be averted. She de- 
clined to join in such a declaration, although 
she was asked to do so by the Russian foreign 
minister and the French ambassador at St. 
Petersburg as early as July 24. 4 Russia 
thought that Germany was counting on Eng- 
land's neutrality and that this was the reason 
for her supporting Austria-Hungary in her 
militant policy. Sir Edward Grey contended 

2 B. W. P., 5, 46, 116, 119. 4 B. W. P., 6, 24. 

3B. W. P., 3, 10, 6, 24, 11. 



Great Britain Declares War 123 

that Germany had no right to assume that 
Great Britain would stand aside in any event. 
He said that this impression ought to be dis- 
pelled by the orders given (July 27) to the 
fleet concentrated at Portland "not to disperse 
for maneuver leave. " 5 He was careful, how- 
ever, to announce that these naval orders were 
not to be construed as a pledge that Britain 
would assist Russia and France in case they 
should be drawn into war. As late as July 29, 
Sir Edward Grey stated to the French ambas- 
sador at London that his Government would not 
take part in the Serbian dispute nor even in 
a war between Russia and Austria, for that 
would only be a struggle over the hegemony of 
the Balkans. But if Germany or France were 
brought in and the hegemony of Europe were 
involved, that would present a problem the solu- 
tion of which Great Britain had not yet deter- 
mined upon. A like statement was made to the 
German ambassador at London and the an- 
nouncement to him seems to have been more 
positive and to have assumed the tone of a 
threat. He said that if the issue should be- 
come so great that it would involve all Euro- 
pean interests he did not wish the German am- 
bassador to be misled by the friendly tone of 
his conversation "into thinking that we [Great 
Britain] should stand aside." He made it 
5 b. w. P., 47. 



124 The Causes of the European War 

clear that if British interests should require 
intervention the Government would intervene at 
once. 6 

Germany was undoubtedly anxious that Great 
Britain remain neutral if she and Austria were 
to be involved in a war with France and Russia. 
On July 29 Germany made her first bid for 
British neutrality. The chancellor promised 
that if England would pledge her neutrality 
during the ' ' European conflagration ' ' that now 
seemed probable, Germany would give assur- 
ances that the neutrality of Holland and the 
integrity of France would be respected. These 
assurances, however, did not cover the neutral- 
ity of Belgium and the colonial possessions of 
France. 7 Sir Edward Grey declined to bind 
his country to " neutrality on such terms/ ' 8 

While Great Britain did not give Germany a 
promise of neutrality, at the same time she re- 
fused to pledge support to France. This atti- 
tude of indecision she maintained despite the 
opinion of the President of France that the 
peace of Europe was depending on her action. 
On July 30 he declared to the British ambassa- 
dor at Paris that if England should now an- 
nounce her intention of coming "to the aid of 
France in the event of a conflict between France 
and Germany, . . . there would be no war, for 

e B. W. P., 87, 89. s B. W. P., 101. 

i B. W. P., 85. 



Great Britain Declares War 125 

Germany would at once modify her attitude. ' ' 9 
The Italian minister for foreign affairs also 
thought that Britain's attitude would have 
great influence on Germany. He told the 
English ambassador at Kome on July 30 that 
he had reason to believe that "Germany was 
now disposed to give more conciliatory advice 
to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we 
[Great Britain] should [would] act with 
France and Russia, and was most anxious to 
avoid issue with us [Great Britain]." 10 

Next day, Sir Edward Grey told the German 
ambassador at London that he would support at 
Paris and St. Petersburg any reasonable pro- 
posal put forward by Germany, and if France 
and Russia would not accept such a proposal, he 
would "have nothing more to do with the conse- 
quences.' ' On the other hand, if no such pro- 
position was made and France became involved 
in the war, then England would be drawn in. 11 
On this very day Austria-Hungary declared her 
willingness to discuss "the substance of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia." 12 "Austria's 
readiness to discuss was the result of German 
influence at Vienna," according to the claim of 
the German secretary of state. 13 Whether 
Germany gave this conciliatory advice to 

9 B. W. P., 99. 12 B. W. P., 133; A. R B., 51. 

10 B. W. P., 106. 13 B. W. P., 138. 
ii B W. P., 111. 



126 The Causes of the European War 

Austria-Hungary of her own volition or 
whether she was induced to do it by the stiff- 
ening attitude of Great Britain is not revealed 
in the published correspondence. 

While Sir Edward Grey had, by the morning 
of July 31, warned the German ambassador that 
his country would intervene in case "France 
and Germany became involved in war "asa re- 
sult of the failure of Germany to put forward 
a reasonable proposal showing her desire for 
peace, 14 still he declined later on in the same 
day to give a pledge of intervention to France, 
but promised to reconsider this decision when- 
ever any new development should warrant it. 
"The preservation of the neutrality of Bel- 
gium,' ' said he, "might be, I would not say a 
decisive, but an important factor, in determin- 
ing our attitude. ' ' 15 

In the afternoon of the same day Sir Edward 
Grey telegraphed an inquiry to both Germany 
and France as to whether each would respect 
the neutrality of Belgium "so long as no other 
power violates it. ' ' 1G France replied at once 
that she would respect the neutrality of Bel- 
gium. 17 The reply of the German Government 
was not satisfactory. Von Jagow, the secre- 
tary of state, said that he could not answer 
until after he had consulted the Emperor and 

14 B. W. P., Ill, 119. 16 B. W. P., 114. 

15 B. W. P., 116, 119. 17 B. W. P., 125. 



Great Britain Declares War 127 

the chancellor. Besides, the British ambassa- 
dor at Berlin got the impression that Von 
Jagow thought any reply given by him might 
reveal to some extent the German plan of cam- 
paign in case war should break out, and, there- 
fore, he might not give any answer at all. Ac- 
cording to the understanding of the British am- 
bassador, Von Jagow seemed also to think that 
Belgium had already committed hostile acts 
against Germany in that she had held up a con- 
signment of corn for the latter country. 18 

Next morning (August 1), Sir Edward Grey 
had a telephone conversation with Prince Lich- 
nowsky, German ambassador at London, in 
which, according to the understanding of the 
ambassador, Sir Edward Grey asked if Ger- 
many would agree not to " attack France in a 
war between Germany and Russia in case 
France should remain neutral." Prince Lich- 
nowsky expressed the belief that his Govern- 
ment would be willing to enter into such an 
engagement and telegraphed the inquiry, as he 
interpreted it, to Berlin. 

Prince Lichnowsky, however, had, according 
to the London Times, received a very erroneous 
impression of the terms of the proposed en- 
gagement. ' * There was no question, ' ' says this 
paper, "of French neutrality in the event of a 
Russo-German war." This famous telephone 

is B. W. P., 122. 



128 The Causes of the European War 

conversation took place at 11:30 a. m., and, ac- 
cording to the information received by the 
Times, Lichnowsky's misunderstanding was 
corrected in an official conference immediately 
afterward. In this " official conversation . . . 
it was plainly pointed out that ... if G-ermany 
fought France must fight also. " ' ' Prince Lich- 
nowsky at once said that he had been under a 
misapprehension, and telegraphed to Berlin a 
correction of his previous telegram. ,, No such 
telegram appears in the list of dispatches offi- 
cially published by the German Government. 
The Times charges that it was left out with the 
intent to deceive the neutral public and thus 
make out a case of perfidy against England. 
The North German Gazette, on the other hand, 
denies the existence of such a telegram, < and, 
furthermore, states that the private secretary 
of Sir Edward Grey called on Prince Lichnow- 
sky later in the day (at 1 :15 p. m.) and said that 
the foreign "minister desired to make pro- 
posals to me [him] regarding England's neu- 
trality, even for the event that we [Germany] 
should go to war with Russia as well as with 
France." 19 

Sir Edward Grey's testimony as to the mis- 
understanding supports the contention of the 
Times. In the latter part of August, 1914, he 

is London Times, August 27, 1914, quoted in Stowell, 334, 
note; see also S., 824. 



Great Britain Declares War 129 

made in the House of Commons the following 
statement : 

The circumstances were as follows: It was re- 
ported to me one day that the German Ambassador 
had suggested that Germany might remain neutral in 
a war between Russia and Austria and also engage 
not to attack France if we would remain neutral and 
secure the neutrality of France. I said at once that if 
the German Government thought such an arrange- 
ment possible I was sure w T e could secure it. 

It appeared, however, that what the Ambassador 
meant was that we should secure the neutrality of 
France if Germany went to war with Russia. This 
was quite a different proposal, and as I supposed it 
in all probability to be incompatible with the terms 
of the Franco-Russian Alliance, it was not in my 
power to promise to secure it. 

Subsequently, the Ambassador sent for my private 
secretary and told him that as soon as the misunder- 
standing was cleared up he had sent a second telegram 
to Berlin to cancel the impression produced by the 
first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first 
telegram has been published. This second telegram 
does not seem to have been published. 20 

The misunderstanding was apparently not 
cleared up until after the German Emperor had 
made his reply, which was, in part, as follows : 
"On technical grounds my mobilization which 
had already been proclaimed this afternoon, 
must proceed against two fronts, east and west 
as prepared. . . . But if France offers me neu- 
trality, which must be guaranteed by the 

20 London Times, August 29, 1914, quoted in Stowell, 330- 
331. 



130 The Causes of the European War 

British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain 
from attacking Prance and employ my troops 
elsewhere. . . . The troops on my frontier are 
in the act of being stopped by telegraph and 
telephone from crossing into France. " In the 
chancellor's telegram to the German ambassa- 
dor, the same day, he said: "We guarantee 
that our troops will not cross the French fron- 
tier before 7 p. m. on Monday, 3rd inst., if Eng- 
land has consented to our proposal by that 
time." 

Next day Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed the 
chancellor that Sir Edward Grey's " sugges- 
tions were prompted by a desire to make it pos- 
sible for England to keep permanent neutrality, 
but as they were not based on a previous under- 
standing with France and made without knowl- 
edge of our mobilization, they have been aban- 
doned as absolutely hopeless." 21 

No mention is made in the British "White 
Paper of this effort on the part of Germany to 
secure the neutrality of France. Sir Edward 
Grey, however, does tell of an important inter- 
view held with Prince Lichnowsky on this same 
day, in which the price of England's neutrality 
was asked by Germany. The foreign minister 
in a telegram (August 1) to the British ambas- 
sador at Berlin gives the following account of 
this meeting: 

2i For these telegrams, see S., 820-26, 



Great Britain Declares War 131 

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the 
reply of the German Government with regard to the 
neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great 
regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected 
feeling in this country. If Germany could see her 
way to give the same assurance as that which had 
been given by France it would materially contribute 
to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other 
hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of 
Belgium by one combatant while the other respected 
it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public 
feeling in this country. I said that we had been dis- 
cussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I 
was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memoran- 
dum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise 
not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to 
remain neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were 
still free, and we were considering what our attitude 
should be. All I could say was that our attitude 
would be determined largely by public opinion here, 
and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very 
strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that 
we could give a promise of neutrality on that condi- 
tion alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could 
not formulate conditions on which we would remain 
neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of 
France and her colonies might be guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any 
promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I 
could only say that we must keep our hands free. 22 

On this same day (August 1), after he had 
been advised by the British ambassador at Ber- 
lin that the German foreign office would post- 
22 b. w. P., 123, 



132 The Causes of the European War 

pone its reply to the English inquiry regarding 
the neutrality of Belgium probably indefinitely 
and certainly until after the chancellor and the 
Emperor had been consulted, Sir Edward Grey 
told the French ambassador at London that he 
would ask the cabinet to promise that the 
British fleet would oppose an attack on the 
French coast by the German navy. 23 

The cabinet had a memorable meeting next 
day (Sunday). After this session, Sir Edward 
Grey made the following report to the French 
ambassador : 

I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the 
German fleet comes into the Channel or through the 
North Sea to undertake hostile operations against 
French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give 
all the protection in its power. 

This assurance is of course subject to the policy 
of His Majesty's Government receiving the support 
of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His 
Majesty's Government to take any action until the 
above contingency of action by the German fleet takes 
place. 24 

According to the London Times, the cabinet 
up to this time had been divided in opinion as 
to what policy should be pursued, but Ger- 
many^ action regarding Belgium and Luxem- 
burg had turned the scale decisively in favor 
of supporting France if her coast were at- 

23 F. Y. B., 126; B. W. P., 122. 

24 B. W. P., 148. 



Great Britain Declares War 133 

tacked. 25 Nor was this belief confined to the 
members of the party in power, as is shown by 
the following letter, written by the leader of the 
Parliamentary opposition before the cabinet 
had reached a final decision : 

2d August, 1914. 
Dear Mr. Asquith, — Lord Lansdowne and I feel it 
our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as 
in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able 
to consult, it would be fatal to the honor and security 
of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting 
France and Russia at the present juncture; and we 
offer our unhesitating support to the Government in 
any measures they may consider necessary for that 
object. — Yours very truly, A. Bonar Law. 26 

On Monday, August 3, Sir Edward Grey 
made a speech before the House of Commons, 

25 London Times, Aug. 5, 1914; see Stowell, 342-3. 

26 London Times, Aug. 15, 1914, quoted in Stowell, 343. 
The Times also thought that public opinion endorsed this ac- 
tion. An editorial August 3 says that England's safety and 
interests demand that she stand by France as she had success- 
fully done in 1905 and 1911. If not, she will be isolated. 
"It is a question of destroying the security of the Mediter- 
ranean, through which England's route to Egypt and India 
and the bulk of her food supplies pass." The independence 
of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg is necessary to guard 
England's control of the Channel. "By naval agreement with 
France, England has guaranteed French coasts in the north 
against German attack. The French fleet has been concen- 
trated in the Mediterranean to help our Mediterranean squad- 
ron in protecting the freedom of our communications with 
Egypt and India. If once the German armies are allowed to 
crush France, not only will England be unable to preserve the 
independence of Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, but Ger- 
many will be able to annex French territory up to Dunkirk, 
Calais, and Havre, compel Holland and Belgium to cede to her 
their colonies, establish herself within striking distance of 
Australia and New Zealand, and threaten the safety of our 
trade routes on every sea." 



134 The Causes of the European War 

stating what assurances lie had given the 
French Government and his reasons for so do- 
ing. He declared that England was not obliged 
by any engagements to come to the aid of 
France, but that she had for some years been 
bound to France by the ties of a growing friend- 
ship. This friendship imposed upon Britain 
the obligation to see that France's helpless 
coasts were not battered down by a hostile 
fleet. For France, relying on this friendship, 
had concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean 
and thus left her western and northern coasts 
unguarded. Under these circumstances, there- 
fore, he considered that public sentiment would 
not allow the English Government to stand 
aside and allow a friendly neighbor's coasts to 
be " bombarded and battered'' in a war not of 
her own seeking. 

Besides, Britain's self-interests demanded, in 
his opinion, that France be informed as to what 
aid she could count on from England. For if 
Great Britain should promise no aid to France, 
the French fleet would have to be withdrawn 
from the Mediterranean. The English fleet in 
the Mediterranean was not as strong as the 
combined fleets of other nations. If Britain 
should later become involved in the war, she 
would either lose control of the Mediterranean 
route or else be compelled to send thither ships 
badly needed to protect her own coasts. Be- 



Great Britain Declares War 135 

sides, it looked as if Britain would be dragged 
into the war. In fact, he believed that noth- 
ing but an unconditional promise of neutrality 
would save her from that fate. Great Britain, 
of course, could not afford to make such a dis- 
honorable promise; for if she did, her people 
would sacrifice their "respect and good name 
and reputation before the world and should 
not escape the most serious and grave economic 
consequences/ ' 27 

By the fourth of August, the King of Bel- 
gium had made an appeal to Great Britain "for 
diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium," 
whose neutrality was threatened by Germany. 
In response to this appeal, Sir Edward Grey 
sent a protest to the German Government and 
demanded immediate assurances that "the de- 
mand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded 
with and that her neutrality will be respected by 
Germany. ' ' 28 On the same day the German 
foreign secretary telegraphed to the German 
ambassador at London as follows : 

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the 
part of the British Government with regard to our 
intentions, by repeating most positively formal assur- 
ance that, even in the case of armed conflict with 
Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, 
annex Belgian territory. 

27 London Times, Aug. 3, 1914, quoted by Stowell, 345-351. 

28 B. W. P., 153. 



136 The Causes of the European War 

In giving his reason for the violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality, the German foreign secretary 
said: 

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German 
army could not be exposed to French attack across 
Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely 
unimpeachable information. Germany had conse- 
quently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for 
her a question of life or death to prevent French ad- 
vance. 29 

On this same day (August 4), Sir Edward 
Grey, having learned that Belgian territory had 
been invaded by the Germans, sent an ultima- 
tum to Germany. In his telegram to the British 
ambassador at Berlin he said : 

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that Ger- 
man Government will be compelled to carry out, if 
necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered 
indispensable. 

We are also informed that Belgian territory has 
been violated at Gemmenich. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact 
that Germany declined to give the same assurance 
respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply 
to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and 
Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a 
satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this 
morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If 
not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and 
to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to 
take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality 
of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which 
Germany is as much a party as ourselves. 30 

29 B. W. P., 157. so B. W. P., 159. 



Great Britain Declares War 137 

Upon receiving this telegram, Sir E. Goschen, 
the British ambassador at Berlin, Avent to the 
Imperial foreign office and delivered the ulti- 
matum to Von Jagow, German Secretary of 
State. A little later on the same evening Sir E. 
Goschen had an interview with the German 
chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg. Both Von 
Jagow and the chancellor were very much agi- 
tated and apparently were greatly pained at 
England's decision to join the ranks of Ger- 
many's enemies. This last interview between 
the British ambassador and the chancellor has 
been dramatically described by the former as 
follows : 

During the afternoon I received your further tele- 
gram of the same date, and, in compliance with the 
instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to 
the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secre- 
tary of State that unless the Imperial Government 
could give the assurance by 12 o 'clock that night that 
they would proceed no further with their violation 
of Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been 
instructed to demand my passports and inform the 
Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government 
would have to take all steps in their power to uphold 
the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a 
treaty to which Germany was as much a party as 
themselves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he 
could give no other answer than that which he had 
given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety 
of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that 
the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. 
I gave His Excellency a written summary of your 



138 The Causes of the European War 

telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 
12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would expect an answer, asked him whether, in 
view of the terrible consequences which would neces- 
sarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last mo- 
ment that their answer should be reconsidered. He 
replied that if the time given were even twenty-four 
hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said 
that in that case I should have to demand my pass- 
ports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. 
In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow 
expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his 
entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had 
been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, 
through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said 
that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me 
also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but 
that he must understand that under the circumstances 
and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment could not possibly have acted otherwise than 
they had done. 

I then said that I should like to go and see the 
Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I 
should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged 
me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. 
His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted 
for about twenty minutes. He said that the step 
taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a 
degree ; just for a word — ' ' neutrality, ' ' a word which 
in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a 
scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war 
on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than 
to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direc- 
tion had been rendered useless by this last terrible 
step, and the policy to which, I knew, he had de- 
voted himself since his accession to office had tumbled 
down like a house of cards. What we had done 
was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from be- 
hind while he was fighting for his life against two 



Great Britain Declares War 139 

assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all 
the terrible events that might happen. I protested 
strongly against that statement, and said that, in the 
same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to 
understand that for strategical reasons it was a mat- 
ter of life and death to Germany to advance through 
Belgium and violate the latter 's neutrality, so I would 
wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a 
matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great 
Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement 
to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if 
attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, 
or what confidence could any one have in engagements 
given by Great Britain in the future? The Chan- 
cellor said, ' ' But at what price will that compact have 
been kept. Has the British Government thought of 
that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I 
could that fear of consequences could hardly be re- 
garded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, 
but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently over- 
come by the news of our action, and so little disposed 
to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to 
the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he 
said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's 
enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last 
moment he and his Government had been working with 
us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace be- 
tween Austria and Russia. I said that this was part 
of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart 
just at the moment when the relations between them 
had been more friendly and cordial than they had 
been for years. 31 

Soon after this interview, an extra edition of 
the Berliner Tageblatt came out stating that 
Great Britain had declared war on Germany. 
A mob then formed, attacked the British em- 

3i B. W. P., 160. 



140 The Causes of the European War 

bassy, overpowered the police force, and began 
smashing the windows with cobble stones. Sir 
E. Goschen telephoned to the foreign office for 
protection, and Von Jagow at once arranged 
for a larger police force to clear away the mob. 
The German foreign office regretted the occur- 
rence very much and made a satisfactory apol- 
ogy to Sir E. Goschen. Next morning the Brit- 
ish ambassador received his passports and on 
the following day left for England by way of 
Holland. War against Germany was declared 
by Great Britain that same day; the declara- 
tion against Austria-Hungary was not made 
until August 12. 32 

32 B. W. P., 160; S., 1017. 

Note: — It will be remembered that Germany had also vio- 
lated the neutrality of Luxemburg by sending troops to occupy 
the duchy as early as August 2. The German chancellor 
contended that "the military measures taken in Luxemburg do 
not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only 
intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. 
Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any dam- 
age caused by using the railways which are leased to the 
empire." See B. W. P., 129. 

Now the perpetual neutrality of Luxemburg had been guar- 
anteed by the powers in 1867, and this act of Germany's was 
a clear violation of the obligation inherited from Prussia, 
which was one of the powers signatory to the convention of 
1867. England, however, was not willing to regard the in- 
vasion of Luxemburg as a casus belli. She contended that 
the responsibility for the maintenance of the neutrality of 
Luxemburg was collective and was to be discharged only by 
the joint action of all the guaranteeing powers. 

The case of Belgium, however, was, according to Sir Edward 
Grey, different from that of Luxemburg. England's obliga- 
tion to uphold Belgium's neutrality was individual, not col- 
lective, and imposed upon her the duty of requiring the ob- 
servance of the convention of 1839, "without the assistance 
of the other guaranteeing powers." F. Y. B., 137. 



CHAPTER X 

THE VIOLATION" OF THE NEUTRALITY OF 
BELGIUM 

In 1814-15, the European powers met in the 
Congress of Vienna to remake the map of Eu- 
rope, which had been disarranged by Napoleon. 
At that time Germany was divided and weak, 
and France had proved herself aggressive and 
strong. It was feared that this weakness of 
Germany would in the future invite the aggres- 
sion of France, and Europe would thus be 
thrown again into the turmoil of a general war. 
To prevent this the powers planned the creation 
of a strong state between France and Germany 
by uniting Belgium with Holland. 

The union, however, was an unnatural one 
from the beginning; historic tradition was 
against it. Except for a short time during the 
Napoleonic era, the two parts had been sepa- 
rated for more than two centuries and had thus 
grown apart. Besides, the peoples of the two 
countries differed from each other in language, 
race, religion, and economic conditions. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that friction de- 

141 



142 The Causes of the European War 

veloped between the northern and southern 
halves and the Belgians grew more and more 
tired of the union. The revolution of July, 
1830, in France encouraged the Belgian malcon- 
tents, and in August, 1830, the Belgians re- 
volted against Holland and demanded a 
separate government under the Dutch king. 
These demands Avere refused and Belgium de- 
clared her independence, electing Leopold of 
Coburg king. 

It could hardly be expected that this annul- 
ment of the arrangement of 1815 would be coun- 
tenanced by the great powers, and the Holy 
Alliance powers were at first in favor of forcing 
Belgium back into the union with Holland. 
But the independence of Belgium was favored 
by the British foreign minister and the new 
French king, Louis Philippe, who owed his 
throne to a similar revolution and could not 
afford to allow the absolute monarchies to 
thwart the wishes of the Belgian people. 
France, therefore, declared that if they inter- 
vened in favor of the Dutch, she would inter- 
vene in favor of the Belgians. Besides, Eus- 
sia's hands were soon tied by a revolt in 
Poland, and Prussia and Austria had to keep 
their eyes on their Polish subjects and eastern 
boundaries. Consequently, the powers had to 
consent to the independence of Belgium. The 
powers held conferences in London and in 1831 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 143 

agreed to guarantee the perpetual neutrality of 
Belgium. This agreement was superseded by 
another treaty signed in 1839, which also 
guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of Bel- 
gium; Prussia, England, France, Austria, and 
Eussia were the parties to this agreement. The 
neutrality article was as follows : 

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, 
II and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually 
Neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such 
Neutrality towards all other states. 1 

The German Empire was not, of course, a sig- 
natory to the treaty, as it had not come into ex- 
istence at this time. However, the obligation 
as to Belgium's neutrality incurred by Prussia 
in 1839 was binding on the German Empire in 
1914, for it had inherited the treaty obligations 
of the states out of which it was formed. "In 
many instances the German Government has 
claimed the benefits of treaty rights previously 
enjoyed by the separate states of the Empire.' ' 
As an example of this, the German foreign of- 
fice recognized the Prussian-American treaty 
of 1799 as binding upon the Imperial Govern- 
ment in 1915. 2 

On August 9, 1870, at the time of the Franco- 
German War, England and Prussia, "being 
desirous ... of recording in a solemn Act 

i Stowell, 602. 

2Stowell, 385; Jour. (9), 182, 



144 The Causes of the European War 

their fixed determination to maintain the In- 
dependence and Neutrality of Belgium, as pro- 
vided in Article VII of the Treaty' > of 1839, 
signed a new treaty, " which, without impairing 
or invalidating the conditions of the said Quin- 
tuple Treaty [treaty of 1839], shall be sub- 
sidiary and accessory to it." This treaty was 
to last until twelve months after the ratification 
of a treaty of peace between France and the 
North German Confederation. It was further 
agreed that * ' on the expiration of that time the 
Independence and Neutrality of Belgium will, so 
far as the High Contracting Parties are re- 
spectively concerned, continue to rest as hereto- 
fore on Article 1 of the Quintuple Treaty of the 
19th April, 1839." 3 

A few German apologists contend that sub- 
sequent events had deprived the neutrality pro- 
vision of the Quintuple Treaty of its binding 
force and, therefore, it had by 1914 become a 
dead letter. Publicists are, however, all but 
unanimous in contending that it was still alive 
both in spirit as well as in letter. 4 It ought to 

3 For the main provisions of this treaty see Stowell, 602-3 ; 
or for the full treaty, Hertslet's The Map of Europe by Treaty, 
vol. iv, pp. 1886^88. 

* For the arguments on both sides the reader is referred to 
the fuller works, as the scope and plan of this volume do not 
allow of even a resume of these discussions. For a good, 
short discussion favorable to the view that the treaty of 1839 
was still binding, see Stowell, 382-91. For a more lengthy 
argument against this view, see Fuehr, The Neutrality of 
Belgium, 120-176. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 145 

be remembered, however, that the German 
Government in giving its reasons for invading 
Belgium did not claim that the neutrality agree- 
ment was no longer binding, but admitted that 
the invasion was a breach of international law 
and an act of injustice made necessary by the 
conviction that France was preparing to lead an 
army into Belgium. 5 Besides, the German Im- 
perial secretary of state, Herr von Jagow, said 
in 1913: "Belgian neutrality is provided for 
by International Conventions and Germany is 
determined to respect those Conventions. " 6 

On July 24, M. Davignon, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, sent instructions to the Bel- 
gian ambassadors in all the countries which had 
promised to guarantee the neutrality of Bel- 
gium, to the effect that Belgium would expect 
that, in the event of war, her neutrality would 
be respected and that she would do all in her 
power to uphold it. These instructions were 
not to be acted upon by the ambassadors until 
further notice. 7 On the first of August, the 
foreign office telgraphed to the ambassadors to 
carry out these instructions. 8 

Next day (August 2) the German ambassa- 
dor at Brussels handed the following note to 
the Belgian foreign minister : 

s See p. 149. 

6B. G. B., 12, enclosure. 
i B. G. B., 2 and enclosure. 
8 Ibid., 16. 



146 The Causes of the European War 

(Very Confidential.) 

Reliable information has been received by the Ger- 
man Government to the effect that French forces in- 
tend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and 
Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the 
intention of France to march through Belgian terri- 
tory against Germany. 

The German Government cannot but fear that 
Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be un- 
able, without assistance, to repel so considerable a 
French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to 
afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Ger- 
many. It is essential for the self-defense of Ger- 
many that she should anticipate any such hostile at- 
tack. The German Government would, however, feel 
the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of 
hostility against herself the fact that the measures of 
Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own 
protection, to enter Belgian territory. 

In order to exclude any possibility of misunder- 
standing, the German Government make the follow- 
ing declaration : 

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against 
Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in 
the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly 
neutrality towards Germany, the German Govern- 
ment bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to 
guarantee the possessions and independence of the 
Belgian Kingdom in full. 

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-men- 
tioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the 
conclusion of peace. 

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Ger- 
many is prepared, in cooperation with the Belgian 
authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops 
against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for 
any damage that may have been caused by German 
troops 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgiwm 147 

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and 
in particular should she throw difficulties in the way 
of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the 
Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or 
other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be 
compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy. 

In this event, Germany can undertake no obliga- 
tions towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment 
of the relations between the two States must be left 
to the decision of arms. 

The German Government, however, entertain the 
distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and 
that the Belgian Government will know how to take 
the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of 
incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the 
friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States 
will grow more stronger and more enduring. 9 

» The German note was delivered at 7 p. m., 
and the Belgian Government was given only 
twelve hours in which to give its answer. So 
in the early morning of August 3, M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to 
the German ambassador at Brussels the follow- 
ing reply: 

This note has made a deep and painful impression 
upon the Belgian Government. 

The intentions attributed to France by Germany 
are in contradiction to the formal declarations made 
by us on August 1, in the name of the French Gov- 
ernment. 

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian 
neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium in- 
tends to fulfill her international obligations and the 

9 B. G. B., 20. 



148 The Causes of the European War 

Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance 
to the invader. 

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 
1870, vouch for the independance and neutrality of 
Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and not- 
ably of the Government of His Majesty the King of 
Prussia. 

Belgium has always been faithful to her interna- 
tional obligations, she has carried out her duties in a 
spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing 
undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neu- 
trality. 

The attack upon her independence with which the 
German Government threaten her constitutes a fla- 
grant violation of international law. No strategic in- 
terest justifies such a violation of law. 

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept 
the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the 
honor of the nation and betray their duty towards 
Europe. 

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played 
for more than eighty years in the civilization of the 
world, they refuse to believe that the independence 
of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the 
violation of her neutrality. 

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Govern- 
ment are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in 
their power, every attack upon their rights. 10 

Next morning Germany announced to Bel- 
gium that inasmuch as her Government had re- 
jected ■ " the well intentioned proposals made to 
them [it] by the German Government, the 
latter, to their deep regret,' ' would be "com- 
pelled to take — if necessary by force of arms — 

io b. G. B., 22. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 149 

those measures of defence already fore- 
shadowed as indispensable in view of the 
menace of France." 11 This threat was fol- 
lowed up immediately; for German troops en- 
tered Belgian territory that very morning 
(August 4). 12 Negotiations between the two 
countries were broken off at once. 13 

On that same August 4, the Imperial chancel- 
lor made a speech before the Reichstag, in 
which he said, in part: 

Gentlemen, we are now acting in self-defense. Ne- 
cessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Lux- 
emburg and have possibly already entered on Belgian 
soil. 

Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. 

The French Government has notified Brussels that 
it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as the ad- 
versary respected it. But we know that France stood 
ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could 
not. A French invasion in our flank and the lower 
Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were 
forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Govern- 
ments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The injustice — 
I speak openly — the injustice we thereby commit we 
will try to make good as soon as our military aims 
have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and 
is fighting for his All, can only consider the one and 
best way to strike. 14 

Germany was still willing, she said, to ad- 
here to her original promise to Belgium, 

11 B. G. B., 27. 

12 B. G. B., 40. 
is B. G. B., 34. 

i* See International Conciliation, pamphlet 84. 



150 The Causes of the European War 

namely, to restore her territory to her after 
the war. 15 Three days later (August 9), after 
Liege had fallen, Germany again approached 
Belgium through the Dutch minister for foreign 
affairs. She renewed the promise to restore 
her territory to her after the war, if Belgium 
would come to terms with her. 16 This offer 
was flatly declined by Belgium. 17 

On the same day (August 3) on which Bel- 
gium declined to meet Germany's demands, 
King Albert asked the King of England to have 
his Government intervene diplomatically to 
safeguard the neutrality of his country. ls The 
Belgian Government contends, however, that it 
did not ask for military aid until after its ter- 
ritory had been invaded by Germany. 19 In the 
meantime (August 4) Britain announced to 
Belgium that she expected her to uphold her 
neutrality and also promised aid if her neutral- 
ity were violated. 20 

After Brussels had been captured by the Ger- 
mans, certain documents were found in the Bel- 
gian archives, which were published to support 
the charge of Germany that Belgium had before 
the war surrendered her neutrality. These 
documents show the following : 

(1) In April, 1906, General Ducarme, Chief 

is B. G. B., 36. i 8 B. G. B., 25. 

is B. G. B., 60, 62, enclosure. " B. G. B., 78. 
it B. G. B., 65. 20 B. G. B., 28. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 151 

of the Belgian General Staff, reported to the 
Belgian minister of war the results of some con- 
versations that he had had with Lieutenant 
Colonel Barnardiston, military attache of the 
British legation at Brussels. At these inter- 
views plans were discussed for sending British 
troops to Belgium to aid her against Germany 
in case war broke out. Colonel Barnardiston 
"referred to the anxieties of the general staff 
of his country with regard to the general politi- 
cal situation, in view of the possibility of war 
soon breaking out." The discussion covered 
details as to the number of British troops to be 
furnished, places of disembarkation, methods 
of transportation, etc. It is also stated that 
Colonel Barnardiston gave General Ducarme 
much secret information regarding the "mili- 
tary circumstances and the situation" of Bel- 
gium's "Eastern neighbor." The term "al- 
lied forces ' ' was used in the documents for the 
British and Belgian troops. At one of these 
conferences an agreement was reached as to a 
plan of combined operations in case Antwerp 
were attacked by the Germans. 

Colonel Barnardiston is represented as say- 
ing that this plan had the approval of the chief 
of the British general staff; but he insisted that" 
these conversations were not binding on his 
Government, and that they were not known by 
any one except the general staff, the English 



152 The Causes of the European War 

minister at Brussels, and himself. He "did 
not know whether the opinion of his sovereign 
had been consulted.' ' 

On the margin of the document was the fol- 
lowing statement : ' ' The entry of the English 
into Belgium shall not take place until after the 
violation of our [Belgian] neutrality by Ger- 
many.' ' 21 

On April 23, 1912, a similar conversation was 
held between the British military attache in 
Brussels, who was now Lieutenant Colonel 
Bridges, and the Belgian chief of the general 
staff, who was now General Jungbluth. At 
this meeting "Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told 
the general that Great Britain had, available 
for dispatch to the Continent, an army com- 
posed of six divisions of infantry and eight 
brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She 
had also all that she needed for home defence. 
Everything was ready. 

i l The British Government, at the time of the 
recent events, would have immediately landed 
troops on our territory, even if we had not 
asked for help. 

"The general protested that our consent 
would be necessary for this. The military 
attache answered that he knew that, but that as 
we were not in a position to prevent the Ger- 
mans passing through our territory, Great 

2i B. G. B., appendix 4 (1), S., 845-6. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 153 

Britain would have landed her troops in any 
event. . . . 

"The general added that, after all, we were, 
besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans 
from going through." 22 

One of the documents found was a dispatch 
from Baron Greindl, Belgian minister at Ber- 
lin, to the Belgian minister for foreign affairs, 
dated December 23, 1911. The burden of this 
dispatch was that the Belgian Government was 
acting unwisely in making arrangements as if 
the only danger of attack was from the side 
of Germany. Belgium's neutrality, he thought, 
was in as much danger from the French as the 
German side. He said: "From the French 
side the danger threatens not only in the south 
from Luxemburg; it threatens us along our 
whole common frontier. For this assertion we 
are not dependent only on surmises. We have 
positive facts to go upon. ' ' 23 

Another document found was "a map show- 
ing (it is alleged) the method of deployment of 
the French army." 24 

These documents were published on October 
13, 1914, by the North German Gazette and 
were also afterwards printed in English and 
commented on by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, Ger- 

22 B. G. B., 4 (2), Col. Doc, 360-1. 

23 B. G. B., appendix 2, Col. Doc, 351. 

24 B. G. B., appendix 5, Col. Doc, 363. 



154 The Causes of the European War 

man agent in America. These two advocates 
for Germany contend that these documents 
prove that England had intended, in case a 
Franco-German war broke out, to send troops 
to Belgium and thus violate the neutrality of 
Belgium; that Belgium by listening to and 
keeping secret the "whisperings' ' of Great 
Britain had compromised her neutrality; and 
that she should have notified the other signator- 
ies of the treaty of 1839, especially Germany, 
of the suggestions of England. They charge 
that the negotiations prove that Belgium had 
entered into a convention with Great Britain 
against Germany, and that the French military 
map, together with other facts mentioned in the 
documents, go to show that France was a party 
to this convention. 25 

Belgium's defense to these charges is as fol- 
lows: 

"It is recognized that Belgium has the right 
to make defensive agreements for putting into 
operation the guarantees given by the guaran- 
teeing powers." Now the arrangement con- 
templated by the Belgian and English officials 
was just such an agreement. These discus- 
sions, however, did not result in a convention 
between Belgium and Great Britain, and no 
evidence that such a convention existed has 
been adduced. These negotiations went no 

25 S., 839-40; Col. Doc, 364. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 155 

farther than "the submission of a report to the 
minister of war by the chief of the general 
staff." Even in these discussions Belgium did 
not take the initiative ; she only showed a will- 
ingness to discuss with the British officials 
plans for carrying out the obligations that 
Great Britain had assumed in 1839. But the 
Belgian Government in 1906 considered after 
these conversations that the general guarantee 
was adequate and that a supplementary agree- 
ment as to detailed plans for making good 
the guarantee was not necessary. "Baron 
Greindl's attitude towards Barnardiston's sug- 
gestions proves conclusively that he knew that 
these suggestions had not resulted in any con- 
vention. ' ' 

As to the conversation between Colonel 
Bridges and General Jungbluth, the Belgian 
chief of staff protested against the opinion of 
the English colonel that Britain would have 
landed troops in Belgium without her consent 
since, in his opinion, Belgium could not have 
prevented the Germans from passing through 
the country. General Jungbluth insisted that 
Belgium's consent was necessary and that Bel- 
gium was " l perfectly well able' to stop the 
Germans ; that is to say, to make them lose suffi- 
cient time to deprive them of the advantage of 
a sudden attack. ' ' In taking this stand, ! ' Gen- 
eral Jungbluth defended her [Belgium's] free- 
dom and neutrality." 



156 The Causes of the European War 

The French military map, it is contended, 
was not connected with the other documents and 
is, therefore, no evidence that France was a 
party to an alleged convention between Eng- 
land and Belgium. It only proves that the gen- 
eral staff of Belgium was on the look-out for 
information regarding the "military plans of 
neighboring powers." 26 As evidence that 
Great Britain so understood the attitude of the 
Belgian Government, Belgium points to the fol- 
lowing official statement, published in the 
London Times, September 30, 1914 : 

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian 
army would oppose by force a ''preventive" disem- 
barkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian 
Government did not hesitate at the time of the Agadir 
crises to warn foreign ambassadors, in terms which 
could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to 
compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every 
means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it 
from any and every quarter. 27 

Britain disavows having ever had any inten- 
tion of violating the neutrality of Belgium. 
Sir Edward Grey, however, admits that 

In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great 
Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against 
violation from any side, some academic discussions 
may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barn- 
ardiston, have taken place between General Grierson 
and the Belgian military authorities as to what assist- 

26 B. G. B., appendix 5, Col. Doc, 361-5. 

27 B. G. B., appendix 6, enclosure 3. 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 157 

ance the British army might be able to afford to Bel- 
gium should one of her neighbors violate that neu- 
trality. Some notes with reference to the subject 
may exist in the archives at Brussels. 

At that time there existed, he says, a fear in 
England and Belgium that Germany might at- 
tack France through Belgium as she had the 
year previous " adopted a threatening attitude 
towards France with regard to Morocco.' ' 
This feeling of apprehension, he asserts, has 
been kept alive by the fact that Germany " since 
1906 has established an elaborate network of 
strategical railways leading from the Bhine to 
the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly- 
populated tract, deliberately constructed to per- 
mit of the sudden attack upon Belgium, which 
was carried out two months ago." 28 

The conversation between the English Col- 
onel Bridges and the Belgian chief of staff 
seems to have aroused a fear in Belgium that 
England would be the first power to violate her 
neutrality. Sir Edward Grey was informed of 
the existence of this feeling and spoke of it to 
the Belgian minister on April 7, 1913. He as- 
sured him that his Government would not be 
the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, 
nor did he believe that public sentiment in Eng- 
land would ever approve of it. He promised 
the Belgian minister that his Government 

28 B. G. B., appendix 3, Col. Doc, 353. 



158 The Causes of the European War 

would never send troops into Belgium as long 
as her neutrality was not violated by any other 
power. 29 

The lord high chancellor of England also 
denied that his country had ever had any inten- 
tion of violating the neutrality of Belgium. In 
a letter written to the Master of Christ's Col- 
lege, Cambridge, November 14, 1914, he said: 

It is quite untrue that the British Government had 
ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her coun- 
try in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. 
The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as 
regards railways, have for some years given rise to 
the apprehension that Germany would attack Prance 
through Belgium. Whatever military discussions 
have taken place before this war have been limited 
entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to 
defend France if Germany attacked her through Bel- 
gium. The Germans have stated that we contemplated 
sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed 
ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Con- 
tinent, and we had never contemplated the possibility 
of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. 30 

It is charged by the Germans that " French 
and British troops had marched into Belgium 
before the outbreak of the war"; also, that 
"British military stores had been placed at 
Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian 
frontier, before the outbreak of the war and 
that this is evidence of an intention to attack 

29 B. G. B., appendix 1, Col. Doc, 350. 

so B. G. B., appendix 6, enclosure 1, Col. Doc, 365-6, 



Violation of Neutrality of Belgium 159 

Germany through Belgium. ' ' In answer to the 
first of these charges, the London Times prints 
(September 30, 1914) an official statement as 
follows : 

The German press has been attempting to per- 
suade the public that if Germany herself had not 
violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain 
would have done so. It has declared that French and 
British troops had marched into Belgium before the 
outbreak of war. We have received from the Bel- 
gian Minister of War an official statement which de- 
nies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the 
one hand, that "before August 3 not a single French 
soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, 
" it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single Eng- 
lish soldier in Belgium. ' ' 

In answer to the second accusation, the lord 
chancellor said (November 14) : 

The Germans have stated that British military 
stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress 
near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the 
war, and that this is evidence of an intention to at- 
tack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers 
and no British stores were landed on the Continent till 
after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium 
had appealed to France and England for assistance. 
It was only after this appeal that British troops were 
sent to France; and, if the Germans found British 
munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were 
sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak 
of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of 
Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the 
British Government. 31 

si B. Gr. B., appendix 6, enclosures 1, 3. 

Mr. Alexander Fuehr, in his book on the neutrality of Bel- 



160 The Causes of the European War 

gium, says that German officials took many affidavits of 
French captives to the effect that French troops had invaded 
Belgium on July 31. Three of these affidavits are given at 
length in the appendix. They state that several French regi- 
ments had crossed the Belgian frontier on that date. It is 
needless to say, however, that such evidence is of little, if any, 
value.— Fuehr, 230-235. 



CHAPTER XI 

JAPAN AND TURKEY DRAWN INTO THE 
CONFLICT 

When the great European conflict broke out, 
Germany held Kiaochou, a district on the north- 
ern coast of China. She had gotten possession 
of this territory by first seizing (1897) and then 
leasing it from China. The murder of two 
German missionaries by the Chinese had fur- 
nished the occasion for thus getting a foothold 
in the Far East. Nor were the Germans slow 
to take advantage of the good fortune that had 
placed this territory in their possession. The 
city of Tsingtau, in this district, was modern- 
ized and strongly fortified by them and thus 
made into an important naval base. All of this 
was calculated to excite the jealousy and rivalry 
of Japan. 

Now, Japan was a power that had to be 
reckoned with in the Far East, not only because 
of her own strength but also because that 
strength had been doubled by an alliance with 
England. The first treaty between these two 
countries was signed in 1902, and had been re- 
newed in 1905 and again in 1911. The object 

161 



162 The Causes of the European War 

of the alliance was to maintain "the general 
peace in the regions of eastern Asia and of 
India, " and to insnre "the independence and 
integrity of the Chinese Empire and the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunities for the commerce 
and industry of all nations in China." Each 
of the contracting parties was bound to assist 
the other if it should become "involved in a 
war concerning these matters" with two na- 
tions at once. If either ally should be at war 
with only one power, the other should remain 
neutral. 1 

When the European war first broke out, 
Japan expressed the hope (August 4, 1914) that 
it would be confined to Europe and that she 
would be able to maintain a strict neutrality. 
She declared, however, at this early date, that 
"in the event of Great Britain becoming in- 
volved in the conflict and the object of the 
Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance be at 
stake, Japan may take such measures as are 
necessary to fulfill her obligations under that 
Agreement. ' ' 2 Germany on August 12 an- 
nounced to the Japanese Government that her 
East Asiatic squadron had been "instructed to 
avoid hostile acts against England in case 
Japan remains neutral." 3 

iSee Hazen, 700. For the full text of the treaty of 1911, 
see Publications of Amer. Ass'n. for Inter. Conciliation, Series 
No. Ill, Document No. 85, pp. 29-30. 

2 Inter. Conciliation, No. 85, p. 33. 

3 S., 814. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 163 

The account of Japan's subsequent action can 
best be given in the words of Baron Kato, her 
minister for foreign affairs. In a speech be- 
fore the Imperial Diet, September 5, 1914, he 
said in part : 

It is plain from the foregoing statement that the 
Imperial Government from the outset earnestly hoped 
that the effect of the European war would not extend 
over to the Far East. As was related above, however, 
Great Britain was at last compelled to take part in 
the contest, and early in August the British Govern- 
ment asked the Imperial Government for assistance 
under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 
Alliance. German men-of-war and armed vessels 
were then prowling the seas of Eastern Asia to the 
serious menace of our commerce and that of our Ally, 
while in Kiaochou, her leased territory in China, 
Germany was busy with warlike preparations, ap- 
parently with the purpose of making it the base of 
her warlike operations in Eastern Asia. Grave anxi- 
ety was thus felt as to the maintenance of the peace 
of the Par East. 

As you are all aware the Agreement of Alliance 
between Japan and Great Britain has for its object, 
the consolidation and maintenance of the general peace 
in Eastern Asia, insuring the independence and in- 
tegrity of China as well as the principle of equal op- 
portunities for the commerce and industry of all na- 
tions in that country, and the maintenance and de- 
fense respectively of the territorial rights and of the 
special interests of the contracting parties in Eastern 
Asia. Therefore inasmuch as she is asked by her Ally 
for assistance at the time when the commerce in East- 
ern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike 
as one of their special interests, is subjected to con- 
stant menace, Japan, which regards that alliance as 



164 The Causes of the European War 

the guiding principle of her foreign policy, cannot 
but comply with such request and do her part. Be- 
sides in the opinion of the Government the possession 
by Germany, whose interests are opposed to those of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, of a base of her power- 
ful activities in one corner of the Far East is not only 
a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent 
peace of Eastern Asia, but is also in conflict with the 
more immediate interests of our own Empire. The 
Government, therefore, resolved to comply with the 
British request and if necessary in doing so to open 
hostilities against Germany and after the Imperial 
sanction was obtained, they communicated this resolu- 
tion to the British Government. Full and frank ex- 
change of views between the two Governments fol- 
lowed and it was finally agreed between them to take 
such measures as may be necessary to protect the gen- 
eral interest contemplated by the Agreement of Al- 
liance. 

Japan had no desire or inclination to get herself 
involved in the present conflict. She only believed 
that she owed it to herself to be faithful to the Al- 
liance and strengthen its foundation by ensuring the 
permanent peace of the East and by protecting the 
special interests of our two allied Powers. Desiring, 
however, to solve the situation by pacific means, the 
Imperial Government gave on August 15th the fol- 
lowing advice to the German Government: 

"Considering it highly important and necessary, 
in the present situation, to take measures to remove 
all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East 
and to safeguard the general interests contemplated 
by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and 
Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring 
peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the 
aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese 
Government sincerely believe it their duty to give ad- 
vice to the Imperial German Government to carry out 
the following two propositions : 



Japan and Turkey Brawn In 165 

"1st. To withdraw immediately from the Japan- 
ese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and 
armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once 
those which cannot be so withdrawn. 

"2nd. To deliver on a date not later than Sep- 
tember 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, 
without condition or compensation, the entire leased 
territory of Kiaochou with a view to eventual restora- 
tion of same to China. 

"The Imperial Japanese Government announce, at 
the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving 
by noon August 23, 1914, the answer of the Imperial 
German Government signifying an unconditional ac- 
ceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial 
Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take 
such action as they may deem necessary to meet the 
situation. ' ' 4 

The time limit of the ultimatum expired at 
noon August 23. According to Baron Kato's 
statement, the Japanese Government had re- 
ceived no answer from Germany up to the last 
moment. The German Government did, how- 
ever, on the 23rd state orally to the Japanese 
charge d'aff aires that it had "no reply to make 
to the demands of Japan.' ' Diplomatic nego- 
tiations were at once broken off, and war was 
declared by Japan on the same day. 5 Four 
days later Austria-Hungary broke relations 
with Japan by recalling her ambassador from 
Tokio. 6 

At the beginning of the war "the English 

* Inter. Con., No. 85, pp. 33-35. 
s G. W. B., 30. 
e A. R. B., 69. 



166 The Causes of the European War 

Government ordered the seizure of two dread- 
noughts that were being built for Turkey in 
British yards.' ' Turkey regarded this as an 
unfriendly act, especially as she had made great 
sacrifices for this addition to the strength of her 
navy, having borrowed money for it at the rate 
of twenty per cent. Turkish women had even 
sold their hair to help secure funds for the con- 
struction of these war-ships. The people had 
1 'made such great sacrifices because they re- 
garded these vessels as agencies through which 
Turkey was to attack Greece and win back the 
islands of the ^Egean. ' ' They were, therefore, 
very much incensed at the loss of these dread- 
noughts, though the legal right of the English 
Government to requisition them was beyond 
dispute. 

Britain maintained that she needed these ves- 
sels for her own protection, but would reim- 
burse the Ottoman Government for all financial 
losses entailed by their seizure and, further- 
more, would return them at the end of the war. 
The British ambassador at Constantinople, ap- 
parently, did not feel right over this act of his 
Government, for he spoke of it as "Turkey's 
one concrete and substantial grievance against 
Great Britain." 7 

7B. C. (13), 1, 2, 4, 34; B. C. (14), p. 3; R. 0. B. (2), 10; 
Turkish Official Documents, Inter. Conciliation, pamphlet 86, 
p. 5. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 167 

Despite this alleged grievance, the Porte an- 
nounced its intention to remain neutral. 
Mobilization had been decided upon early in 
August, but this had been done, it was said, 
1 ' only because it would take months to complete, 
and because the Government wished not to be 
taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bul- 
garia, though they had also been alarmed by 
rumors of action by Russia." 8 Great Britain 
promised (August 7) that if neutrality were 
maintained by the Ottoman Government she 
would not " alter the status of Egypt' ' provided 
Egypt should remain quiet and "no unforeseen 
circumstances" should arise. 9 

This policy of neutrality was soon subjected 
to a severe strain. On August 10 two Ger- 
man warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, to 
find shelter from attack by the Allied fleet, came 
into the Dardanelles. Sir Edward Grey de- 
manded that these ships be forbidden to re- 
main in Turkish waters longer than twenty-four 
hours or else be interned. Instead of intern- 
ing them, the Ottoman Government contended 
that it had bought them and promised to allow 
the officers and crews to return to Germany. 

8B. C. (13), 3. 

According to Mr. Morgenthau, former American ambassador 
at Constantinople, the mobilization of the Turkish forces was 
carried on under the direction of German generals acting on 
instructions from Berlin. World's Work, June, 1918, pp. 158, 
160. 

»B. C. (13), 5. 



168 The Causes of the European War 

The grand vizier said that the "purchase was 
due to our [England's] detention of Sultan 
Osman [one of the ships taken over by the 
Government]. They must have ships to bar- 
gain with regard to question of the islands on 
equal terms with Greece, and it was in no way 
directed against Russia." Sir Edward Grey 
was willing to acquiesce in the transfer, pro- 
vided it was bona fide and the crews were re- 
turned to Germany at once. The sale was, 
however, not bona fide, but was only a sham 
transaction arranged by Baron Wangenheim, 
the German ambassador. That such was the 
case was virtually admitted by both Baron 
Wangenheim and Talaat Pasha, the "boss of 
Turkey." 10 

The grand vizier contended that Turkey did 
not have enough sailors to man these boats until 
her transport returned from London. He 
promised that if he were given a little time 
gradually he would get rid of the German crews. 
The whole trouble, he said, was caused by the 
seizure of the Ottoman war-ships by the British 
Government. As England had not paid for the 
vessels, his people looked upon the act as rob- 
bery and as an indication that she intended ' ' to 
assist Greece in aggressive designs against 
Turkey." 11 

10 B. C. (13), 8, 9, 11; World's Work, June, 1918, pp. 166, 
168. 

ii B. C. (13), 20. 



Japan and Turkey Brawn In 169 

The grand vizier, however, was unable to 
make good his pledge that the German crews 
would gradually be sent home. On the con- 
trary, the Germans on the Goeben and Breslau 
were reenf orced by others who came from time 
to time and found places in the navy and the 
forts in strategic positions near Constanti- 
nople. German gold and war materials also 
were sent to the Turkish capital. The Otto- 
man Government was thus, in the opinion of the 
British and American ambassadors, entirely 
under the control of the Teutonic foreigners. 12 

The British foreign office was very patient 
with the grand vizier despite his failure to 
make good his promises. The British and Kus- 
sian ambassadors believed that he was sincere 
and really desirous of maintaining neutrality, 
but that he was not able to take a determined 
stand against the Germans. The Sultan, "a 
majority of the ministry, and a considerable 
section of the Committee of Union and 
Progress' ' were, in the opinion of the English 
ambassador, "opposed to so desperate an ad- 
venture as war with the Allies." But Enver 
Pasha, the minister of war, seemed to be the 
dominating influence in the ministry and he 
was for war. " Dominated by a quasi-Na- 
poleonic ideal, by political Pan-Islamism, and 

12 R. O. B. (2), 36, 37, 39, 76, 86, 87, 88; B. C. (13), 31, 
39, 40, 43, 46, 47, 76; B. C. (14), pp. 2, 3, 4; Turk. Doc; 
World's Work, June, 1918, pp. 174, 176. 



170 The Causes of the European War 

by a conviction of the superiority of the Ger- 
man arms, [he] was from the first a strong 
partisan of the German alliance. " 13 

The press was also very hostile to the Eng- 
lish. As the country was under martial law, 
the press was under a censorship, and, there- 
fore, its utterances might be taken as an expres- 
sion of the sentiments of the Government. Sir 
Louis Mallet, British ambassador at Constan- 
tinople, complained that not only was news in 
favor of the Allies suppressed, but that slander 
and vituperation against the Entente was in- 
dulged in without censorial restraint. The 
newspapers, not only of the capital but also of 
the provinces, were " enthusiastically pro-Ger- 
man. ' ' 

The hostility of the Turkish press to the En- 
tente powers was not, according to Ambassador 
Morgenthau, a reflection of public sentiment, 
for he is of the opinion that a majority of the 
people were more kindly disposed to England 
and France than to Germany. But Baron 
Wangenheim, by a judicious and unscrupulous 
use of money, had won over the press to the 
support of Germany. "A censorship was es- 
tablished in the interest of the Central Pow- 
ers" and "all Turkish editors were ordered to 
write in Germany's favor." German agents 
were carrying on an unbridled propaganda 

13 R. O. B. (2), 36; B. C. (14), p. 1. 



Japan and Turkey Brawn In 171 

through the press and other agencies against 
the Entente powers. 14 

The Germans were, of course, trying to do all 
they could to bring Turkey into the war on 
their side. In support of their propaganda, 
they used, according to the contention of Sir 
Louis Mallet, such arguments as the following : 

German success in the European war was said to 
be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from 
Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely 
alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be 
recovered for the Empire. India and other Moslem 
countries represented as groaning under Christian rule 
might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities 
for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would 
emerge from the war the one great Power of the 
East, even as Germany would be the one great Power 
of the West. Such was the substance of German mis- 
representations. 15 

I* B. C. (13), 147, enclosure 1; B. C. (13), p. 3; World's 
Work, June, 1918, p. 175. 

The Russian ambassador at Constantinople said (September 
14) that he had information to the effect that the leading 
papers of the Turkish capital were subsidized by Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. R. O. B. (2), 53. 

is B. C. (14), p. 1; R. O. B. (2), 75. 

Mr. Morgenthau thinks that prior to the battle of the Marne 
Germany did not want Turkey to enter the war and quotes 
Ambassador Wangenheim as saying that his country preferred 
that Turkey remain neutral. The Germans were at that time 
counting on a short war and did not want to be hampered by 
obligations to the Porte. But after the battle of the Marne, 
when the Teutons had lost the hope of a speedy victory, they 
wanted the active help of the Ottoman Empire. Then it was 
that Baron Wangenheim used the power that he had built up 
in Constantinople in favor of enlisting the active support of 
the Ottoman Government on the side of the Teutonic Allies 
World's Work, June, 1918, 173-4, 178. 



172 The Causes of the European War 

Great Britain, on the other hand, could not 
hold out such glowing prospects as an induce- 
ment for neutrality. In fact, it seems that the 
Entente powers made little or no effort at bar- 
gaining with the Porte. Besides, there seems 
to have been a fear on the part of the Turkish 
people that Britain had designs against the in- 
tegrity and independence of their country. To 
alleviate these fears, Sir Edward Grey directed 
Sir Louis Mallet " to address the following com- 
munication to the Porte" "as soon as the 
French and Russian ambassadors have re- 
ceived similar instructions " : 

If the Turkish Government will repatriate imme- 
diately the German officers and crews of the Goeben 
and Breslau, will give a written assurance that all 
facilities shall be furnished for the peaceful and un- 
interrupted passage of merchant vessels, and that all 
the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by 
Turkey during the present war, the three allied Pow- 
ers will in return agree, with regard to the Capitula- 
tions, to withdraw their extra-territorial jurisdiction 
as soon as a scheme of judicial administration, which 
will satisfy modern conditions, is set up. 

They will further give a joint guarantee in writ- 
ing that they will respect the independence and in- 
tegrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions 
in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall 
prejudice this independence and integrity. ' ' 

This communication was delivered by the 
ambassadors of all three of the Entente pow- 
ers; but the Turkish Government, it seems, 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 173 

"attached no importance to the statement. ' ' 16 
On September 9 the Ottoman Government is- 
sued a statement to the powers declaring the 
Capitulations to be abolished after October l. 17 
Thereupon, the ambassadors of the powers, in- 
cluding Austria-Hungary and Germany, "sent 
identic notes to the Sublime Porte stating 
that . . . capitulary regime . . . cannot be 
abolished . . . without consent of contracting 
parties." Therefore, "we cannot recognize 
executory force after that date (October 1) of 
unilateral decision of the Sublime Porte. ' ' Sir 
Edward Grey, however, said (September 16) 
that he was "prepared to consider reasonable 
concessions about Capitulations," as long as 
Turkey maintained neutrality. Eussia was 
also willing to agree to concessions as to 
the Capitulations provided Turkey would de- 
mobilize and send away the German military 
officers. 18 

is B. C. (13), 21, 27, 28, 64; R. O. B. (2), 35. 

The Turkish cabinet seemed to put little faith in Entente 
pledges respecting the future integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
In discussing these pledges with Ambassador Morgenthau, 
Talaat Pasha said: "They promised that we should not be 
dismembered after the Balkan wars, and see what happened 
to European Turkey then." World's Work, June, 1918, p. 175. 

it The Capitulations were agreements that had been entered 
into by Turkey with the various European powers granting 
to the nationals of the latter who reside in the Ottoman do- 
minions "liberty of residence and of travel, inviolability of 
domicile, freedom of religion, and, to a certain extent, the 
right to be tried by courts of their own nationality." — Inter. 
Year Book. 

is B. C. (13), 73, 77; R. 0. B. (2), 55, 56. 



174 The Causes of the European War 

England's forbearance toward Turkey con- 
tinned despite the fact that the German crews 
still remained with the two vessels alleged to 
have been purchased from Germany, and also 
despite the fact that the British ambassador 
was satisfied that the so-called sale was ficti- 
tious. Besides, the Entente powers had other 
grievances against the Porte. English mer- 
chant ships had been illegally detained in the 
Dardanelles, 19 and a German ship "anchored 
opposite the German embassy at Therapia" 
had been used as a wireless station by the 
Teutons. 20 

On September 27 Turkey committed a more 
important breach of neutrality. The Ottoman 
military authorities on that date closed the 
Dardanelles, giving as a reason that the "sud- 
den actions of [the] British fleet had given rise 
to the belief that an immediate attack was 
contemplated. ' ' The Entente ambassadors at 
Constantinople protested to the grand vizier 
against this action and the English ambassador 
assured him that any such belief was unfounded 
and expressed the wish that the Dardanelles be 
opened at once. 21 The grand vizier offered to 
reopen the straits if the British fleet would 
"move a little farther from the entrance to the 

is B. C. (13), 12, 26, 34. 

20 B. C. (14), p. 2; World's Work, June, 1918, 158-160. 

21 B. C. (13), 97; R. 0. B. (2), 68. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 175 

Dardanelles." 22 This Sir Edward Grey was 
unwilling to consent to, as long as "German 
officers and men remain in Turkish waters and 
are in control of [the] Turkish fleet." 23 

The real reason, however, for closing the 
straits was, in the opinion of Mr. Morgenthau, 
that Germany had now decided to bring Turkey 
into the war and this was the first step toward 
the accomplishment of that purpose. At this 
time Turkey was no longer mistress of her own 
house but was receiving orders from her Teu- 
tonic masters. The Germans had strengthened 
the fortifications at the Dardanelles and Baron 
Wangenheim had boasted that he could close 
the straits in thirty minutes. The order for 
closing the Dardanelles was issued by a German 
general without consulting the Ottoman author- 
ities. The Turkish cabinet had had nothing to 
do with the order given by the German general, 
if we are to credit a statement made by the 
minister of finance. ' ' It 's all a surprise to us, ' ' 
he said to the American ambassador when the 
latter protested against the closing of the 
straits. Ambassador Morgenthau, on whose 
authority these statements are made, repre- 
sents the Ottoman cabinet as reluctantly acqui- 
escing in the bullying policy imposed upon it 
by Germany. 24 

22 B. C. (13), 98. 

23 B. C. (13), 102. 

24 World's Work, June, 1918, 177-8. 



176 The Causes of the European War 

One serious cause of trouble between the 
Porte and the British Government was the 
preparations alleged to have been made by the 
former for attacking Egypt. The Ottoman 
Government contended that the military prep- 
arations in Syria were only a part of the gen- 
eral mobilization movement, " having no other 
object than to put Turkey on a footing to de- 
fend her neutrality. ' ' The Porte also declared 
that Great Britain had aroused anxiety among 
the Turks as to the observance of her pledge 
regarding Egypt because she had declared that 
province in a state of war and had brought in 
troops from India. 25 When Bedouins crossed 
(October 28) the Egyptian frontier, the grand 
vizier declared that he did not believe the re- 
port, but that "if it were true he would give 
immediate orders for [the] recall of [the] 
Bedouins." 26 

25 B. C. (13), 118, 149. 

26 Sir Edward Grey gave the following as a summary of the 
preparations for an attack on Egypt made by the Turkish 
Government : 

The Mosul and Damascus Army Corps have, since their 
mobilization, been constantly sending troops south prepara- 
tory to an invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal from Akaba 
and Gaza. A large body of Bedouin Arabs has been called 
out and armed to assist in this venture. Transport has been 
collected and roads have been prepared up to the frontier 
of Egypt. Mines have been dispatched to be laid in the Gulf 
of Akaba to protect the force from naval attack, and the 
notorious Sheikh Aziz Shawish, who has been so well known 
as a firebrand in raising Moslem feeling against Christians, 
has published and disseminated through Syria, and probably 
India, an inflammatory document urging Mohammedans to 
fight against Great Britain. Dr. Pruffer, who was so long 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 111 

Notwithstanding these assurances, the Otto- 
man Government seemed anxious to recover its 
authority over Egypt. The minister of marine 
told the French ambassador (October 22) that 
the Turks felt about Egypt as the "French did 
about Alsace-Lorraine," and that while "they 
would do nothing officially," yet they "would 
shut their eyes to any agitation which was di- 
rected against English occupation of Egypt. ' ' 27 

While relations between Turkey and Great 
Britain were thus strained almost to the break- 
ing point, a new cause of trouble arose between 
the Porte and the Eussian Government. On 
the morning of October 29, "two or three Turk- 
ish torpedo boats raided Odessa harbor and 
sank" one Eussian gunboat and damaged one 
French and three other Eussian boats. 28 The 
grand vizier contended that the Eussian fleet 
had provoked the attack. This the Eussian 
foreign office "categorically denied," and the 
British ambassador said that he had proof that 
the orders for the attack had been given on Oc- 
tober 27 and that these orders came "as the re- 
sult of a conspiracy hatched between the Ger- 
man representatives in Constantinople and a 

engaged in intrigues in Cairo against the British occupation, 
and is now attached to the German Embassy in Constanti- 
nople, has been busily occupied in Syria trying to incite the 
people to take part in this conflict. B. C. (13), 166, 169, 
173, 176. 

27 B. C. (13), 164. 

28 B. C. (13), 178; R. O. B. (2), 91. 



178 The Causes of the European War 

small and unscrupulous Turkish faction." 29 
This statement of Sir Louis Mallet as to Ger- 
many's responsibility for the raid on Odessa 
is confirmed by important evidence furnished 
by the American ambassador. On the day of 
the attack (but before it was made) Talaat 
Pasha told Mr. Morgenthau that Turkey had 
decided to cast in her lot with Germany and ad- 
mitted that fear was the motive that had 
prompted this decision. He believed that 
Germany would win the war and in that event 
Turkey would fare badly at her hands if she had 
declined to help win the victory. Besides, the 
alliance with Germany afforded an opportunity 
to wreak revenge on Russia. But both Talaat 
and the minister of marine declared that they 
knew nothing beforehand of the plan to attack 
Odessa and the latter put the whole responsi- 
bility on the German Admiral Souchon. Mr. 
Morgenthau adds that the ships which made the 
raid were commanded by German officers and 
manned almost entirely by German crews. 30 

On November 1 the Turkish charge d'affaires 
at St. Petersburg read to M. Sazonof, the Rus- 
sian foreign minister, a telegram from the 
grand vizier, which contained the following 
statement : 

Convey to the Minister of Foreign Affairs our in- 

29 R. O. B. (2), 97; B. C. (14), p. 5. 
so World's Work, June, 1918, 182-3. 



Japan and Turkey Drawn In 179 

finite regret that an act of hostility, provoked by the 
Russian fleet, has compromised friendly relations be- 
tween the two countries. 

You may assure the Imperial Russian Govern- 
ment that the Sublime Porte will not fail to give an 
appropriate solution to this question, and that it will 
adopt all means necessary to prevent the possible re- 
currence of similar events. 

You may at once declare to the Minister of For- 
eign Affairs that we have decided not to allow the Im- 
perial fleet further passage into the Black Sea, and 
that we hope that the Russian fleet, on its part, will 
not further come to cruise in our waters. 

Sazonof's reply was, in part, as follows: 

I replied to the Turkish Charge d 'Affaires that I 
categorically denied that the hostile initiative was 
taken by our fleet. Further, that I feared that it is 
now too late, anyhow, to make any sort of negotia- 
tions. If Turkey had announced the immediate ex- 
pulsion of all German soldiers and sailors, it might 
then still have been possible to enter into negotiations 
looking to reparation for the treacherous attack upon 
our coast and the damages caused thereby. I added 
that the communication presented by him in no wise 
affected the situation that had arisen. 31 

It was now too late to negotiate, as M. Sazo- 
nof had observed, for the Entente ambassadors 
had asked for their passports and two days be- 
fore had had their final interview with the 
grand vizier. 32 

31 r. o. B. (2), 97. 

32 R. O. B. (2), 90, 91, 94, 98; B. C. (13), 180. 



CHAPTEE XII 

ITALY ENTEES THE WAR 

For more than a decade preceding the war, 
the ties holding Italy to the Triple Alliance had 
been weakening. The feeling of coolness be- 
tween Italy and her allies was increased by the 
former's support of France against Germany 
in the Algeciras Conference of 1906. The 
Turco-Italian War of 1911-12, by which Italy 
gained Tripoli and Cyenaica, also loosened to 
some extent the bond that held her to the Triple 
Alliance. The effect of this war was to weaken 
Turkey at a time when it was Germany's policy 
to strengthen her. It is true that the Teutonic 
Governments did not protest against Italy's ac- 
tion except that Austria-Hungary declared that 
she would regard an Italian attack on European 
Turkey as a violation of Article VII of the 
Treaty of the Triple Alliance ; 1 but the atti- 
tude of the press showed that the course of 
Italy met with disapproval in both Teutonic 
countries. Besides, Italy's imperialistic as- 
pirations were encouraged by the success of this 

1 1. G. B., 6. 

}80 



Italy Enters the War 181 

war, and these aspirations crossed the line of 
Austrian ambition in the Balkans. A more 
cordial feeling had also grown up between Italy 
and France, which had found expression in 
political and economic understandings at the 
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth century. 

During the negotiations preceding the out- 
break of August, 1914, Italy showed herself 
anxious for the maintenance of peace, and 
readily supported the proposals made to that 
end. When her partners in the Triple Alliance 
went to war with the other powers, she re- 
mained neutral, contending that her obligations 
by the terms of the alliance bound her to act not 
in an aggressive but only in a defensive war. 
In her opinion, this was not only an aggressive 
war, but the steps leading to it had been taken 
without her advice or knowledge; for she had 
been kept in the dark as to the demands that 
would be made by Austria on Serbia until just 
before the ultimatum reached Belgrade. 2 

Not only did Italy excuse herself for not hav- 
ing aided her allies, but she went further and 
charged that Austria-Hungary by invading 
Serbia without her previous consent had vio- 
lated Article VII of the Treaty of Alliance. 
As early as July 25, 1914, her ambassador at 
Vienna, acting on instructions from the foreign 

2F. Y. B., 26, 51; B. W. P., 152; R. O. B. (2), 4, 17, 22. 



182 The Causes of the European War 

office, declared to the Austro-Hungarian foreign 
minister that Italy would have a claim to com- 
pensation under the terms of Article VII if 
Austria should occupy Serbian territory. A 
few days later the Government raised the ques- 
tion both at Vienna and Berlin as to whether 
the Italian-speaking provinces of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire would be ceded to Italy, and 
threatened to withdraw from the Triple Al- 
liance "if adequate compensation were not ob- 
tained. ' ' 3 

si. G. B., 3; A. P. B. (2), 9. See also speech of Premier 
Antonio Salandra, made June 2, 1915. 

The following articles of the Treaty of Triple Alliance show 
whether Italy was obligated under the terms of the treaty to 
come to the aid of Austria-Hungary and whether Austria- 
Hungary owed Italy compensation because of the former's in- 
vasion of Serbia. 

Article III. If one or two of the high contracting parties 
should be attacked without direct provocation on their part, 
and be engaged in war with two or several Great Powers not 
signatory to this Treaty, the casus foederis shall apply simul- 
taneously to all the high contracting parties. 

Article IV. In the event that a Great Power not signa- 
tory to this Treaty should menace the safety of the states of 
one of the high contracting parties, and that the menaced 
party should be forced to make war on that Power, the two 
others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevo- 
lent neutrality. Each one of them in that case reserves to 
herself the right to participate in the war, if she should con- 
sider it appropriate to make common cause with her ally. 

Article VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous 
solely that the territorial status quo in the near East be 
maintained as much as possible, pledge themselves to exert 
their influence to prevent all territorial modification which 
may prove detrimental to one or the other of the Powers signa- 
tory to this treaty. To that end they shall communicate to 
one another all such information as may be suitable for their 
mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispositions as 
well as those of other Powers. Should, however, the status quo 
in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish coasts and 



Italy Enters the War 183 

Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian for- 
eign minister, had expected that the Italian 
Government would demand compensation, and 
as early as July 20 he advised the Austro-Hun- 
garian ambassador at Rome as to his interpre- 
tation of Article VII. According to his view, 
the phrase, "in the regions of the Balkans,' ' re- 
ferred only to Turkish possessions, and, there- 
fore, a military occupation of Serbian territory 
would not give Italy a right to compensation. 
Italy's interpretation, however, was upheld by 
Germany, and by July 31 Count Berchtold 
was willing to accept Italy's interpretation of 
Article VII, provided the latter power would 
"observe a friendly attitude toward the pend- 
ing operations of war between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Serbia" and would "carry out her 
duties as an ally in case the present conflict 
should lead to a general conflagration." The 
Italian Government took the position that the 
interpretation of the treaty was not subject to 
conditions and declined to pledge its neutrality 
on such terms. 4 

islands in the Adriatic and Mge&n seas in the course of events 
become impossible; and should Austria- Hungary or Italy be 
placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third 
Power or otherwise, to modify that status quo by a temporary 
or permanent occupation on their part, such occupation shall 
take place only after a previous agreement has been made be- 
tween the two Powers, based on the principle of reciprocal 
compensation for all advantages, territorial or otherwise, which 
either of them may obtain beyond the present status quo, a 
compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate interests and 

aspirations of both parties. S., 335-6, 346. 
4 A. E. B. (2),2, enclosure; 15, 16, 25, 26. 



184 The Causes of the European War 

Later (August 22), the German foreign office 
advised Austria-Hungary to accept unreserv- 
edly Italy 's interpretation of Article VII. 
Three days later the Austrian and German am- 
bassadors at Eome announced for their Govern- 
ments an unqualified acceptance of the Italian 
interpretation of the phrase "in the regions of 
the Balkans. " Count Berchtold also said that 
this declaration implied a willingness on his 
part ' ' to enter into negotiations with Italy con- 
cerning compensation in the case of a tem- 
porary or permanent occupation of territory 
in the Balkans by [ Austria- Hun gary ].' ' 5 

Discussions relative to this point seem to 
have fallen into abeyance for a few months but 
were renewed in December, when, according to 
the claim of Baron Sonnino, Italian foreign 
minister, a new situation had been created by 
the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia with- 
out a previous agreement with Italy. A seri- 
ous effort was now begun to induce the Teutonic 
powers to compensate Italy for the disturbance 
of the equilibrium in the Balkans occasioned by 
the Austrian invasion of Serbia. The Govern- 
ment took the position that "it could never al- 
low the integrity and political and economical 
independence of Serbia to be jeopardized, as 
this was contrary to our [its] interests as well 
as to the disposition of the treaty." 6 

5 A. R. B. (2), 42, 44, 45. 

el. G. B., 3, 6; A. R. B. (2), 74, 75. 



Italy Enters the War 185 

At first Count Berchtold was not willing to 
allow any compensation to Italy, contending 
that the occupation of Serbia was neither per- 
manent nor even temporary, but only "moment- 
ary." Afterwards (December 20), Count 
Berchtold expressed his willingness to negotiate 
as to the compensation due Italy "in case of 
temporary or permanent occupations in the 
Balkans by Austria-Hungary." This change 
of heart had, according to evidence received by 
the Italian ambassador at Vienna, been brought 
about as a result of advice from Germany. 7 

The principle of compensation having been 
yielded by Austria-Hungary, it looked as if an 
agreement might be reached. To render the 
negotiations as smooth as possible, Germany 
sent Prince von Billow, the ex-chancellor, as 
ambassador extraordinary to Rome. 

The questions yet to be settled were the 
amount and location of the territory to be given 
and the time of payment. Baron Sonnino let it 
be known that he would not accept territory 

Count Berchtold expressed surprise at this attitude; for he 
claims that Marquis di San Giuliano, Sonnino's predecessor, 
had given him assurances "that Italy would not impede Aus- 
tria's military operations," and he only wanted Austria to 
recognize the "applicability of Article VII to the present situ- 
ation." 

1 I. G. B., 3, 4, 5, 7; A. R. B. (2), 75, 78. 

It ought to be said in this connection that Count Berchtold, 
as early as December 13, telegraphed to the Austrian repre- 
sentative at Rome that he had "no material objection" to enter- 
ing upon negotiations with the Italian Government with refer- 
ence to a possible compensation. A. R. B. (2), 76. 



186 The Causes of the European War 

that had to be taken from the Entente Allies, 
as "this would be equal to taking part in the 
conflict." 8 Baron Macchio, now Austro-Hun- 
garian representative at Rome, hinted at 
"compensations with regard to Albania, a 
country so near Italy and so easily accessible." 
Baron Sonnino replied that Italy had only a 
negative interest in Albania — she was only con- 
cerned in keeping other powers out; besides, 
the acceptance of territory here would embroil 
her unnecessarily in the Balkan troubles and 
win for her the lasting enmity of Serbia and 
Bulgaria. He said that Austria-Hungary 
ought to cede to his country the Italian-speak- 
ing districts now belonging to the Dual Mon- 
archy. Prince von Biilow was in favor of the 
cession of Trentino and said that "Germany 
was sending to Vienna Count Wedel . . . with 
the intent of inducing the Austrian Government 
to give the Trentino to Italy.' ' He thought, 
however, that Italy should not ask for more, 
for he believed that Austria would go to war 
rather than surrender Trieste. 9 Austria-Hun- 
gary was naturally loth to part with her 
possessions and Baron Burian, her foreign min- 
ister, expressed (January 18) surprise that 
Italy should raise such an embarrassing ques- 
tion ; he still thought that she ought to be will- 

s I. G. B., 10. 

»I. G. B., 8, 10, 11; A. R. B. (2), 90, 98, enclosure. 



Italy Enters the War 187 

ing to "accept a discussion regarding the com- 
pensations relating to territories possessed by 
other warring states. ' ' 10 

On January 26 Prince von Billow asked Italy 
to formulate her demands. This the Italian 
foreign minister was unwilling to do until Aus- 
tria-Hungary had accepted * ' explicitly and defi- 
nitely that the discussions bear on the ground 
of the cession of territory now possessed by the 
[Austro-Hungarian] Empire.' ' 1X The Austro- 
Hungarian Government hesitated, neither ac- 
cepting nor rejecting the basis of discussion de- 
manded by Italy. 

The negotiations were further complicated by 
the demand made by Austria-Hungary on Italy 
for compensation under Article VII for the oc- 
cupation of Valona and the retention of the 
iEgean Islands. Italy denied the right of com- 
pensation because of her action in reference to 
these places and undertook to justify it on the 
ground that the "occupation of Valona had 
been caused by the general state of disorder 
which reigned in Albania, ' ' and that the iEgean 
Islands were retained because Turkey had not 
yet complied with all the terms of the treaty 
of Lausanne. Besides, she contended that Aus- 

10 i. G. B., 12. 

ill. G. B., 15; A. R. B. (2), 99. 

The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister spoke of Italy's 
"preposterous" request as a demand for "a slice of our own 
flesh." 



188 The Causes of the European War 

tria-Hungary had waived all her claim to com- 
pensation; for on May 27, 1912, her foreign 
minister had declared that he " would not avail 
himself in this instance of the right of compen- 
sation which was dne him," provided Italy 
would not seize any more of the islands. In 
deference to this request, Italy had refrained 
from seizing any of the other islands, though 
the strategic reasons for doing so were very 
strong. 

After having made this defense, Baron Son- 
nino, on February 12, withdrew all the pro- 
posals made, declaring that his Government 
would "intrench itself in the simple interpreta- 
tion of Article VII, declaring that it considers 
as openly contrary to the very article whatever 
military action Austria-Hungary would make 
from now on in the Balkans." This was a 
threat to withdraw from the Triple Alliance 
if the Austro-Hungarian Government should 
again attack Serbia before an agreement as to 
compensations had been concluded. 12 

While the question of the cession of Austro- 
Hungarian territory was still unsettled a new 

12 Austria-Hungary contended that Count Berchtold's state- 
ment " 'that he would not have availed himself in this in- 
stance of the right of compensation which was due him' ought 
to be interpreted in the sense that he did not intend to avail 
himself of the right of compensation at the moment in which 
the occupation of the islands had occurred . . . but that he 
reserved to avail himself of that right at an opportune mo- 
ment." I. G. B., 20, 21, 22, 23, 24; A. R. B. (2), 95, en- 
closure, 104, 106, 109, enclosure; S., 345. 



Italy Enters the War 189 

difficulty arose. Austria-Hungary claimed that 
the agreement as to compensation might be in- 
itiated before but could not be consummated 
until after the campaign against Serbia was 
over, as it could not be determined until then 
how much Austria-Hungary would profit by the 
military operations. Italy contended (Febru- 
ary 22) that Article VII spoke of a "previous 
agreement," which could only mean a definite 
understanding before military operations were 
begun. Any other construction would leave 
her without any guarantee that the agreement 
initiated before the campaign would be satis- 
factorily concluded after it. Germany agreed 
with Italy in her interpretation of this part of 
Article VII, and " strongly intervened at 
Vienna to favor an understanding between Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Italy. ' ' 13 It was doubtless 
in consequence of this intervention that Aus- 
tria-Hungary announced (March 9) her willing- 
ness to enter upon negotiations "on the basis 
of cession of Austrian territory.' ' 14 

The people in Italy were almost unanimous 
in the conviction that the Government must use 
this opportunity for enabling their country to 
realize its national ambitions. The press was 
now clamoring for war. The Giornale d' Italia 
declared (March 7) that it would "be extremely 

is I. G. B., 27, 31, 38; A. R. B. (2), 109, enclosure. 
i*I. G. B., 39; A. R. B. (2), 115. 



190 The Causes of the European War 

difficult for Italy longer to remain neutral.' ' 
Baron Sonnino had in his negotiations with 
Austria-Hungary more than once spoken of the 
national aspirations of the Italian people and 
the impossibility of the Government 's carrying 
out a policy in opposition to these aspirations. 
It would, therefore, naturally be expected that 
Austria would have to come to Italy's terms if 
neutrality were to be maintained. 

On March 10 the Italian foreign minister 
stated that he was willing to specify the de- 
mands of Italy as soon as Austria-Hungary 
should accept certain conditions which he laid 
down as bases for negotiations. One of these 
was the provision that "when the accord shall 
be concluded it shall take immediate effect. ' ' 15 

This, the most important of the three condi- 
tions, was not accepted by Austria-Hungary. 
Baron Burian said (March 13) "that it would 
be impossible for the Imperial and Royal [Aus- 
tro-Hungarian] Government to admit the pass- 
ing on of any territories of the monarchy be- 
fore the conclusion of peace." He also still 
held that Austria had a claim to compensation 
because of the Italian occupation of Valona and 
the iEgean Islands. Italy, however, positively 
declined to allow the last-named question to 
come up for discussion. 16 Austria pointed out 

is i. G. B., 42. 

"I. G. B., 43, 44; A. R. B. (2), 117, enclosure. 



Italy Enters the War 191 

that there were very serious obstacles to the 
transfer of any of her territory to Italy in time 
of war. 

Germany, although she had up to this time 
been urging Austria-Hungary to yield, thought 
that Italy was asking too much. She promised 
to guarantee that "the agreement to be con- 
cluded between Italy and Austria-Hungary will 
be put into execution faithfully and loyally im- 
mediately after the conclusion of peace.' ' 17 

Italy, however, feared that the Austrian and 
Hungarian Parliaments would not confirm the 
cession of territory after the war was over, 
when she would have no means of compelling 
compliance with the terms of the agreement. 
As to the guarantee of Germany, she considered 
it "valuable in the case of a victorious Ger- 
many, which presupposes also a victorious Aus- 
tria, but would have less value in case both 
should be defeated." 18 Baron Sonnino said 
that "the expectation of an immediate execu- 
tion would strongly influence public opinion to- 
ward moderation in the demands of the ces- 
sions, while any delay would encourage larger 
demands." In short, he was offering Austria 
a discount for cash. 19 Baron Burian tried to 
allay Sonnino J s fears regarding the future ac- 
tions of the Austrian and Hungarian Parlia- 

"I. G. B., 46; A. R. B. (2), 125, 128. 
" I. G. B., 46, 53; A. R. B. (2), 121. 
19 I. G. B., 52. 



192 The Causes of the European War 

ments by declaring that "they could not reject 
an act which had taken place under the ample 
power possessed by his Majesty the Em- 
peror." 20 

As they were deadlocked on this point, Prince 
von Billow suggested that they take up the other 
question as to the amount of compensation, 
leaving this one in abeyance without preju- 
dice. 21 This was done and Austria-Hungary 
made (March 27) an offer of the terms on which 
she was willing to purchase the neutrality of 
Italy. 22 These terms being regarded as vague 
and unsatisfactory by Italy, she was invited to 
make counter-proposals. 23 Thereupon Baron 
Sonnino (April 8, 1915) formulated conditions 
that would be acceptable to his country. They 
were in part as follows : 

(1) Austria-Hungary to cede "the Trentino 
to Italy, with the boundaries which the Italian 
realm had in 1811. ,, 

(2) The boundary between Italy and Austria 
to be corrected, "the cities of Gradisca and 
Goriza being comprised in the ceded terri- 
tory." 

(3) "The city of Trieste with its territory' ' 
to be "constituted into an autonomous and inde- 
pendent state.' ' 

20 I. G. B., 51. 

2il. G. B., 50; A. R. B. (2), 121. 

221. G. B., 56; A. R. B. (2), 131. 

23 1. G. B., 58, 62; A. R. B. (2), 134, 138, 



Italy Enters the War 193 

(4) Austria-Hungary to cede "to Italy the 
group of the Curzolari Islands. ' ' 

(5) Italy to "occupy at once the territories 
. . . ceded to her"; "Trieste and her terri- 
tory' ' to be cleared immediately " of the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities and troops." 

(6) Austria-Hungary to acknowledge "the 
full sovereignty of Italy on Valona and her bay, 
including Sasseno, with as much territory in 
the * Hinterland ' as may be requested for their 
defense." 

(7) Austria-Hungary to renounce "com- 
pletely every interest in Albania." 

There were also some minor clauses con- 
tained in articles 8 and 9. 

For these concessions Italy agreed to bind 
herself during the present war "to preserve a 
perfect neutrality with regard to Austria-Hun- 
gary and Germany" and to renounce "any 
right to further invoke, for her own advantage, 
the dispositions of Article VII of the Treaty of 
the Triple Alliance," provided "Austria-Hun- 
gary makes the same renunciation for all that 
may regard the Italian occupation of the Is- 
lands of the Dodekanese [the iEgean Is- 
lands]." 24 

Austria-Hungary was willing to cede "all the 
districts which form what is commonly called 
the Trentino," but would not agree to the 

2*1. G. B'., 64; A. R. B. (2), 141. 



194 The Causes of the European War 

boundary for these districts laid down by the 
Italian proposals. 25 In his reply to Italy 's 
proposals, Baron Burian, Austro-Hungarian 
foreign minister, objected to "a change in the 
frontier line toward the Isonzo," as this 
" would render difficult the military defense of 
that part of the [Austro-Hungarian] Mon- 
archy's frontier, and would place the frontier 
of Italy too near to the city of Trieste. To de- 
tach this city from Austria-Hungary would de- 
prive the latter of its most important center of 
maritime traffic and put in possession of Italy 
the principal line of communication between 
that city and Germany. Finally, the acquisi- 
tion of the Curzolari Islands, which dominate 
Dalmatia, would make Italy mistress of those 
regions, and the Adriatic Sea would become an 
Italian sea, in the case Italy maintained pos- 
session of Valona." 26 

"As to the proposal contained in Article V, 
according to which the territories ceded by 
Austria-Hungary should be immediately trans- 
ferred to Italy, Baron Burian observed that the 
rearrangements that such a proposal would 

25 i. G. B„ 60, 71. 

26 Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian representative at Rome, 
in discussing the reply of his government with the Italian 
foreign minister, said: "To Austria-Hungary it would be like 
depriving a human being of air if the Italian border were to 
be pushed to the very gates of Trieste, if a free state were to 
arise which would cut off [Austria-Hungary's] access to the 
sea." A. R. B. (2), 147; I. G. B., 71. 



Italy Enters the War 195 

carry with it, which would be impracticable 
even in time of peace for various reasons of 
general administration, . . . would be even 
more so in time of war. On this subject, he 
added that, without quoting other historical 
examples, it was sufficient to remember the pro- 
cedure adopted on the occasion of the cession 
of Nice and Savoy to France in 1860, in which, 
even after the conclusion of peace, a certain 
number of months elapsed between the conclu- 
sion of the convention and the actual transfer 
of the ceded territories." 

The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister also 
declared that his country could not ' ' disinterest 
itself in Albania, a region so near the sphere of 
its most sensitive interests. ' ' 27 In an inter- 
view with the Italian ambassador at Vienna, he 
expressed (April 29) his willingness to discuss 
with the Italian foreign minister "the recipro- 
cal interests in Albania, keeping in mind the 
changed circumstances during the present war, 
and to join with the Eoyal [Italian] Govern- 
ment in a new agreement regarding the same, 
which could, in establishing anew the question 
on European ground, imply also the disin- 
terestedness of Austria-Hungary provided that 
Italy would equally disinterest herself in Al- 
bania, to the exception of Yalona and of the 
sphere of interests which would have there 

27 1. Q. B., 60, 71; A. R. B. (2), 144. 



196 The Causes of the European War 

their center, and that sufficient guarantees 
should be given against undertakings or estab- 
lishments of other powers in Albania, an event- 
uality threatening the political and maritime 
interests of Austria-Hungary as well as those 
of Italy." 28 

It is needless to say that Baron Burian's an- 
swer was unsatisfactory to Italy. He hoped, 
however (if we are to accept the opinion of the 
Italian ambassador at Vienna), that Italy 
would abate her demands, and believed that she 
would not go to war with Austria and Germany 
even though her "requests were not accepted 
integrally." 29 

If this was the opinion of the Austro-Hun- 
garian foreign minister, he had woefully mis- 
judged the situation in Italy, 30 for at this time 
both the Government and, apparently, the 
people also were determined to go to war rather 
than lose this opportunity of realizing their 
national aspirations. We are not surprised, 
therefore, that Italy decided to end the long 
and apparently fruitless negotiations. On May 
3, Baron Sonnino notified the Austro-Hun- 

28 1. G. B., 75; A. R. B. (2), 44. 

29 1. G. B., 74. 

30 Baron Macchio thought ( May 2 ) that public sentiment in 
Italy was "three quarters opposed to war." The street dem- 
onstrations of May 16 and 17 at Rome and in the provinces 
in favor of war were, he seemed to think, arranged by the 
resigned cabinet as a political move. A. R. B. (2), 167, 187, 
189, 191. 



Italy Enters the War 197 

garian Government that he was constrained to 
withdraw all his "propositions for an accord" 
and that * ' Italy, confident in her good right, af- 
firms and proclaims that from this moment she 
resumes her entire freedom of action, and de- 
clares her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hun- 
gary to be void and henceforth of no effect.' ' 31 
The Austro-Hungarian Government protested 
against this action of Italy, saying that the 
treaty had been renewed to last until 1920, and 
could not be denounced or nullified before that 
date. 32 

Prince von Billow and Baron Macchio did 
not even now cease their efforts to win the 
neutrality of Italy, and in this endeavor they 
were probably supported by the Italian ex- 
premier, Signor Giolitti. These efforts were 
rewarded with another offer made by Austria- 
Hungary May 18. 

By the terms of this proposal, Austria-Hun- 
gary would cede to Italy that part of the Tyrol 
"the inhabitants of which are of Italian na- 
tionality," with the same boundaries as in the 
previous offer; and the territory west of the 
Isonzo, including Gradisca, the population of 
which is purely Italian. Trieste would become 
an imperial free city. 

Austria-Hungary would also declare "her 
political disinterestedness with regard to Al- 

si I. G. B., 76. 32 a. R. B. (2), 200. 



198 The Causes of the European War 

bania" ; would not contest Italy's "unrestricted 
sovereignty over Valona and its bay, as well as 
over the sphere of interest surrounding it"; 
and would waive all claims for compensation 
growing out of the Italian occupation of the 
iEgean Islands. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government would 
"issue a solemn proclamation concerning the 
territorial cessions immediately after the con- 
clusion of [the] agreement," and mixed com- 
missions would be appointed "to settle details 
in connection with the cession of the territories 
in question.' ' "Military persons born in the 
territories ceded to Italy" would be "with- 
drawn from the fighting lines of the Austro- 
Hungarian army" immediately after the con- 
clusion of the agreement. 

Italy would undertake "to maintain absolute 
neutrality toward Austria-Hungary and Ger- 
many and Turkey as long as this war lasts," 
and would declare "her disinterestedness in 
any territorial or other advantage that might 
accrue to Austria-Hungary as a result either of 
the present miltitary operations or of the treat- 
ies of peace that shall mark their end. ' ' 

Austria-Hungary and Italy were both to ac- 
cept "the guarantee assumed by Germany for 
the faithful and loyal execution of this agree- 
ment. ' ' 33 

S3 A. R. B. (2), 178, 185, 188, 190, 194. 



Italy Enters the War 199 

Next day the provision as to mixed commis- 
sions was modified so as to read, in part, as 
follows: "The transfer of the ceded terri- 
tories will take place as soon as the decisions 
taken by aforesaid commissions shall have been 
satisfied; it will be complete within one 
month. " 34 Three days later (May 22) Baron 
Macchio was instructed by the Austro-Hun- 
garian foreign office to ask Baron Sonnino if 
he would be willing to sign the above-mentioned 
agreement provided Austria-Hungary "met 
Italy still further on the question of the putting 
of the cessions into effect, without, however, 
conceding immediate military occupation.' ' 
Baron Macchio raised this question in his inter- 
view with Sonnino next day, but the latter re- 
plied that this offer had come too late and, that, 
besides, the last proposal, even when finally 
amended, was not satisfactory. 35 

The Italian premier in a speech June 2, 1915, 
referred to these proposals as an eleventh hour 
bid and intimated that he did -not believe that 
they had been made in good faith. The fact 
that they contained no promise of immediate 
execution rendered them impossible of consid- 
eration, even if they had met Italy's wishes in 
other respects. Besides, he contended that 
they fell far short of his country's demands. 
The boundaries proposed for Trentino were, 

"A. R. B. (2), 192, 195. 35 A. R. B. (2), 202, 203. 



200 The Causes of the European War 

he maintained, not those asked for by Baron 
Sonnino on April 8, and, if accepted, would 
leave Austria-Hungary in possession of the 
gates to Italy. The offer provided for the au- 
tonomy of Trieste; Sonnino had asked for its 
independence. Besides, there was no provision 
that would give Italy a satisfactory position 
in the Adriatic. 36 

Austria's final bid had indeed come too late, 
for the Entente Governments had offered and 
Italy had accepted terms more favorable than 
any that the Central Powers had been able to 
promise. For by a secret treaty with the 
Allies, dated May 9, 1915, Italy had entered 
into an engagement with the Allies which tied 
her hands as regards further bargaining with 
the Teutonic Governments. 37 

36 See Salandra's speech. 

37 This treaty was published by the Bolsheviki after they 
got control in Petrograd in November, 1917. The full text of 
the treaty, translated from the Russian language, is printed 
in the Current History Magazine, published by the New York 
Times Company. The extracts given below are taken from 
this text by permission of the publishers. The following are 
the main provisions of the treaty: 

IV. By the future treaty of peace Italy shall receive the 
Trentino, the whole of Southern Tyrol, as far as its natural 
and geographical frontier, the Brenner; the city of Trieste and 
its surroundings, the County of Gorizia and Gradisca, the 
whole of Istria as far as the Quarnero, including Volosca and 
the Istrian Islands, Cherso and Lussin, as also the lesser 
islands of Plavnik, Unia, Canidoli, Palazzuola, S. Pietro 
Nerovio, Asinello and Gruica, with their neighboring islets. . . . 

V. In the Same way Italy shall receive the Province of 
Dalmatia in its present extent, including further to the north 
Lissarika and Trebinje ( i. e., two small places in Southwestern 



Italy Enters the War 201 

The war policy of the Government was sup- 
ported by both houses of Parliament by large 

Croatia), and to the south all places as far as a line starting 
from the sea close to Cape Planka [between Trail and Se- 
benico] and following the watershed eastward in such a way 
as to place in Italian hands all the valleys whose rivers enter 
the sea near Sebenico — namely, the Gikola, Krka, and Butisn- 
jica, with their tributaries. To Italy also will belong all the 
islands north and west of the Dalmatian coast . . . 

VII 

To Italy will be conceded the right of conducting the foreign 
relations of Albania; in any case Italy will be bound to secure 
for Albania a territory sufficiently extensive to enable its fron- 
tiers to join those of Greece and Serbia to the east of the Lake 
of Ohrida. 

VIII. Italy shall obtain full possession of all the islands 
of the Dodecannese, at present occupied by her. 

IX. France, Great Britain, and Russia recognize as an 
axiom the fact that Italy is interested in maintaining the 
political balance of power in the Mediterranean, and her right 
to take over, when Turkey is broken up, a portion equal to 
theirs in the Mediterranean — namely, in that part which bor- 
ders on the Province of Adalia, where Italy has already ac- 
quired special rights and interests, laid down in the Italo- 
British convention. The zone to be assigned to Italy will, in 
due course, be fixed in accordance with the vital interests of 
France and Great Britain. In the same way regard must be 
had for the interests of Italy, even in the event of the powers 
maintaining for a further period of time the inviolability of 
Asiatic Turkey, and merely proceeding to map out spheres of 
interest among themselves. In the event of France, Great 
Britain, and Russia occupying during the present war dis- 
tricts of Asiatic Turkey, the whole district bordering on 
Adalia, and defined above in greater detail, shall be reserved 
to Italy, who reserves the right to occupy it. 

X. In Libya Italy obtains recognition of all those rights 
and prerogatives hitherto reserved to the Sultan by the Treaty 
of Lausanne. 

XL Italy shall receive a military contribution correspond- 
ing to her strength and sacrifices. 



XIII. In the event of an extension of the French and Brit- 
ish colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, 



202 The Causes of the European War 

and enthusiastic majorities, 38 and on May 23, 
1915, war was declared against Austria. 39 It 
was not until August 27, 1916, that a declaration 
of war against Germany was made, which was 
to be effective August 28. 

France and Great Britain recognize to Italy in principle the 
right of demanding for herself certain compensations in the 
form of an extension of her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, 
Libya, and the colonial districts bordering on French and Brit- 
ish colonies. 

38 A. R. B. (2), 198, 201. 

39 A. R. B. (2), 204. 



CHAPTEB XIII 

THE LESSER BELLIGERENTS 

As has been seen, Bulgaria at the opening of 
the war was smarting under the defeats of the 
last Balkan War, and was anxious to recover 
territory in Macedonia then held by Serbia. 
She had a seaport, Dedeagatch, on the iEgean 
Sea, but to get to it by rail her people were 
obliged to pass through Turkish territory. 
They were, therefore, desirous of getting from 
Turkey a strip of land that would properly link 
up Dedeagatch with their other possessions. 
Both the Teutonic and Entente Allies were, 
therefore, in a position to make tempting offers 
to Bulgaria. 

The Bulgarian premier stated on August 9 
that his country was ready to go to war on 
such terms as would satisfy her "national as- 
pirations." She would join in with the En- 
tente Allies if they could give binding guaran- 
tees that the portion of Macedonia which had 
been lost to Serbia in the second Balkan War 
and minor portions of Greek Macedonia would 
be restored to her. This was virtually an an- 

203 



204 The Causes of the European War 

nouncement that Bulgarian support would be 
sold to the highest bidder. 

The Entente powers were handicapped in the 
game of bargaining. Serbia was unwilling to 
give up as much of her Macedonian territory 
as Bulgaria demanded, and the Greek king was 
opposed to the sacrifice of any of his pos- 
sessions. Russia's announced intention to take 
Constantinople for herself also aroused the 
jealousy and fear of the Bulgarians. Besides, 
considerable friction developed between the 
Serbs and the Bulgars over the Valandova in- 
cident. On April 2 a Serbian blockhouse at 
Valandova was attacked by a band of raiders, 
with a loss of life on both sides. Serbia claims 
that these raiders were Bulgarian soldiers 
(Komitadjis). Bulgaria denied that they were 
and disavowed all responsibility for the inva- 
sion. 

Russian diplomacy, however, smoothed over 
this cause of dispute, and the Entente were able 
(by August 10) to make Bulgaria a good offer. 
According to the Giornale d'ltalia, they offered 
to meet her demands as to Serbian Macedonia, 
Serbia to be compensated out of Greek terri- 
tory. 

In the meantime, the diplomacy of the Cen- 
tral powers had been active and, as it later 
proved, more successful than that of their 
rivals. German bankers had in February made 



The Lesser Belligerents 205 

large advances on a loan contracted by Bulgaria 
in the summer of 1914, and Turkey had agreed 
to allow Bulgarian express trains from Dedea- 
gatch to go through without stopping on Turk- 
ish territory. Later a treaty was signed (an- 
nounced August 23) between Bulgaria and Tur- 
key by which the former was granted the cov- 
eted strip of the latter 's territory, which would 
properly connect her seaport Dedeagatch with 
the interior of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Gov- 
ernment promised as its part of the agreement 
to maintain armed neutrality. 

On September 21 Bulgaria began to mobilize, 
declaring at the same time that she was not 
preparing for war, but was only taking steps 
that were necessary to preserve armed neutral- 
ity. It looked now as if Bulgaria had decided 
to cast in her lot with the Teutonic allies. She 
was aided in making up her mind by the failure 
of the Allied campaign against the Dardanelles 
and the collapse of the Eussian defensive in 
Poland. It is thought, too, that Bulgaria had 
entered into a secret agreement with the Cen- 
tral powers in July, 1915, whereby she was 
promised very liberal territorial concessions on 
condition that she would attack Serbia. At any 
rate, Bulgaria had decided that the Teutonic 
promises were either more alluring to her or 
else stood a better chance of being redeemed. 

The Entente powers were not satisfied with 



206 The Causes of the European War 

Bulgaria's explanation regarding the mobiliza- 
tion of her forces, and on October 3, 1915, Rus- 
sia sent an ultimatum to Bulgaria stating that 
the events then taking place showed that the 
Government of King Ferdinand had decided 
"to place the fate of its country in the hands of 
Germany. M "The presence of German and 
Austrian officers at the ministry of war and on 
the staff of the army, the concentration of 
troops in the zone bordering Serbia and the 
extensive financial support accepted from our 
enemies by the Sofia Cabinet, no longer leave 
any doubt as to the object of the military prep- 
arations of Bulgaria.' ' The Russian minister 
was instructed to leave Bulgaria if the Bulgar- 
ian Government did not "within twenty-four 
hours openly break with the enemies of the Slav 
cause and of Russia, and does [did] not at once 
proceed to send away officers belonging to 
armies of states which are at war with the 
powers of the Entente. ' ' x 

Instead of complying with these demands, 
Bulgaria, on October 13, attacked Serbia and 
next day declared war on her. Great Britain 
declared war on Bulgaria October 14, and Rus- 
sia and Italy followed suit on October 19. 

Portugal and Great Britain have been bound 
together by the ties of friendship for centuries. 
It is said that since the time of Edward III 

i Chicago Herald, October 4, 1915. 



The Lesser Belligerents 207 

(1373) the two countries have been united by 
"a covenant of mutual support." This old 
agreement, revised by Cromwell and again by 
Charles II, was declared to be still binding in 
1873 by Queen Victoria. Portugal was thus 
in close alliance with Great Britain when the 
war broke out in 1914. The fact that Portugal 
owes the security of her African possessions to 
British friendship makes her value the more 
highly her alliance with the mistress of the seas. 

When Britain became involved in the war, 
Portugal declared her willingness to act on her 
obligations to her ally whenever the latter 
should desire it. This policy announced by the 
Government received the approval of Parlia- 
ment and the support of the press and of all 
political parties. The Portuguese premier even 
offered to send an expeditionary force to aid 
the Allies in Belgium. There were, however, 
strong military and financial objections to Por- 
tugal's participation in the war, and it was de- 
cided best for the Allied cause for her not to 
break with Germany at this time. She, there- 
fore, maintained a formal neutrality toward 
the Teutonic powers, but her heart was all the 
time with the Entente Allies. 

The role that had been imposed upon Portu- 
gal by her friends was a difficult one to fill, and 
Germany charged her with numerous violations 
of neutrality. The final break did not come, 



208 The Causes of the European War 

however, until March 9, 1916, when Germany 
declared war on Portugal. Austria-Hungary 
followed the German example on March 15. 
The immediate cause of the rupture was the 
seizure by the Portuguese Government of 
thirty-six interned German merchant vessels on 
the ground that her commercial needs urgently 
demanded an increase in her shipping facilities. 
Germany claimed, in her declaration of war, 
that the shortage in Portuguese tonnage did 
not justify the requisition of so many ships and 
that the Government had taken no steps toward 
satisfying the shipowners as to compensation. 
Sir Edward Grey, however, contended that the 
vessels would have been duly paid for if the 
German Government had had the patience to 
wait. 

Rumania had an ambition to incorporate in 
her dominions the three and one-half million 
Rumans living in Transylvania, Bukovina, the 
Banat, and Bessarabia. As these territories 
now belong to Austria-Hungary and Russia, 
it follows that her aspirations can be realized 
only at the expense of these two neighboring 
powers. 

When the Great War broke out, both groups 
of belligerents were thus in a position to make 
attractive bids for Rumanian neutrality or sup- 
port. Each could offer territory already under 
its control and also lands that it hoped to 



The Lesser Belligerents 209 

wrest from the enemy. Both sides were fa- 
vored by advantages and hampered by disad- 
vantages in the bargaining contest. 

The Teutonic allies could start with an offi- 
cial friendship that had lasted for forty years. 
Eussia had appropriated Rumanian Bess- 
arabia after defeating Turkey in 1878 and had 
thereby destroyed the cordial feeling that had 
existed toward her among the Rumanian 
people. The Teutonic powers thus found it 
easy to extend their influence over Rumania. 
The present King of Rumania is a Hohen- 
zollern, and her ruling aristocracy has been 
guided by German ideals. 2 

Despite all of this, however, at the outbreak 
of the great conflict, public sentiment in Ru- 
mania seemed to be overwhelmingly in favor of 
the Entente Allies, and she was expected to go 
into the war on their side. Entente diplomacy 
had, however, failed to win her over until Aug- 
ust 27, 1916, when she entered the war against 
the Teutons. The Rumanian Government was 
induced to take this step partly by the fear of 
Bulgaria and partly on account of Allied suc- 

2 Since this chapter was written a good many other coun- 
tries have either declared war on or broken diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Central powers. As they have taken little or no 
part, however, in the activities of the war it has not been 
thought advisable to discuss their reasons for breaking with 
the Teutonic allies. For a list of these declarations with dates 
up to the end of 1917, see the Statesman's Year Book for 1917, 
p. xxvi. 



210 The Causes of the European War 

cesses on the western front and contempo- 
raneous Eussian successes in re-conquering 
Bukovina. This action also brought her into 
war with the allies of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Germany. 



PART III 
WHY AMERICA ENTERED THE WAR 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE FIRST SUBMARINE CONTROVERSY 

Our controversy with Germany began on 
February 4, 1915, at which time the German 
Government issued a proclamation declaring 
the waters around the British Isles a war zone. 
All enemy ships found in this zone on and after 
February 18, 1915, were to be " destroyed with- 
out its being always possible to avert the 
dangers threatening the crews and passengers 
on that account." The proclamation went on 
to recite that even neutral ships would be * ' ex- 
posed to danger in the war zone as in view of 
the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 
1st by the British Government and of the ac- 
cidents of naval war, it cannot always be 
avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks 
that are directed at enemy ships.' ' The effort 
would be made to destroy all enemy merchant 
ships in the war zone even if it were not always 
"possible to avert the dangers which may 
menace persons and merchandise." Neutral 
powers were "accordingly forewarned not to 
continue to entrust their crews, passengers, or 
merchandise to such vessels." 

213 



214 The Causes of the European War 

In short, this was a warning that neutrals 
would run a serious risk of losing their lives 
and their ships if they should venture into the 
war zone. The excuse given for this defiance 
of international law was that it was a retalia- 
tory measure necessitated by Britain's restric- 
tions on German trade. Great Britain, it was 
alleged, had violated international law by de- 
claring the North Sea a war area, by extending 
unreasonably the lists of contraband of war, 
and by refusing to abide by the Declaration of 
London. 1 

The United States Government felt that it 
could not acquiesce in this infringement of its 
rights as a neutral and so protested vigorously 

i Jour. (9), 83-5. 

The Declaration of London is a codification of the rules of 
naval warfare as agreed upon by representatives of the ten 
leading maritime states at a conference held in London in the 
winter of 1908-09. The Declaration, however, has not been 
ratified by all the countries represented at the conference and 
therefore does not have the binding force of international law. 
Great Britain was one of the powers which had not ratified the 
principles of the Declaration, although her representatives at 
the conference had signed it. In the beginning of the war our 
State Department asked all the belligerents if they would 
agree to be bound by the principles of the Declaration of 
London provided that their opponents would make the same 
pledge. The Teutonic allies replied that they would accept 
the Declaration on these conditions, but the Entente Allies 
declined to do so. The reason for this refusal was that Great 
Britain, being the strongest naval power of the belligerents 
and the one upon whom the restrictions of the Declaration 
would bear most heavily, objected to certain clauses, mainly 
those dealing with contraband of war. After this refusal our 
Government announced that it would not consider the articles 
of the Declaration as binding but would fall back upon the 
principles of international law. Jour. (9), 1-8; Rogers, Amer- 
ica's Case against Germany, 41-43; War Cyclopedia. 



The First Submarine Controversy 215 

against the proposed policy in a note dated 
February 10, 1915. It took the position that a 
belligerent's rights as to neutral ships on the 
high seas are confined to " visit and search un- 
less a blockade is proclaimed and effectively 
maintained." And inasmuch as the proclama- 
tion did not provide for that, Germany had no 
warrant under international law to sink an 
American ship. A warning as to the conse- 
quences in case American ships or lives were 
destroyed was conveyed to the Imperial Gov- 
ernment in strong terms as follows: 

If the commanders of German vessels of war should 
act upon the presumption that the flag of the United 
States was not being used in good faith and should 
destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the 
lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for 
the Government of the United States to view the act 
in any other light than as an indefensible violation of 
neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to 
reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily 
subsisting between the two Governments. 

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Im- 
perial German Government can readily appreciate 
that the Government of the United States would be 
constrained to hold the Imperial German Government 
to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval 
authorities and to take any steps it might be neces- 
sary to take to safeguard American lives and prop- 
erty and to secure to American citizens the full en- 
joyment of their acknowledged rights on the high 
seas. 2 

The reply of Von Jagow, German foreign 

2 Jour. (9), 86-88. 



216 The Causes of the European War 

minister, to Secretary Bryan's note was made 
on February 16. It reiterated the reasons al- 
leged for Germany's action, namely, that Great 
Britain was violating international law and 
that the policy proposed was necessary as an 
act of defense. He explained that it was far 
from the intention of the German Government 
"ever to destroy neutral lives and neutral 
property, but on the other hand they cannot 
be blind to the fact that dangers arise through 
the action to be carried out against England 
which menace without discrimination all trade 
within the area of maritime war." If neutral 
ships should enter this war zone they would 
"bear their own responsibility for any unfor- 
tunate accidents." The German Government 
would "expressly decline all responsibility for 
such accidents and their consequences." It 
was pointed out to our Government, however, 
that the German Government had "announced 
merely the destruction of enemy merchant ves- 
sels found within the area of maritime war. ' ' 

It was intimated that such accidents were 
quite likely to happen inasmuch as British ves- 
sels were using neutral flags and it would be 
"very difficult for the German submarines to 
recognize neutral merchant vessels as such." 
Besides, it would be dangerous and therefore 
"not possible in the majority of cases" for the 
submarines to practice visit and search owing 



The First Submarine Controversy 217 

to the fact that many English merchant ships 
were armed and the submarine commander who 
would be conducting the search would "in the 
case of a disguised English ship" be exposed 
to destruction. 3 

The policy announced by the German foreign 
office would, if enforced, be clearly a violation 
of international law. The Teutonic allies were 
not maintaining an effective blockade of the 
British Isles, as numerous vessels came to and 
went from the British ports after the announce- 
ment of the new policy. Germany, therefore, 
did not even have the right to seize a neutral 
vessel on the high seas (including in that term 
the war zone) unless it carried a cargo of con- 
traband. A belligerent does have, however, 
the right to seize enemy merchant ships and 
even to destroy them provided it is not feasible 
to bring them into a prize court. There is also 
precedent in favor of the right of a belligerent 
to destroy in extreme cases neutral vessels car- 
rying contraband; but in all cases no merchant 
vessel, neutral or enemy, can be destroyed until 
adequate provision has been made "for the 
safety of all persons on board/ ' This view is 
supported by the unanimous opinion of the 
authorities on international law and the uni- 
versal practice of belligerents before 1914. 
Germany's defense of her policy rested on the 

3 Jour. (9), 9CK-96. 



218 The Causes of the European War 

contention that the submarine cannot be ef- 
fective if international law is observed and, 
therefore, an exception ought to be made in its 
favor. Our Government rightfully took the 
position that the dictates of humanity and the 
time-honored principles of international law 
should be upheld even at the cost of submarine 
efficiency. 4 

The fact that the submarine was placed at a 
disadvantage by virtue of England's sea 
methods did not in the least relieve Germany 
of the obligation to respect the rights accorded 
to neutrals by international law. Our Govern- 
ment was in no wise responsible for nor obli- 
gated to relieve the embarrassment in which the 
submarine was placed by British practices, 
even if those practices had overstepped the 
limits prescribed by international law. It is 
true that Secretary Bryan did on February 10 
send a protest to the British Government 
against the "general use of the flag of the 
United States by British vessels traversing" 
the war zone ; but in so doing he did not assume 
the responsibility of compelling Great Britain 
to conduct her naval warfare in accordance 
with the requirements of international law. It 
ought also to be remembered that while Ger- 
many complained of the acquiescence of the 

* Garner, Inter. Law Jour., Vol. 9, 615, 617-19, 624; Vol. 
10, 12-31; Rogers, 48-56. 



The First Submarine Controversy 219 

neutral governments in England's alleged vio- 
lations of international law, she did not charge 
that the United States had compromised her 
neutrality by such acquiescence. On the con- 
trary, she stated in this same note that "the 
exercise of rights and the toleration of wrong 
on the part of neutrals is limited by their 
pleasure alone and involves no formal breach 
of neutrality. The German Government have 
not in consequence made any charge of formal 
breach of neutrality. ' ' 5 Since the United 
States, according to the admission of Germany, 
had been guilty of no breach of neutrality, her 
rights on the sea were in no sense affected by 
the alleged ill conduct of Great Britain. 

The submarine controversy entered upon the 
acute stage when Germany proceeded to act 
upon the policy outlined in her note of Febru- 
ary 4. Our Government soon had reason for 
complaint against Germany because of the de- 
struction of American lives and ships. 6 These 
minor grievances were all reduced to compara- 

5 Jour (9), 88-89, 92. 

6 A citizen of the United States had lost his life on March 28, 
when the British steamer Falaba was sunk by a German sub- 
marine. The Oulftig'ht, an American vessel, had been sunk by 
a submarine on May 1, and three American lives were lost. 
Another American vessel, the William P. Frye, had been sunk 
on January 28 by a German auxiliary cruiser, but the Im- 
perial Government had on April 5 expressed its willingness 
in this case to compensate the owners for ship and cargo under 
the terms of the Prussian-American treaty of 1799. The other 
cases were still pending when the Lusitania was destroved. 
Jour. (9), 130, 181-2. 



220 The Causes of the European War 

tive unimportance by the greater issue created 
by the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915. 
The Lusitania, an unarmed British merchant- 
man, was sunk off the coast of Ireland by a 
German submarine and more than eleven hun- 
dred lives were lost, one hundred and fourteen 
of them being Americans. No warning had 
been given and no effort was made to save the 
lives of the passengers and crew. It is true 
that before the Lusitania left New York there 
had been published as an advertisement in the 
New York papers a notice, signed by the Ger- 
man embassy at Washington, which warned 
American citizens against taking passage on 
any enemy ship going through the war zone. 7 
For the German embassy to send such a notice 
to the American people except through the 
regular diplomatic channels was in itself an in- 
sult to our Government. Our Secretary of 
State called attention to its " surprising irreg- 
ularity' ' in his first note to Germany after the 
sinking of the Lusitania. 

On May 13, 1915, Secretary Bryan sent a 
note to the German foreign office, reminding 
it of the previously announced intention of his 
Government to hold "the Imperial German 
Government to a strict accountability for any in- 
fringement, ' ' " intentional or incidental," "of 
the rights of American ship-masters or of 

7 See War Cyclopedia, p. 159. 



The First Submarine Controversy 221 

American citizens bound on lawful errands as 
passengers on merchant ships of belligerent 
nationality. ' ' He also expressed the earnest 
conviction that submarines could not be used 
against merchantmen "without an inevitable 
violation of many sacred principles of justice 
and humanity." The note assumed a threaten- 
ing tone at the end and closed with this final 
warning : 

The Imperial German Government will not expect 
the Government of the United States to omit any word 
or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred 
duty of maintaining the rights of the United States 
and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exer- 
cise and enjoyment. 8 

The German reply to this note was made on 
May 28. It contended that the Ldisitania had 
been built with Government funds as an 
auxiliary cruiser ; that on her last trip she had 
"Canadian troops and munitions on board," 
"as on earlier occasions"; that she carried a 
cargo prohibited by the laws of the United 
States to passenger vessels; and that, accord- 
ing to evidence in hand, "the Lusitania when 
she left New York undoubtedly had guns on 
board which were mounted under decks and 
masked." In making these representations 
the German Government reserved the right to 
make "a final statement of its position with 

8 Jour. (9), 129-133. 



222 The Causes of the European War 

regard to the demands made in connection with 
the sinking of the Lusitania nntil a reply is re- 
ceived from the American Government. ' ' 9 

The reply of onr Government to this com- 
munication was made on June 9 by Mr. Lan- 
sing, acting Secretary of State, because Mr. 
Bryan was unwilling to sign the note and had 
resigned as Secretary of State on the previous 
day. Our second note declared that the Ger- 
man Government had been misinformed as to 
the status of the Lusitania. Mr. Lansing 
pointed out that it was the duty of our Gov- 
ernment "to see to it that the Lusitania was 
not armed for offensive action, that she was 
not serving as a transport, that she did not 
carry a cargo prohibited by the statutes of the 
United States; — and [that] it performed that 
duty and enforced its statutes with scrupulous 
vigilance through its regularly constituted of- 
ficials." The question as to whether she car- 
ried contraband was irrelevant, as that fact 
even if established gave the submarine com- 
mander no excuse for taking American lives. 
Only the actual resistance of the Lusitania "to 
capture or refusal to stop when ordered to 
do so for the purpose of visit could," in his 
opinion, "have afforded the commander of the 
submarine any justification for so much as 
putting the lives of those on board the ship in 

9 Jour. (9), 133-136. 



The First Submarine Controversy 223 

jeopardy.' J The note reaffirmed the former 
representations and asked for assurances that 
American lives and ships would be safe- 
guarded in the future. 10 

It was nearly a month (July 9) before the 
German foreign office replied to our second 
Lusitania note. In this reply Germany prom- 
ised that American vessels would hereafter not 
be molested in the war zone provided they had 
such markings as would render them distin- 
guishable from enemy vessels. This pledge 
was accompanied by an expression of the hope 
that the Government of the United States 
would guarantee that the vessels so marked 
would have no contraband on board. In order 
to provide for the safety of American pas- 
senger traffic the German Government was 
willing to extend the same immunity from at- 
tack to a reasonable number of neutral vessels, 
which were to carry the American flag and be 
marked in the same way "as the American 
steamers above mentioned." If the requisite 
number of neutral vessels could not be ac- 
quired by our Government then four enemy 
vessels could be placed under the flag of the 
United States under the same conditions as 
those mentioned for American ships. 11 

In his reply on July 21, Secretary Lansing 
declared the last German note to be "very un- 

io Jour. (9), 138-141. "Jour. (9), 149-153. 



224 The Causes of the European War 

satisfactory, because it fails to meet the real 
differences between the two Governments and 
indicates no way in which the accepted princi- 
ples of law and humanity may be applied in 
the grave matter in controversy, but proposes, 
on the contrary, arrangements for a partial 
suspension of those principles which virtually 
set them aside." He noted with satisfaction 
the acceptance on the part of the German Gov- 
erment of the ' ' principle that the high seas are 
free, that the character and cargo of a mer- 
chantman must first be ascertained before she 
can lawfully be seized or destroyed, and that 
the lives of non-combatants may in no case be 
put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or 
seeks to escape after being summoned to submit 
to examination. ' ? He was disappointed, how- 
ever, "to find that the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment regards itself as in a large degree 
exempt from the obligation to observe these 
principles.' ' 

The offer of immunity from attack for ves- 
sels having certain markings was rejected, as 
"the very agreement would, by implication, 
subject other vessels to illegal attack and 
would be a curtailment and therefore an 
abandonment of the principles for which this 
Government contends." The note ended with 
the warning that a "repetition by the com- 
manders of German naval vessels of acts in 



The First Submarine Controversy 225 

contravention of those rights must be regarded 
by the Government of the United States, when 
they affect American citizens, as deliberately 
unfriendly. ' ' 12 

The further negotiations as to the Lusitania 
were considered by informal notes between 
Ambassador Bernstorff and Secretary Lan- 
sing. On September 1, 1915, Count Bern- 
storfT stated that his Government had pledged 
itself not to sink liners in the future, unless 
they should resist attack or try to escape, until 
adequate provision had been made for the 
safety of non-combatants. 13 This pledge was 
not a settlement of the case but inasmuch as 
it was a promise of future good conduct, it 
considerably relieved the tension and made 
possible a more leisurely conduct of further 
negotiations. 14 

While the Lusitania case was still under dis- 
cussion another serious cause of dispute arose 

12 Jour. (9), 155-7. 

is Jour. (10), 166. 

i* The conversations between Count Bernstorff and Secre- 
tary Lansing were spun out to such a length that it was not 
until February, 1916, that an agreement had about been 
reached. At that time the two Governments had virtually 
come to an understanding as to the principles involved and 
only minor questions of phraseology were holding back a final 
settlement. But about this time the German Government an- 
nounced (February 10) its intention to treat armed merchant- 
men as war vessels. As this announcement cancelled all 
pledges insofar as they applied to merchant vessels carrying 
arms, even for defense, Secretary Lansing refused to accept 
the German offer, and so the controversy remained unsettled. 
N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1916. 



226 The Causes of the European War 

between Germany and the United States. On 
August 19, 1915, the British unarmed steamer 
Arabic was torpedoed near the site of the de- 
struction of the Lusitania. It was bound for 
New York, was unarmed, carried no contra- 
band, and was sunk without warning. A con- 
siderable number of the crew and passengers, 
including two Americans, lost their lives. 15 
The German Government seemed to appreciate 
the seriousness of the situation and to fear that 
our Government would regard the destruction 
of American lives on the Arabic as an un- 
friendly act. Consequently, Count Bernstorff, 
the German ambassador at Washington, in a 
communication to Secretary Lansing in reply 
to his last Lusitania note, declared (September 
1) that he had been instructed to make for his 
Government the pledge mentioned on the previ- 
ous page. 16 The German Government, how- 
ever, tried (September 7) to excuse its sub- 
marine commander on the ground that al- 
though he had been ordered not to sink mer- 
chantmen without warning, he was under the 
impression that the Arabic was going to ram 
his vessel. It, therefore, declined to assume 
responsibility for the act even if it should be 
proved that the commander of the undersea 
boat had been mistaken. 17 

is Rogers, 97; Jour. (10), 170-2, 203-229. 
16 Jour. (10), 166. 
it Jour. (10), 167-8. 



The First Submarine Controversy 227 

A week later Secretary Lansing forwarded 
evidence to the German Government which 
proved that the Arabic received no warning 
and that it did not see the submarine before it 
was fired upon. The commander of the sub- 
marine was, therefore, without excuse in as- 
suming that the Arabic was preparing to ram 
his vessel. 18 

There was no immediate response to this 
note, but on October 5 the German Government 
declared its willingness to disavow the act and 
pay indemnities for the American lives lost. 
The incident was thus closed and America had 
won a diplomatic victory. 19 

is /&;<£, 170-2. wlbid., 172-3. 



CHAPTER XV 

MINOR CONTROVERSIES AND THE SUSSEX 
CASE 

The fact that Great Britain's control of the 
sea put Germany at a disadvantage in pur- 
chasing munitions of war from us caused some 
pro-German Americans to agitate in favor of 
the prohibition by our Government of the ex- 
port of arms and ammunition. Encouraged 
by this agitation the Teutonic allies protested 
against this trade, contending that our Govern- 
ment should lay an embargo on arms if it were 
to maintain a really neutral attitude toward 
the belligerents. These protests came in the 
form first of a hint or request in the German 
note of February 16, 1915 ; then as a complaint 
in a memorandum presented by the German 
ambassador, Count BernstorfT, April 4, 1915; 
and finally as a formal appeal from the Austro- 
Hungarian Government June 29, 1915. 

The main arguments advanced to support 
their protest were that the trade in munitions 
had assumed such proportions as had never 
been known before and that the United States 

228 



Minor Controversies 229 

was enjoying a complete monopoly of the sale 
of war supplies. It was admitted that Ger- 
many had allowed her nationals to sell am- 
munition to belligerents in previous wars, but 
in those cases the trade was open to many neu- 
trals and it was only a question as to what 
share of this trade each neutral should get. 
The Austrian note even went so far as to say 
that the weight of authority on international 
law was in favor of the contention that a neu- 
tral nation may not permit the traffic in contra- 
band of war when it assumes such dimensions 
as to involve the neutrality of the Govern- 
ment. 1 

Our Government in its replies took the posi- 
tion that a neutral power has no right to 
change its laws on neutrality during a war pro- 
vided such a change would affect unequally its 
relations with the belligerents and that an em- 
bargo on arms laid by our Government 
would be such a change; that this opinion is 
upheld by a very large majority of the authori- 
ties on international law and is explicitly con- 
firmed by an article of the Hague Convention. 2 

i Jour. (9), 91, 92, 125-127, 146^-149. 

2 The preamble to Convention XIII Concerning the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare, Hague Con- 
ference, 1907, contains the following statement: 

. . . "these rules should not, in principle, be altered, in the 
course of the war, by a neutral Power, except in a case where 
experience has shown the necessity for such change for the 
protection of the right of that Power." 

Article 7. "A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the 



230 The Causes of the European War 

Besides, it has been the universal practice for 
nations to permit the sale of munitions to belli- 
gerents, a practice in which both Germany and 
Austria have engaged in previous wars. In 
one of these wars — that between the Boer re- 
publics and Great Britain — the situation was 
parallel to the one at the present time. The 
Boer Allies were shut off from getting war 
supplies, but this fact did not cause Germany 
to stop the sale of munitions to Great Britain. 
It is true that in this case the amount sold was 
not so great as in the present war, but the prin- 
ciple involved is not affected by the extent of 
the business. 

A very important practical reason was also 
given to explain "why the Government of the 
United States has from the foundation of the 
Republic to the present time advocated and 
practiced unrestricted trade in arms and mili- 
tary supplies. It has never been the policy of 
this country to maintain in time of peace a 
large military establishment or stores of arms 
and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by 
a well equipped and powerful enemy. ... In 
consequence of this standing policy the United 
States would, in the event of attack by a 
foreign power, be at the outset of the war seri- 

export or transit, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, 
of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which 
can be of use to an army or fleet." Hague and Geneva Con- 
ventions, United States Navy Department, p. 70. 



Minor Controversies 231 

ously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack 
of arms and ammunition and by the means to 
produce them in sufficient quantities to supply 
the requirements of national defense. The 
United States has always depended upon the 
right and power to purchase arms and am- 
munition from neutral nations in case of 
foreign attack. This right, which it claims for 
itself, it cannot deny to others." 3 

There was another important reason why 
our Government should not restrain its citizens 
from the exercise of a right accorded them by 
international law, but of course it could not be 
given as an argument in a diplomatic note. 
This reason was that a large majority of our 
people were in sympathy with the Allies be- 
cause they thought that the war had been 
forced upon them and that they were fighting 
for the political and social ideals that are held 
sacred in America. Besides, Germany's treat- 
ment of Belgium and her method of conduct- 
ing the war in defiance of international usage 
and the principles of humanity had still further 
alienated American sympathy from her. For 
that reason public sentiment in America would 
not permit the Government to strain its neu- 
trality in the interest of the enemies of our 
kinsmen and friends. Then, too, Germany had 
before the war made adequate provision for 

3 Jour. (9), 127-129, 166-171, 259-60. 



232 The Causes of the European War 

munitions and was thus armed. The Allies, on 
the other hand, had not provided for enough 
military supplies for the war and were, there- 
fore, not so well armed as their enemies. The 
situation was like that of an unarmed man in 
a fight with an armed assailant, reaching for 
a pistol lying near him. An embargo on arms 
from America would have had the effect of 
pushing beyond his reach the pistol that would 
place him on an equal footing with his enemy 
and of putting him thereby at the mercy of 
his opponent. Such a policy on the part of 
America would not only have been unneutral; 
it would also have been unnatural. For the 
unarmed man was, in the case of England, our 
kinsman ; in the case of France, our friend and 
former helper ; and in both cases the champion 
of our ideals. 

Another cause of disagreement between Ger- 
many and the United States was the question 
of armed merchantmen. As early as Septem- 
ber 19, 1914, our Government stated its posi- 
tion as favoring the right of a merchantman 
to carry "armament and ammunition for the 
sole purpose of defense without acquiring the 
character of a ship of war. ' ' 4 The German 
foreign office took exception to this ruling and 
contended (October 15) that an armed mer- 
chantman should be considered as a regular 

* Jour. (9), 234. 



Minor Controversies 233 

war ship and should be accorded the same 
treatment in neutral ports as the latter. 5 

Acting Secretary Lansing dissented from 
this opinion (November 7) and reiterated the 
intention of his Government to allow defen- 
sively-armed merchantmen to enjoy the hospi- 
tality of our ports. In defense of this policy 
he pointed out the well-established fact that 
"the practice of a majority of nations and the 
consensus of opinion by the leading authori- 
ties on international law, including many Ger- 
man writers, support the proposition that mer- 
chant? vessels may arm for defense without los- 
ing their private character. ' ' 6 Our Govern- 
ment now rested its case and the question was 
not agitated again for more than a year, 
though Germany had not receded from her 
position. 

The case was reopened, however, at the 
beginning of the year 1916. "Italian and 
British ships were armed on account of the 
ruthless submarine campaign which was being 
waged in the Mediterranean. The hint was 
given that Germany intended to sink all armed 
merchantmen without warning. ' ' 7 Secretary 
Lansing felt impelled to make an effort to pre- 
vent the "appalling loss of life among non- 

slUd., 238. 

e Jour. (9), 238-240; also see Higgins, Amer. Jour, of In- 
ternational Law, Vol. 8, p. 715. 
TEogers, 161. 



234 The Causes of the European War 

combatants," and in an effort to do so un- 
fortunately weakened the unassailable position 
which he had hitherto held with reference to 
the mooted question. On January 18, 1916, he 
made proposals for a joint agreement between 
the Allied and Teutonic powers whereby the 
former were to promise not to arm their mer- 
chant vessels and the latter to pledge them- 
selves to conduct their submarine warfare in 
accordance with the principle of visit and 
search, that is, according to international law. 
He even went so far as to contend that the ar- 
rangement proposed by him was just in view 
of the new situation created by the submarine. 
His communication closed with the following 
unhappy statement: 

I should add that my Government is impressed with 
the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant 
vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of 
the character of submarine warfare and the defensive 
weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an 
auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well 
as by a belligerent Government, and is seriously con- 
sidering instructing its officials accordingly. 8 

The Teutonic belligerents were quick to take 
advantage of Lansing's mistake and an- 
nounced (February 10 and 12) that they would 
henceforth treat armed merchantmen as war 
ships. This meant, of course, that they would 
sink them without warning and would assume 

s Jour. (10), 310-13. 



Minor Controversies 235 

no responsibility for the loss of neutral lives. 9 
If the Allies had acceded to this proposition 
they would have voluntarily given up all the 
protection that their merchantmen had against 
the submarines and would have placed them at 
the mercy of the undersea craft. That they 
would voluntarily make such a sacrifice in 
order to relieve Germany of the embarrass- 
ment in which international law had placed her 
could hardly be expected of the best-natured 
belligerents. Consequently, they all politely 
declined the offer of our State Depart- 
ment. The British ambassador in his reply 
made this statement: " Great Britain is un- 
able to agree that upon a non-guaranteed Ger- 
man promise, human life may be surrendered 
defenseless to the mercy of an enemy who . . . 
has shown himself to be both faithless and 
lawless." 10 

At this juncture Congress unfortunately 
took up the question and resolutions were 
offered providing that American citizens be 
warned to keep off of armed merchantmen. It 
looked as if the resolution would be supported 
by a large majority in both houses. President 
Wilson now took a firm stand with reference 
to the right of American citizens to travel on 
defensively-armed vessels and used his in- 
fluence against the resolutions. 

s Jour. (10), 313, 318, 10 Jour. (10), 336-8, 340-1. 



236 The Causes of the European War 

The supporters of the President's policy 
mustered their forces against the resolutions 
and succeeded in having them tabled in both 
houses early in March. The executive was 
now free to deal with the situation without 
Congressional interference and final action was 
taken by our State Department on April 26. 
At that time there was published a memor- 
andum (dated March 25) which definitely out- 
lined the future attitude of the Government 
toward armed merchantmen. The position 
taken in this memorandum was, in brief, as fol- 
lows: 

A merchant vessel has the right to arm for 
defense and when so armed must be treated by 
both neutrals and belligerents as a merchant- 
man. If armed for offense it assumes the 
status of a war ship and must be so regarded 
by both belligerents and neutrals. In deter- 
mining whether the armament of a merchant 
vessel is for offense or defense the neutral 
must take into account all evidence, such as in- 
structions to the commander, previous career 
of the vessel, size and position of the guns, etc. 
The neutral may act upon a reasonable pre- 
sumption in withholding hospitality from an 
armed merchantman. On the other hand, a 
belligerent must act only on proof in treating 
an armed vessel as a war ship. 11 

ii Jour. (10), 367-72. 



Minor Controversies 237 

The negotiations regarding armed merchant- 
men proved to be of only academic interest, as 
the only important controversies between 
America and Germany before the break in re- 
lations resulted from the latter 's attacks on un- 
armed merchantmen. In March four English 
vessels and one French liner 12 on which were 
American citizens were sunk by German sub- 
marines and a number of American lives were 
lost. Secretary Lansing made prompt inquiry 
of Germany as to whether she or her allies 
were responsible for these sinkings. 13 The 
most important of these cases was that of the 
Sussex. The Sussex was an unarmed French 
steamer, was sunk without warning in the 
British Channel on March 24, 1916, and about 
eighty non-combatant passengers "of all ages 
and sexes, including citizens of the United 
States, were killed or injured." 

The German foreign office made its reply to 
Lansing's inquiries in a note bearing date of 
April 10. The sinking of three of the vessels 
was admitted and the case of another was still 
being investigated. The foreign minister con- 
tended, however, that these three vessels had 
tried to escape after having been summoned to 
stop and that in every case they were sunk only 

12 The Englishman, the Manchester Engineer, the Berwin- 
dale, the Eagle Point, and the Sussex. 

13 Jour. (10), 181-3. 



238 The Causes of the European War 

after the passengers had been put in life boats. 
The opinion was expressed that the Sussex 
could not have been injured by a German sub- 
marine but had probably been sunk by a 
British mine. It was admitted that a German 
submarine had torpedoed a vessel in the 
British Channel at about the time and place 
that the Sussex was sunk, but the submarine 
commander said that the vessel attacked by 
him had the appearance of a war ship. It 
could not have been the Sussex, the note con- 
tended, inasmuch as the picture of his victim 
drawn by the German commander did not cor- 
respond with a picture of the Sussex found in 
an English newspaper. The German foreign 
office went on to state that it would, however, 
welcome any additional evidence that the 
American Government might have at its dis- 
posal. In case the two Governments could not 
come to an agreement, Germany was willing to 
settle the facts by a mixed commission in ac- 
cordance with the Hague Convention of 1907. 14 
A week later (April 18) Secretary Lansing 
made a reply which was a vigorous arraign- 
ment of Germany not only for this offense but 
for her whole submarine policy. He made the 
charge and backed it up with incontrovertible 
evidence that the Sussex had been sunk with- 
out warning by a German torpedo. The of- 

i*Jour. (10), 183-186, 



Minor Controversies 239 

fense was aggravated, he said, by the fact that 
it was not an isolated case but only an extreme 
instance of an unjustifiable policy which had 
resulted in the loss of hundreds of American 
lives. This practice had been maintained in 
spite of assurances given by the German Gov- 
ernment "to the Government of the United 
States that at least passenger ships would not 
be thus dealt with." At the end the note 
assumed the tone of an ultimatum. It said: 

Unless the Imperial Government should now imme- 
diately declare and effect an abandonment of its pres- 
ent methods of submarine warfare against passenger 
and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the 
United States can have no choice but to sever diplo- 
matic relations with the German Empire altogether. 
This action the Government of the United States con- 
templates with the greatest reluctance but feels con- 
strained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights 
of neutral nations. 15 

This vigorous assertion of American rights 
seemed to bring the German Government to a 
realization of the gravity of the situation. 
Lansing's note was followed by a speech made 
by President Wilson before a joint session of 
Congress in which the same principles were 
emphatically enunciated. 16 Wilhelmstrasse was 
now doubtless convinced that the American 
Government had reached the limit of its 

is Jour. (10), 186-195. 

16 Cong. Record, LIII, 6421-22. 



240 The Causes of the European War 

patience. If a break in diplomatic relations 
were to be avoided it would have to accede to 
our demands. 

When this second American note reached 
Berlin both Mr. Gerard, American ambassador 
at Berlin, and Von Jagow, German foreign 
minister, felt that a break in relations between 
the two powers was unavoidable. In a few 
days Ambassador Gerard was invited by Von 
Jagow to visit the Emperor at Great General 
Headquarters. The invitation was accepted 
and Mr. Gerard left Berlin for the meeting 
with the Kaiser on April 28th. At the inter- 
view the Sussex case and other topics were dis- 
cussed and the Emperor seems to have spoken 
rather unreservedly. He frankly said that 
" there was no longer any international law." 
He wanted to know why our Government had 
not brought Great Britain to terms for her 
alleged breaches of international usage. Our 
ambassador very tactfully replied that it was 
for us to decide the order in which we would 
enforce our rights, and in doing so used this 
illustration: "I answered that, ... as I 
had already told the Chancellor, if two men 
entered my grounds and one stepped on my 
flowerbeds and the other killed my sister, I 
should probably first pursue the murderer of 
my sister. ' ' 17 

17 Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 260, 324-5, 339-41. 



Minor Controversies 241 

A favorable reply to Lansing's note came on 
May 4. To what extent the Kaiser had been in- 
fluenced to meet our demands by the interview 
with our ambassador can only be conjectured. 
At any rate Germany had yielded though she 
had done it with a very bad grace. The gen- 
eral tone of Von Jagow's note was rasping and 
there was a flat denial of the charge that the 
sinking of the Sussex was only an instance of 
"the deliberate method of indiscriminate de- 
struction of vessels of all sorts.' ' It admitted 
the possibility that "the ship mentioned in the 
note of April 10 as torpedoed by a German 
submarine ' ' might be identical with the Sussex 
and if such should prove to be the case the 
"German Government will [would] not fail to 
draw the consequences resulting therefrom." 
The astounding statement was also made that 
the German Government had never pledged 
itself to "conduct submarine warfare in accord- 
ance with the general principles of visit and 
search" in the war zone. Such a promise, 
however, was now made in the following clause 
of the note: 

The German Government . . . notifies the Govern- 
ment of the United States that the German naval 
forces have received the following orders : In accord- 
ance with the general principles of visit and search 
and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by in- 
ternational law, such vessels, both within and without 
the area declared as a naval war zone, shall not be 



242 The Causes of the European War 

sunk without warning and without saving human 
lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer 
resistance. 

With this pledge was coupled the statement 
that Germany counted on America's inducing 
Great Britain to " observe the rules of inter- 
national law universally recognized before the 
war as they are laid down in the notes pre- 
sented by the Government of the United States 
to the British Government on December 28, 
1914, and November 5, 1915.' ' If the Govern- 
ment of the United States should fail to induce 
all the belligerents to follow the laws of 
humanity, then Germany would reserve her 
liberty of action. 18 

Our State Department regarded this reply 
as a virtual acceptance of its demands. It was 
careful to explain, however, that it took it for 
granted that the Imperial German Government 
did "not intend to imply that the maintenance 
of its newly announced policy is [was] in any 
way contingent upon the course or result of 
diplomatic negotiations between the Govern- 
ment of the United States and any other belli- 
gerent Government. ' ' The concluding para- 
graph of the note was as follows: 

In order, however, to avoid any possible misunder- 
standing, the Government of the United States noti- 
fies the Imperial Government that it can not for a 

is Jour. (10), 195-199. 



Minor Controversies 243 

moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that 
respect by German naval authorities for the rights of 
citizens of the United States upon the high seas should 
in any way or in the slightest degree be made contin- 
gent upon the conduct of any other Government af- 
fecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. 
Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; 
absolute, not relative. 19 

The pledge of the German Government was 
clinched by another note (May 8) which ac- 
knowledged that their submarine commander 
had disobeyed instructions in the Sussex case 
and had "been appropriately punished." It 
also disavowed the act and offered repara- 
tion. 20 The submarine controversy was now 
laid to rest for the time being and the firmness 
of our Government was rewarded with a diplo- 
matic victory. 

is Jour. (10), 199-200. 20 Rogers, 188. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE, FINAL BREAK 

While no serious controversy arose between 
our Government and that of Germany for 
about eight months after the Sussex pledge 
was made, still merchant vessels were being 
sunk without warning and neutral lives lost. 
The German foreign office, however, always 
had an explanation or excuse for these sink- 
ings and firmly maintained that the Sussex 
pledge was being observed. Our Government 
seems to have accepted these explanations and 
to have taken the attitude that Germany was 
trying to live up to her promises. 1 

Sentiment in Germany was divided as to the 
wisdom of prosecuting ruthless warfare. One 
party, composed qf the jingoes, led by Von 
Tirpitz, and of all factions opposed to the 
chancellor, were in favor of giving free rein 
to the undersea boats even if it should bring 
America into the war. They hated America 
and despised her military and naval strength. 
The other party, headed by the chancellor, ap- 

i Rogers, 192-195 5 Gerard, 357-8. 
244 



The Final Break 245 

parently wanted to remain on good terms with 
the United States and opposed unrestricted 
submarine activity. Ambassador Gerard is of 
the opinion that both the chancellor, Von Beth- 
mann-Holweg and the foreign minister, Von 
Jagow, were sincere in their professions of 
friendship for America and were favorably 
inclined toward peace negotiations. The chan- 
cellor expressed the hope that President Wil- 
son would make an effort to bring the war to a 
close, saying that if he did not "public opinion 
in Germany would undoubtedly force a re- 
sumption of a ruthless submarine war." It 
looked, therefore, as if peace alone could pre- 
vent the accession to power of the party in 
favor of the cancellation of the Sussex pledge. 
Ambassador Gerard was urged by Von 
Jagow and the chancellor to visit America and 
try to induce the President to take the initia- 
tive in an endeavor to end the war. Mr. 
Gerard did return to the United States for a 
short visit and had an interview with Presi- 
dent Wilson in October, 1916. He was greatly 
impressed with President Wilson's desire for 
peace, and reported to the German chancellor 
on his return that he believed "the President 
was ready to go very far in the way of coercing 
any nation which refused a reasonable 
peace. ' ' 2 

2 Gerard, 345, 346, 349, 358-9, 368. 



246 The Causes of the European War 

Whether the German Government was sin- 
cerely desirous of peace or only wanted to 
drive a wedge in between the Entente Allies 
cannot at this time be determined. At any 
rate the Teutonic allies sent notes to neutrals 
on December 12, 1916, announcing their will- 
ingness to negotiate for peace and asked these 
neutral powers to notify the Allied belligerents 
of their proposal. They did not, however, in- 
dicate what terms would be acceptable to 
them. 3 

Our Secretary of State passed on this pro- 
posal (December 16) and at the same time in- 
dicated that our Government would soon make, 
of its own accord, an overture of peace to the 
belligerents, which would, however, be in no 
sense connected with the Teutonic offer to 
negotiate. 4 This overture came two days 
later (December 18) when President Wilson 
sent notes to all the belligerent nations asking 
them to state the terms on which they would 
be willing to conclude the war. 5 The reply of 
the Teutonic allies to this note came on De- 
cember 26, 1916. It did not give the terms that 
would be acceptable to them but only reiterated 
their willingness to negotiate and suggested a 
peace congress on neutral territory. 6 The En- 
tente powers replied to both the Teutonic pro- 

3 Dip. Cor., 305-309. 6 IUd., 321-26. 

*Ibid., 309-11. *Ibid., 327-8, 333. 



The Final Break 247 

posals and President Wilson's note, stating in 
a general way the conditions on which they 
wonld stop fighting. These were based on the 
principle of restitution, reparation, and guar- 
antees for the future. While the Teutonic 
allies had not put down their demands in a 
formal note, yet in a conversation with Mr. 
Gerard the chancellor had indicated (January, 
1917) what concessions would be expected. 
These were out of all reason, and so the belli- 
gerents were still poles apart as to peace 
terms. 7 

These abortive efforts at peace ended on 
January 22, 1917, when President Wilson made 
a speech before the United States Senate giving 
in a general way his idea as to the principles on 
which a just settlement should be based. A 
peace founded on such principles would, he 
thought, be lasting, and only such a peace 
would the United States be willing to assist in 
guaranteeing. 8 

The peace moves had now failed and the 
chauvinists and advocates of ruthless sub- 
marine warfare were in control in Germany. 
Whether they owed their ascendency to the 
failure of the peace drive cannot as yet be de- 
termined. If we can accept at face value state- 
ments made by the chancellor and foreign min- 

t Ibid., 311-313, 335-39; Gerard, 365-6. 
*Ibid., 381-86. 



248 The Causes of the European War 

ister, this party had in its favor the belief on 
the part of the German Government that 
America would not go to war even if unre- 
stricted submarine activity were resumed. 
This conviction was also shared by the German 
people, in the opinion of Mr. Gerard. They 
considered that inasmuch as President Wilson 
had run on his peace record, his re-election was 
equivalent to a mandate from the American 
people to keep out of war at any cost. 9 

Before President Wilson had made his peace 
address, the German foreign office had decided 
to cancel all its previous pledges and to enter 
upon a policy of unrestricted submarine war- 
fare. 10 Accordingly, on July 31, our State De- 
partment was notified by Oount Bernstorff, 
German ambassador at Washington, that on 
the next day Germany would declare the sea 
areas around Great Britain, France, and Italy 
and in the eastern Mediterranean as war zones 
and would sink all vessels, neutral as well as 
belligerent, that should venture into these pro- 
hibited areas. "All sea traffic,' ' the memoran- 
dum continued, "will be stopped with every 
available weapon and without further notice.' ' 
An exception to this general policy would be 
made in favor of American passenger vessels 

e Gerard, 364. 

10 We know that this policy was decided on as early as Jan- 
uary 19 because the Zimmermann note which refers to it bears 
that date. See War Cyclopedia, p. 312. 



The Final Break 249 

if they would adhere to the following regula- 
tion: They must go to Falmouth only and in 
a certain lane designated in the memorandum. 
Only one trip each way was to be made each 
week; the ships were to be marked with broad 
vertical stripes ; and their cargoes must include 
no articles that Germany had denned as contra- 
band. 11 

The situation was now worse than it had ever 
been before. President Wilson was faced by 
two alternatives. He had either to back down 
from the position he had taken in the Sussex 
note and thereby announce his inability or un- 
willingness to protect American citizens in 
their recognized rights, or break relations with 
Germany and thereby declare his intention to 
uphold the dignity and right of his country. 
He chose the latter alternative and relations 
between the two Governments were broken off 
on February 3, 1917. On that same day Presi- 
dent Wilson made a speech before Congress 
announcing the break with Germany and giv- 
ing his reasons for such important action. In 
this address he said, in part : 

Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the Ger- 
man Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable 
renunciation of the assurances given this Government 
at one of the most critical moments of tension in the 
relations of the two Governments, I refuse to believe 
that it is the intention of the German authorities to 

ii Dip. Cor., 403-407. 



250 The Causes of the European War 

do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at 
liberty to do. . . . Only actual overt acts on their 
part can make me believe it even now. ... If Ameri- 
can ships or American lives should in fact be sacrificed 
by their naval commanders in heedless contravention 
of the just and reasonable understandings of inter- 
national law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I 
shall take the liberty of coming again before the Con- 
gress, to ask that authority be given me to use any 
means that may be necessary for the protection of our 
seamen and our people in the prosecution of their 
peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. 12 

When our ambassador at Berlin was notified 
of the break in relations, he immediately asked 
for his passports. They were denied him for 
the alleged reason that Count BernstorfT might 
be detained in America and the German ships 
in American harbors were reported to have 
been confiscated by the Government. Ambas- 
sador Gerard tells us that he was asked by the 
acting foreign minister to sign a document re- 
affirming and adding to the treaty of 1799 be- 
tween Prussia and the United States and was 
told that if he refused to do so "it would 
be very difficult for Americans to leave the 
country, particularly the American corres- 
pondents.' ' Mr. Gerard declined to sign the 
paper, saying at the time, "I would stay here 
until hell freezes over before I would put my 
name to such a paper.' ' 

Our ambassador was in the meantime vir- 

12 Dip. Cor., 409-13. 



The Final Break 251 

tually a prisoner in his residence. He was cut 
off from telephone, mail, and telegraph privi- 
leges for a few days until a message was re- 
ceived in Berlin from the editor of the New 
York Times, stating that Bernstorff was being 
courteously treated in America and Germany's 
ships had not been confiscated. He was then 
allowed to leave for the United States. 13 

Germany proceeded to put into practice the 
policy announced on January 31. The sub- 
marines became more active than ever, and 
nearly one hundred ships are said to have been 
sunk in two weeks. Two American ships were 
in this number and American lives had also 
been lost. These sinkings were, however, as 
President Wilson said, accompanied by "no cir- 
cumstances which might not have been ex- 
pected at any time in connection with the use of 
the submarine against merchantmen as the 
German Government has used it." In other 
words, the President took the position (Febru- 
ary 26) that no overt act had been committed 
and the situation was virtually the same as it 
was when diplomatic relations were severed. 
But our vessels were afraid to leave port for 
the war zone and the effect of the German 
threat was to drive American and other neu- 
tral shipping ofT the high seas. 14 

is Gerard, 375-385. 

i* Rogers, 208-9; Cong. Record, LIV, 4272. 



252 The Causes of the European War 

President Wilson felt that our Government 
should take steps to restore to American com- 
merce its rights on the ocean. His plan was to 
arm our merchant ships so that they could ef- 
fectively defend themselves from undersea at- 
tack. He considered that he had power to do 
this without any special authorization from 
Congress, but felt that a policy fraught with 
such serious possibilities should have the sup- 
port of the representatives of the people. Ac- 
cordingly, he appeared before Congress (Feb- 
ruary 26) and asked for authority to arm 
American merchantmen for defense "and to 
employ any other instrumentalities or methods 
that may be necessary and adequate to protect 
our ships and our people in their legitimate 
and peaceful pursuits on the seas. ' ' 15 

Eesolutions empowering the President to 
arm our merchant ships were offered in both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives 
and both houses were overwhelmingly in favor 
of the policy. There was, however, some op- 
position to the proposal that the President be 
given discretionary power as to the use of 
" other means and instrumentalities ' ' and also 
to the inclusion in the list of ships to be pro- 
tected by the Government those vessels carry- 
ing contraband of war. 

While Congress was still considering the 

15 Cong. Record, LIV, 4272, cited by Robinson and West. 



The Final Break 253 

question there was made public an important 
document which had come into the possession 
of our State Department. This was a letter 
written on January 19, 1917, by Dr. Alfred 
Zimmermann, German Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, to Von Eckhard, German min- 
ister to Mexico. In this letter Dr. Zimmermann 
stated that Germany would soon resume ruth- 
less submarine warfare and that the United 
States might in consequence be drawn into the 
war. In case the United States should enter 
the war against Germany, the Mexican min- 
ister was to try to form an alliance between 
Germany and Mexico. Financial support 
could be promised Mexico, and she would be 
encouraged by Germany "to reconquer the lost 
territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona.' ' 
The German minister was also to suggest 
"that the President of Mexico, on his own 
initiative, should communicate with Japan sug- 
gesting adherence at once to this plan." 16 

The publication of this note strengthened the 
sentiment in Congress in favor of a more 
vigorous policy toward Germany and the 
House of Representatives passed the armed 
neutrality bill by an almost unanimous vote. 17 
The bill as it passed the House omitted the 

is This letter can be found conveniently in the Handbook of 
the War (National Security League), pp. 37-8. 
it The vote was 403 to 13. 



254 The Causes of the European War 

clause empowering the President to " employ 
any other instrumentalities or methods' ' that 
he might deem necessary. A very large 
majority of the senators were also in favor of 
the measure but a small " group of willful 
men" in the upper house were by filibustering 
opposition able to keep the resolution from 
coming to a vote before the session came to an 
end on March 4. The policy of armed neutral- 
ity had, however, received a virtual endorse- 
ment by Congress, and on March 12 a procla- 
mation was issued stating that merchantmen 
passing through the war zone would be armed 
for defense. 

In the meantime, Germany was carrying out 
her ruthless submarine warfare and many 
overt acts were committed. President Wilson 
had already (March 9) summoned Congress to 
meet in extra session on April 16. But the 
situation was becoming so grave that the 
President considered it necessary for Congress 
to convene at an earlier date. Accordingly, he 
issued another proclamation calling Congress 
together on April 2, "to receive a communica- 
tion by the Executive on grave questions of 
national policy, which should be immediately 
taken under consideration. " 

On the opening day of this special session 
(April 2), President Wilson appeared before 
Congress in joint session and made his famous 



The Final Break 255 

address advising a declaration of war. In a 
spirit of sorrow rather than of anger he 
pointed out the wrongs that our people, as well 
as those of other neutral countries, had suf- 
fered at the hands of Germany, and the duty 
incumbent upon our Government to take such 
action as would uphold American rights. In 
speaking of German war practices since her 
new policy went into effect, he made the fol- 
lowing scathing indictment: 

The new policy has swept every restriction aside. 
Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their char- 
acter, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have 
been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning 
and without thought of help or mercy for those on 
board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those 
of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carry- 
ing relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people 
of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe 
conduct through the proscribed areas by the German 
Government itself and were distinguished by unmis- 
takable marks of identity, have been sunk with the 
same reckless lack of compassion or of principle. 

Another grievance mentioned by the Presi- 
dent was the criminal activity in our country 
of German spies, which, he said, had begun 
even before the war. The Prussian autocracy 
had "filled our unsuspecting communities and 
even our offices of government with spies and 
set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot 
against our national unity of counsel, our 
peace within and without, our industries and 



256 The Causes of the European War 

our commerce." These intrigues, he said, 
have "been carried on at the instigation, with 
the support, and even under the personal direc- 
tion of official agents of the Imperial Govern- 
ment accredited to the Government of the 
United States." 

He made it clear that we were not going to 
fight to avenge the loss of property but only 
to protect "the lives of non-combatants, men, 
women and children, engaged in pursuits which 
have always, even in the darkest periods of 
modern history, been deemed innocent and 
legitimate. ' * "American ships," he con- 
tinued, "have been sunk, American lives 
taken, in ways which it has stirred us very 
deeply to learn of, but the ships and people 
of other neutral and friendly nations have been 
sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the 
same way. There has been no discrimination. 
The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation 
must decide for itself how it will meet it." 

Armed neutrality had proved ineffective and 
so a more vigorous policy had to be resorted to, 
unless we were willing to acquiesce in the high- 
handed measures practiced against us. His 
position on this point was, however, very de- 
cided : 

There is one choice we can not make, we are in- 
capable of making: we will not choose the path of 
submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our 



The Final Break 257 

nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The 
wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no 
common wrongs ; they cut to the very roots of human 
life. 

There was, therefore, in his opinion, only one 
alternative, namely, a declaration of war on 
the part of Congress. He accordingly made 
the following recommendation: 

With a profound sense of the solemn and even 
tragical character of the step I am taking and of the 
grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesi- 
tating obedience to what I deem my constitutional 
duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent 
course of the Imperial German Government to be in 
fact nothing less than war against the government and 
the people of the United States; that it formally ac- 
cept the status of belligerent which has thus been 
thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not 
only to put the country in a more thorough state of 
defense but also to exert all its power and employ all 
its resources to bring the Goverment of the German 
Empire to terms and end the war. 

In giving reasons for our taking up the 
sword the President did not confine himself to 
the obligation of his Government to defend the 
rights of its citizens, but he spoke of a higher 
motive — the desire to promote universal peace 
and to "make the world safe for democracy." 
These high aims are beautifully expressed as 
follows : 

Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the prin- 
ciples of peace and justice in the life of the world as 



258 The Causes of the European War 

against selfish and autocratic power and to set up 
amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of 
the world such a concert of purpose and of action as 
will henceforth ensure the observance of those prin- 
ciples. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable 
when the peace of the world is involved and the free- 
dom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and 
freedom lies in the existence of autocratic govern- 
ments backed by organized force which is controlled 
wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. 
We have seen the last of neutrality in such circum- 
stances. We are at the beginning of an age in which 
it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct 
and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed 
among nations and their governments that are ob- 
served among the individual citizens of civilized states. 

We have no quarrel with the German people. We 
have no feelings toward them but one of sympathy 
and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that 
their government acted in entering this war. It was 
not with their previous knowledge or approval. It 
was a war determined upon as wars used to be deter- 
mined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples 
were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were 
provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of 
small groups of ambitious men who were accustomed 
to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-gov- 
erned nations do not fill their neighbor states with 
spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some 
critical posture of affairs which will give them an op- 
portunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs 
can be successfully worked out only under cover and 
where no one has the right to ask questions. . . . 

A steadfast concert for peace can never be main- 
tained except by a partnership of democratic nations. 
No autocratic government could be trusted to keep 
faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a 
league of honor, a partnership of opinion. . . . 

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose 



The Final Break 259 

because we know that in such a government, following 
such methods, we can never have a friend ; and that in 
the presence of its organized power, always lying in 
wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there 
can be no assured security for the democratic govern- 
ments of the world. We are now about to accept 
gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and 
shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation 
to check and nullify its pretentions and its power. 
We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of 
false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ulti- 
mate peace of the world and for the liberation of its 
peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights 
of nations great and small and the privilege of men 
everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedi- 
ence. The world must be made safe for democracy. 
Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations 
of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. 
We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no in- 
demnities for ourselves, no material compensation for 
the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one 
of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall 
be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure 
as the faith and the freedom of nations can make 
them. . . . 

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen 
of the Congress, which I have performed in thus ad- 
dressing you. There are, it may be, many months of 
fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful 
thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into 
the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization 
itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is 
more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the 
things which we have always carried nearest our 
hearts, — for democracy, for the right of those who 
submit to authority to have a voice in their own gov- 
ernments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, 
for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of 
free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all na- 



260 The Causes of the European War 

tions and make the world itself at last free. To such 
a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, 
everything that we are and everything that we have, 
with the pride of those who know that the day has 
come when America is privileged to spend her blood 
and her might for the principles that gave her birth 
and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. 
God helping her, she can do no other. 18 



The idealism behind the high motives men- 
tioned by the President was doubtless an im- 
portant reason for our joining the Allies. Our 
people considered that the Entente Allies were 
championing in Europe the principles held 
dear in America. A defeat for the Allies 
would, therefore, mean a defeat for democracy 
and world peace and a victory for autocracy 
and militarism. 

There was also a feeling in the United States 
that a far-sighted policy of self-defense de- 
manded our participation in the conflict. For 
it was thought that if Germany should win in 
this war, her enhanced power and prestige 
would lead her to attack us at no distant date 
in the future. With our natural allies weak- 
ened and humiliated and ourselves isolated, 
the German Government, flushed with victory, 
might soon be tempted to measure swords with 
us on our side of the Atlantic. The occasion 
for such a contest could easily arise. Ger- 

is Dip. Cor., 422-29. 



The Final Break 261 

many had ambitions in South America and 
does not recognize our Monroe Doctrine. Be- 
sides, feeling in Germany was already strong 
against America because of our sympathy for 
and alleged partiality to the Allies. We now 
have reliable evidence to support the belief 
that the German Government was contemplat- 
ing the future possibility of chastising us. 
Mr. Gerard speaks of the hostility of public 
sentiment manifested toward us in influential 
circles in Germany. He tells of an interview 
given out by Admiral von Tirpitz (in the name 
of a "high naval authority") and published in 
the Frankfurter Zeitung in which the German 
admiral boasted that Germany would force 
America to pay an indemnity big enough to 
cover the cost of the war after the Allies 
had been defeated and the English fleet 
captured. 19 Mr. Gerard also reports some big 
talk indulged in by the Emperor on the occa- 
sion of an interview held between the Emperor 
and himself as early as October, 1915. On this 
occasion the Kaiser showed "great bitterness 
against the United States and repeatedly said, 
1 America had better look out after this war; 
and I shall stand no nonsense from America 
after the war. ' ' ' 20 

Congress was prompt to act on the recom- 
mendation of the President and declared on 

i» Gerard, 249. 20 Gerard, 252. 



262 The Causes of the European War 

April 6, 1917, that a state of war exists between 
Germany and the United States by act of the 
German Imperial Government. 21 The Presi- 
dent had not asked for a declaration of war on 
the allies of Germany because they had "not 
made war upon ns or challenged ns to defend 
our right and our honor." 22 Germany was, 
therefore, the only one of the Central powers 
formally included in our list of enemies at this 
time, and it was not until December 17, 1917, 
that a declaration of war was made against 
Austria-Hungary. 23 

21 War Cyclopedia, Art., "War." 

22 Dip. Cor., 437-8. 

23 War Cyclopedia, "War." 



INDEX 



Adrianople, treaty of (1829), 25. 

Afghanistan, clash of Russian and 
British interests in, 15 ; agree- 
ments finally made between 
Great Britain and Russia as to 
relations with, 18. 

Africa, friction between France 
and Great Britain due to con- 
flicting claims in, 16-17; at- 
tempted interference of Ger- 
many with France in, 20—21. 

Agadir crisis, 22-23 ; attitude of 
Belgium at time of, 156 

Albania, early history of people of, 
24, 33, 35; by treaty of Lon- 
don (1912) becomes an autono- 
mous state, 36; disadvantageous 
effect of creation of Kingdom of, 
on Serbia, 39-40; offers of 
Austria-Hungary to Italy re- 
garding (1914-15), 186, 193, 
195. 

Albert, King of Belgium, appeals 
for help to King of England, 
135, 150. 

Algeciras Congress, diplomatic de- 
feat of Germany at, 21; effect 
of Italy's attitude in, on Triple 
Alliance, 180. 

Alsace-Lorraine, effects of loss of, 
on France, 6. 

America, reasons for entrance of, 
into Great War, 213 ff . ; begin- 
ning of controversy between 
Germany and, with issuance of 
war zone declaration (Febru- 
ary 4, 1914), 213; protest of, 
against Germany's proposed 
policy, 214—215 ; position taken 
by Germany in reply to pro- 
test, 215-2i7; lives of citizens 
lost in submarine sinkings, 
219 n.; Lusitania sinking and 
subsequent exchange of notes, 
220-225 ; the Arabic sinking, 
226-227; diplomatic victory 
won by, in Arabic incident, 
227; controversy over trade in 
arms and ammunition, 228— 
232 ; discussion concerning 
armed merchant vessels, 232— 
237; diplomatic victory of, in 
Sussex case, 243 ; immediate 



steps leading to break in rela- 
tions with Germany, 244-250; 
publication of Zimmermann 
note and passage of armed neu- 
trality bill, 253-254; idealism 
behind motives of, in joining 
the Allies, 260; Germany's en- 
mity to, previous to declaration 
of war, 260-261; declarations 
of war by, against Germany 
and against Austria, 261-262. 

Anatolian railroad, building of, 
under German auspices, 12. 

Arabic, sinking of the, 226-227. 

Armed merchantman discussion 
between United States and 
Germany, 232-23 7. 

Armed neutrality bill, passage of, 
by American Congress, 253- 
254. 

Arms and ammunition, controversy 
between Germany and America 
over trade in, 228-232. 

Assassination of Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand and his wife, 43. 

Austria (Austria-Hungary), party 
to quadruple alliance of 1815, 
3 ; friendly relations between 
Germany and, cultivated by 
Bismarck, 7; rivalry of Russia 
and, in the Balkans, 8 ; dip- 
lomatic victory of, over Russia 
at Congress of Berlin (1878), 
8 ; joins Triple Alliance against 
Russia, 9 ; enters on policy of 
expansion toward ^Egean, 29; 
annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by, 30 ; agitation 
among great powers against, 
3 1 ; support given to, by Ger- 
many, 31-32; increased hos- 
tility of Russia to, on account 
of attitude in Balkan Wars of 
1912-14, 36; state of relations 
between Serbia and, in 1914, 
43 ; general sentiment in, upon 
assassination of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, 44, 48-51; 
ultimatum sent by, to Serbia, in 
note of July 23, 1914, 52-57; 
statement issued by, to great 
powers, 58-61; Germany's re- 
sponsibility for ultimatum of 
263 



264 



Index 



to Serbia, 63-67; support given 
to, by Germany, 67; reception 
of note by Serbia, 67-68 ; re- 
fuses Russia's request that time 
limit set by ultimatum be ex- 
tended, 75 ; moderate reply of 
Serbia to, in note of July 25, 
78—84; dissatisfaction of, with 
Serbian reply and breaking of 
diplomatic relations, 84—85; 
question of desire of, for war 
with Serbia, 92-94; rejects Sir 
Edward Grey's mediation pro- 
posals and proposals made by 
Russia, 96 ; declares war on 
Serbia, but continues negotia- 
tions with Russia, 98 ; Ger- 
many and, share responsibility 
for Great War, 99-101; efforts 
of other powers to prevent war 
between Russia and, 102-103 ; 
final offer made to, by Russia 
(July 30), 110; declares war 
on Russia, 117; steps leading to 
declaration of war between 
France and, 117—119; declara- 
tion of war against, by Great 
Britain, 140 ; breaks off rela- 
tions with Japan, 165 ; events 
leading to declaration of war 
against by Italy, 181-202; ap- 
peals to America in regard to 
latter's trade in army supplies, 
228; war declared against, by 
America (December 17, 1917), 
262. 

Bagdad Railroad, beginning of 
controversy over, 12-14; condi- 
tion of controversy upon eve of 
Great "War, 14; effect of dispute 
over, upon relations between 
Great Britain and France, 17; 
obtaining of concession for 
building, by Germany, 30. 

Balkans, account of peoples in 
the, 24-25; history of states in 
the, 25-29; wars between Tur- 
key and states of, in 1912-14, 
32-38; results of wars of 1912- 
14, 38-40. 

Barnardiston, Colonel, conversa- 
tions between General Ducarme 
and, 150-152 

Belgium, neutrality of, not guar- 
anteed in German propositions 
to Great Britain before out- 
break of war, 124; Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's statement concern- 
ing preservation of neutrality 
of Belgium, 126; replies of 
France and Germany as to re- 



specting Belgian neutrality, 
126-1 -.7; charged with com- 
mitting hostile acts against 
Germany, 127; appeals on 
August 4, 1914, to Great 
Britain for diplomatic interven- 
tion in her behalf, 135 ; Ger- 
many's reasons for violating 
neutrality of, 136; difference 
between Britain's obligation to 
preserve neutrality of, and 
case of Luxemburg, 140 ; history 
of events leading to guarantee- 
ing of perpetual neutrality of, 
by treaty of 1839, 141-144; 
arguments of both sides con- 
cerning Germany's violation of 
neutrality cf, 144-160; effect 
in America of Germany's treat- 
ment of, 231. 

Berlin Congress and treaty 
(1878), 8, 28. 

Bernstorff, Count von, German 
ambassador at Washington, 
225, 226, 228, 248; fear in 
Germany of detention of, in 
America, 250. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, made chancel- 
lor, 22 ; present at Potsdam 
Conference (July 5, 1914), 65- 
66 ; final interview between 
British ambassador and, 137- 
139; quoted on violation of 
neutrality of Belgium and 
Luxemburg, 149 ; unrestricted 
submarine warfare opposed by, 
244-245 ; sincerity of, in 
hopes for preserving America's 
friendship, 245. 

Bismarck, policy of, regarding 
France, 7 ; formation of Three 
Emperors' League by, 7—8 ; 
succeeds in policy of isolating 
France, 10. 

Bosnia, annexation of, by Austria- 
Hungary (1908), 30. 

Bridges, Colonel, conversation be- 
tween General Jungbluth and, 
152-153, 155. 

Bryan, W. J., American secretary 
of state, 216, 218, 220; resigna- 
tion of, 222. 

Buchanan. Sir G., views of, on 
Austro-Serbian crisis, 70. 

Bucharest, treaty of (1912), 38. 

Bulgaria, revolt of, from Turkey 
in 1876, 27; declared an au- 
tonomous state under treaty of 
San Stefano (1878), 28; by 
treaty of Berlin is made an au- 
tonomous principality tributarv 
to Turkey, 28-29; results to, of 



Index 



265 



Balkan Wars of, 1912-14, 37; 
dissatisfaction of, with treaty 
of Bucharest, 40 ; mercenary 
course of, upon outbreak of 
war of 1914, 203-206; war 
declared upon, by Entente pow- 
ers, 206, 

China, friction between Russia 
and Britain in, 15 ; foothold 
gained by Germany in, 161 ; 
Japan's request in 1914 that 
Germany withdraw from, 164- 
165. 

Concert of Europe, league of 
great powers known as, 4 ; 
duration of, 4 ; progress toward 
world peace made under, 4—5. 

Crimean War, Moldavia and 
Wallachia freed from Russian 
protectorate as result of, 26. 

Dardanelles, closing of, by Ger- 
man rather than Turkish or- 
ders, 175. 

Delcasse, Theophile, appointed 
French foreign minister, 17; 
brings about friendly relations 
between France and Great 
Britain, 17-18. 

Dernburg, Bernhard, defense of 
Germany's violation of Belgian 
neutrality by, 153-154. 

Diplomacy, inefficiency of Euro- 
pean, during Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 88. 

Dual Alliance, formed between 
Russia and France, 10. 

Ducarme, General, conversations 
between Colonel Barnardiston 
and, 150-152. 

Edward VII, influence of, in es- 
tablishing friendly relations be- 
tween Great Britain and 
France, 17. 

Egypt, arrangement between 
France and England as to 
(1904), 17; as a cause of 
trouble between Great Britain 
and Turkey, 176-177. 

Einstein. Lewis, cited as to Pots- 
dam Conference, 65. 

England, party to quadruple al- 
liance of 1815, 3; drops out of 
quadruple alliance, 4. See 
Great Britain. 

Entente Gordiale, establishment 
of, between Great Britain and 
France, 17-18 ; Russia and 
Japan become included in, 18- 
19. 



Fashoda, Marchand expedition to, 
16. 

France, effect on, of loss of Al- 
sace-Lorraine, 6—7 ; Bismarck's 
policy toward, 7; success 
of Bismarck's policy of iso- 
lation of, 10; forms Dual 
Alliance with Russia, 10 ; 
rivalry between Great Britain 
and, at end of 19th century, 
16 ; establishment of Entente 
Cordiale between Great Britain 
and, 17-18; attempted inter- 
ference of Germany with Mo- 
roccan policy of, 20-24; at- 
titude of, toward Austro-Hun- 
garian ultimatum to Serbia 
upon assassination of Archduke, 
70 ; asked by Germany to in- 
fluence Russia to moderation, 
in Austro-Serbian crisis, 89 ; 
attitude of, toward Germany's 
proposal, 89 ; acquitted of re- 
sponsibility for Great War, 99 ; 
immediate steps leading to war 
between Teutonic powers and, 
117-119; effort made 'by Ger- 
many to secure neutrality of, 
129-130; charged by Germany 
with intentions of marching 
through Belgium, 146, 153. 

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, as 
sassination of, 43. 

Franco-German War, results of 
6-7. 

Frankfort, treaty of (1871), 6 

Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium 
cited, 144; quoted, 159 n. 

Gerard, Ambassador, interview 
between Kaiser and, 240 
quoted on President Wilson's 
desire for peace, 245; difficul 
ties of, in Berlin, after rupture 
between Germany and Amer- 
ica, 250-251; cited on hostility 
of public sentiment in Germany 
against America, and on 
Kaiser's personal bitterness, 
261. 

Germany, policy of, as dictated by 
Bismarck, following Franco- 
German War, 7-9 ; forms Triple 
Alliance against Russia, 9 ; 
growth of rivalry between 
Great Britain and, 11 ; begin- 
ning of policy of economic 
penetration of Ottoman Em- 
pire, with building of Bagdad 
Railroad, 12-13 ; bad feeling 
toward, aroused in Great 
Britain by designs in Asia 



266 



Index 



Minor, 13-14; condition of 
Bagdad Railroad question at 
opening of Great War, 14 ; 
friction between Great Britain 
and, over rapid development of 
Germany's naval power, 14-15 ; 
defeat of attempt of, to inter- 
fere in French Moroccan policy, 
20-21 ; further controversy with 
France over Moroccan policy, 
21-22; devolopment qf rivalry 
between Russia and, in the 
Balkans, 29-31; supports Aus- 
tria-Hungary in Balkan pol- 
icy, 32; relation of, to af- 
fairs between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Serbia following as- 
sassination of Archduke, 61-68; 
counts on neutrality of Great 
Britain in Serbian crisis, 70 ; 
plan of, for solving war prob- 
lem in Austro-Serbian crisis, 
86-89 ; key to situation in Aus- 
tro-Serbian crisis said to have 
been held by, 94; declines to 
exercise influence over Austria, 
94; objection of, to Earl Grey's 
suggestion of mediation, by four 
powers, 95; shares with Aus- 
tria responsibility for Great 
War, 99-101 ; ratines Austria's 
promise to respect integrity of 
Serbia, 105 ; attitude toward ef- 
forts of the powers to isolate 
the war, 108-109; war de- 
clared between Russia and 
(August 1), 112; steps that led 
to mobilization in, 112-117; 
declaration of war between 
France and, 117-119; steps 
leading to declaration of war 
upon by Great Britain, 121 ff . ; 
seeks to keep Great Britain 
neutral, 124; effort made by, 
to secure neutrality of France, 
129-130; reasons given by, for 
violating Belgian neutrality, 
136; declaration of war 
against, by Great Britain, 140 ; 
violation of neutrality of Lux- 
emburg by, 140 ; bound by 
treaty of 1839 to observe neu- 
trality of Belgium, 143 ; argu- 
ments of, in defense of viola- 
tion of Belgian neutrality. 144— 
160; events leading to Japan's 
declaration of war against, 
161-165 ; course followed by, 
to win support of Turkey, 170- 
179; Italy declares war against, 
202; declares war on Portugal, 



207-208; causes leading to 
war between America and, 
213 ff.; proclamation issued by, 
declaring a war zone around 
British Isles, 213; protest of 
United States Government 
against proposed policy, 214— 
215; position taken by, re- 
garding protest of United 
States, 215-217; policy an- 
nounced by, a violation of in- 
ternational law, 217-219; Lusi- 
tania sinking and its conse- 
quences, 220—225 ; attitude of, 
in Arabic incident, 226-227; 
controversy with America over 
trade in arms and ammunition, 
228-232 ; disagreement over 
armed merchantmen, 232-237; 
the Sussex case, 237-243; 
statement of Emperor, as to in- 
ternational law no longer exist- 
ing, 240 ; outcome of Sussex 
case a diplomatic victory over, 
243; peace demands of (1917), 
247; entrance of, upon policy 
of unrestricted submarine war- 
fare, 248-249; breaking of re- 
lations between America and, 
249-250; resumption of unre- 
stricted submarine warfare by, 
251—252 ; reasons for declara- 
tion of war against, given in 
address by President Wilson, 
254-260; strength of feeling 
and hostile plans in, against 
America, prior to declaration 
of war, 260-261; war declared 
against, bv America (April 6, 
1917), 261-262. 

Goschen, Sir E., account of final 
interview with German chan- 
cellor, 137-139. 

Great Britain, isolated position of, 
between powers of the Triple 
and the Dual Alliance, 10—11 ; 
industrial and colonial rivalry 
between Germany and, 11—15; 
strained relations with Russia 
and France, 15-16 ; alliance 
with Japan due to Russian 
rivalry in Far East, 16; con- 
flicting interests with France 
in northern Africa, 16—17; 
friendly understanding brought 
about between France and, 17- 
18 ; steps leading to friendly re- 
lations with Russia, 18-19 ; de- 
clares a neutral attitude con- 
cerning Austro-Hungarian ul- 
timatum to Serbia, 70 ; not re- 



Index 



267 



sponsible for Great War, 99 ; 
steps leading to declaration of 
war on Teutonic powers, 121— 
140 ; declaration of war against 
Germany, and later against 
Austria, by, 140 ; promises aid 
to Belgium in case neutrality is 
violated, 152 ; intention of vio- 
lating neutrality of Belgium 
disavowed by, 156-160 ; deal- 
ings between Turkey and, lead- 
ing to break in relations, 165- 
179 ; reported agreement be- 
tween Italy and (May 9, 
1915), 200; use of American 
flag on vessels of, 218. 
Greece, steps leading to independ- 
ence of, 25-26. 
Greindl, Baron, dispatch from, to 
Belgian minister of foreign af- 
fairs, 153. 
Grey, Sir Edward, gives impres- 
sion that England will remain 
neutral in case of Austrian war 
with Serbia, 70 ; opinion of, as 
to proper course for Serbia to 
follow, 77; opinion of Serbia's 
reply to Austria, 84; asked by 
Germany to exercise moderating 
influence with Russia, 88 ; pol- 
icy of joint mediation proposed 
by, 89-90; asks Germany to 
use influence with Austria 
against war, 94; second pro- 
posal of, concerning arrange- 
ment of an agreement by four 
powers, 95 ; proposal of July 
31, looking to prevention of 
war between Russia and Aus- 
tria, 107; statement by, of 
British position as to taking 
part in possible European war, 
122-124; failure of, to give 
positive declaration of Great 
Britain's attitude concerning 
war between powers, 124-126; 
statement as to preservation of 
neutrality of Belgium, 126; 
negotiations between German 
ambassador and, 127-132; 
quoted on British protection of 
neutrality of Belgium, 156-157, 
158. 
Hague Tribunal, Franco-German 
dispute over Casablanca affair 
settled by, 22. 
Hayes, Political and Social His- 
tory of Modern Europe, cited, 
12, 18, 19, 23, 32, 34. 
Hazen, Europe Since 1815, cited, 
24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 162. 



Hertslet, The Map of Europe by 

Treaty, cited, 144. 
Herzegovina, annexation of, by 

Austria-Hungary (1908), 30. 

Internationalism, significance of, 
as opposed to nationalism, 5 ; 
becomes allied with despotism, 
5 ; lost opportunity of, 6. 

International law, Germany's sub- 
marine policy concerning neu- 
tral vessels a violation of, 217- 
219; provisions of, regarding 
trade by a neutral in military 
supplies, 228-232 ; Kaiser's 
statement as to non-existence of, 
240. 

Italy, reasons of, for becoming a 
member of Triple Alliance, 9 ; 
attitude of, in Austro- Serbian 
crisis, 90—91 ; effect of war with 
Turkey in 1911-12 on rela- 
tions of, to Triple Alliance, 
180 ; weakening of feeling of, 
for Triple Alliance, for decade 
before Great War. 180 ; re- 
mains neutral upon breaking 
out of European war, 181; 
progress of events leading to 
declaration of war against 
Austria, 181-202; declaration 
of war against Germany by, 
202. 

Jagow, Von, German foreign 
minister, 215-216, 240, 241; 
sincerity of, in friendship for 
America, 245. 

Japan, alliance between Great 
Britain and, 16; joins sides 
with Triple Entente, 19; 
treaties between England and, 
161-162 ; conduct of, at open- 
ing of European war, 162 ; 
conduct of, at opening of Euro- 
pean war, 162 ; ultimatum 
sent to Germany, regarding 
withdrawal from Orient, 163- 
165 ; declares war on Germany, 
165 ; Austria breaks relations 
with, 165; Germany's plans for 
embroiling United States and, 
as revealed by Zimmermann 
note, 253. 

Joint mediation plan proposed by 
Earl Grey in Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 89—90 ; approved by Rus- 
sia. Italy, and France, 90. 

Jungbluth, General, conversation 
between Colonel Bridges and, 
152-153, 155. 



268 



Index 



Kato, Baron, Japanese foreign 
minister, speech by, quoted, 
163-165. 

Kiaochou, held by Germany, 
161 ; Japan demands Ger- 
many's withdrawal from, 165. 

Lansing, Robert, American secre- 
tary of state, 222-227, 233; 
error made by, in armed mer- 
chant controversy, 234; ar- 
raigns Germany for whole sub- 
marine policy, 238-239. 

Law, A. Bonar, letter to Asquith, 
quoted, 133. 

Lichnowsky, Prince, reference 
made by, to Potsdam Confer- 
ence of July 5, 1914, 64; cited 
on responsibility of Central 
powers for the war, 99, 100 ; 
negotiations between Sir Ed- 
ward Grey and, 127-131. 

London, treaty of (1913), 37 

London, Declaration of, 214. 

Lusitania, sinking of the, 220. 

Luxemburg, violation of neutral- 
ity of, by Germany, 140 ; dif- 
ference between relations of 
Great Britain to, and her rela- 
tions to Belgium, 140. 

Mallet, Sir Louis, cited as to 
Germany's responsibility for 
Turkish raid on Odessa, 177. 

Marchand affair, 16-17. 

Marne, effect of battle of, on 
German desires regarding Tur- 
key, 171 n. 

Mesopotamia, proposed develop- 
ment of, by Germany, 12. 

Metternich, reactionary influence 
of, 5. 

Mexico, German plans for em- 
broiling United States and, 253. 

Mobilization, steps that led to 
Russian and German (1914), 
112-118. 

Moltke, General von, present at 
Potsdam Conference, 65. 

Monroe Doctrine, not recognized 
by Germany, 261. 

Montenegro, disposition of, under 
treaties of San Stefano and 
Berlin, 28 ; declares war on 
Austria-Hungary and Germany 
(August, 1914), 120. 

Morgenthau, Ambassador, testi- 
mony of, as to Potsdam Con- 
ference, 65-67 ; cited concern- 
ing mobilization of Turkish 
forces under direction of Ger- 



man generals, 167 n. ; on the 
sale of German war vessels to 
Turkey, 168 ; on hostility of 
Turkish press to Entente pow- 
ers, 170; on effect of battle of 
Marne on relations between 
Germany and Turkey, 171 n.; 
on the closing of the Darda- 
nelles by Germany, 175. 
Morocco, friction between Ger- 
many and France over, 20-24. 



Nationalism, meaning of, 5 ; allied 
with liberalism, 5 ; responsibil- 
ity of, for war of 1914, 6. 

Naval power, friction with Eng- 
land caused by rapid develop- 
ment of Germany's, 14-15. 

Navarino, defeat of Turks in 
naval battle of, 25. 

North German Gazette, denial by, 
of holding of conference at 
Potsdam on July 5, 1914, 63; 
quoted on negotiations be- 
tween Sir Edward Grey and 
German ambassador, 128; de- 
fense of Germany's violation of 
Belgian neutrality by, 153-154. 

Odessa, German responsibility for 
Turkish raid on, 177-178. 

Pashitch, Serbian prime minister, 
on public sentiment concern- 
ing assassination of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, 46-47. 

Peace overtures of winter of 
1916-17, 245, 247. 

Persia, steps taken by Great 
Britain in, to block Bagdad 
Railroad scheme, 13 ; clash of 
British and . Russian interests 
in, 15 ; agreements between 
Great Britain and Russia as to 
relations with, 18. 

Portugal, sympathies of, with Al- 
lied cause in European war, 
206-207; Teutonic powers de- 
clare war upon, 208 

Potsdam Conference of July 5, 
1914, 63-67. 

Prussia, party to quadruple al- 
liance of 1815, 3. 

Prussian-American treaty of 1799, 
143. 

Quadruple Alliance of 1815, 3. 
Quintuple Treaty, guaranteeing 

neutrality of Belgium (1839), 

143. 



Index 



269 



Rogers, America's Case Against 
Germany, cited, 214, 218, 226, 
233, 243, 244, 251. 

Rumania, races found in princi- 
pality of, 26; results to, of 
Balkan wars of 1912-14, 38; 
position at opening of European 
war, 208-209; joins sides with 
Allies, 209. 

Russia, party to quadruple alli- 
ance of 1815, 3; a member of 
Three Emperors' League, 7—8 ; 
rivalry of Austria and, in the 
Balkans, 8 ; diplomatic victory 
of Austria over, by revised 
treaty of San Stefano, 98 ; Bis- 
marck aids Austria against, 8 ; 
alliance of Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, and Italy against, 9 ; 
Dual Alliance formed between 
France and, 10 ; treaties signed 
between Great Britain and, con- 
cerning Persian protectorates, 
13 ; withdrawal of opposition of, 
to Bagdad Railroad, 14; agree- 
ments made in 1907 between 
Great Britain and, 18-19 ; con- 
tinued rivalry between Teutonic 
powers and, in the Balkans, 
28-31; Germany supports Aus- 
tria-Hungary against, 31-32; 
hostility oJE, toward Austria- 
Hungary increased by Austria's 
attitude in Balkan wars of 
1912-14, 36; takes stand 
against Austro-Hungarian de- 
mands on Serbia following as- 
sassination of Archduke, 69 ; 
seeks support of Great Britain, 
69—71 ; refusal of request made 
by, to Austria, that time limit 
set by ultimatum to Serbia be 
extended, 73-75 ; plan of, for 
preventing war in Austro-Ser- 
bian crisis, 87; effort made by 
Germany to secure neutrality 
of, 88 ; mobilizes forces, but 
shows anxiety to avoid a con- 
flict, 92 ; negotiations of, with 
Austria. 96-99 ; acquitted of re- 
sponsibility for Great War, 99 ; 
determination of. to stand by 
Serbia, 102, efforts of other 
powers to prevent war between 
Austria and, 102-103 ; final of- 
fer made to Austria bv (July 
30), 110; war declared be- 
tween Germany and (August 
1), 112; steps that led to mob- 
ilization in 112-117; Austria 
declares war on, 117; events 



leading to break in relation* 
with Turkey, 177-179. 

San Stefano, treaty of (1878), 8, 
27-28. 

Sazonof, Russian foreign minis- 
ter, views of, on Austro-Serbian 
crisis, 69-71, 72 ff. 

Serbia, early history of, 25; 
achieves independence, 28; ill 
treatment of, by Austria-Hun- 
gary, 32 ; results to, of wars 
with Turkey in 1912-14, 33- 
40 ; state of relations between 
Austria-Hungary and, in 1914, 
43 ; attitude of press, people, 
and government of, concerning 
assassination of Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, 43-51 ; ulti- 
matum sent to, by Austria- 
Hungary, in note of July 23, 
1914, 52-57; responsibility of 
Germany for Austrian ultima- 
tum to, 63-67 ; attitude of, 
upon receiving the Austro-Hun- 
garian note, 68 ; moderate re- 
ply of, to Austrian note, 78- 
83 ; failure of reply of, to sat- 
isfy Austria, and consequent 
rupture of diplomatic relations, 
84-85 ; reported inevitability 
of war being thrust upon, by 
Austria, 93 ; war declared 
against, by Austria, 98. 

Stowell, The Diplomacy of the 
War of 1914, cited and quoted, 
9, 18, 31, 143, 144. 

Submarines, opening of contro- 
versy over, between Germany 
and United States, 213-21.7; 
use of, against neutral vessels 
a violation of international 
law, 217-219; American lives 
and vessels lost in sinkings by, 
219 n. ; sinking of the Lusi- 
tania, 220; America's firm 
stand in regard to sinkings by, 
235-243 ; division of sentiment 
in Germany on use of, 244- 
245 ; entrance by Germany 
upon unrestricted use of, 248— 
249. 

Sussex case, the, 237-243. 

Three Emperors' League, forma- 
tion of, 7-8; falls into abey- 
ance, 8. 

Times, London, quoted on nego- 
tiations between Sir Edward 
Grey and German ambassador, 
127; quoted on points which 



270 



Index 



decided British policy toward 
the war, 132-135; quoted on 
British view of neutrality of 
Belgium, 156, 159. 

Times, New York, cited concern- 
ing failure of Germany and 
England to reach agreement as 
to limitation of naval arma- 
ments, 15 ; on German an- 
nouncement as to armed mer- 
chantmen, 225 n. 

Tirpitz, Admiral von, present at 
Potsdam Conference, 65 ; ad- 
vocate of ruthless submarine 
warfare, 244; boasts of, regard- 
ing payment of indemnity by 
America, 261. 

Triple Alliance, formation of, 9- 
10 ; weakening of, by Turco- 
Italian War of 1911-12, 180; 
articles of, affecting Italy's ob- 
ligations in European war, 
182 n. 

Triple Entente, steps leading up 
to, 17-19. 

Turkey, effects of treaty of San 
Stef ano upon, 8 ; beginning of 
Germany's policy of economic 
penetration of, 12—3 ; history of 
early activities of, in Balkans, 
24—25; Greece becomes inde- 
pendent of, 25-26; German 
support of, against Russia, 29— 
30 ; wars between Balkan 
states and, in 1912-14, 32- 
40 ; events determining course 
of, in European war, 165-179 ; 
breaks relations with Entente 
powers, 179. 



Vienna, rearrangement of map of 
Europe at Congress of (1814- 
15), 3. 



Wangenheim, Baron, testimony 
of, concerning Potsdam Con- 
ference, 64-67; activities of, in 
Turkey after opening of war, 
168, 170, 171. 

William II, Emperor of Germany, 
conference held by, at Potsdam 
(July 5, 1914), 63-66; inter- 
views between Ambassador 
Gerard and, 240, 261; bitter- 
ness shown against United 
States by, 261. 

Wilson, President, firm policy of, 
regarding rights of Americans 
to travel on the seas, 235—236, 
239; desire of, for peace 
(1916), 245; notes concerning 
peace terms sent to warring na- 
tions by, 246; speech of Janu- 
ary 22, 1917, setting forth 
principles of a just settlement, 
247 ; effect on Germany of re- 
election of, in regard to Amer- 
ica's staying out of war, 248 ; 
forced to break relations with 
Germany, 249-250; policy of, 
following break with Germany, 
251-254; address of, before 
Congress, advising declaration 
of war, 254-260. 



Zimmermann note, projects 
Germany revealed by, 253. 



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